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2Abstract
This thesis is concerned with estimating the impacts of employment and training 
programs w ithout the use of random assignment. It reviews the literature on 
the American CETA programs that led researchers to conclude that random  
assignment was needed to produce useful estimates.
It reports an investigation of selection bias that yields four findings. It is possible 
to test for selection bias in the absence of random assignment. Pre-program tests 
for selection bias are not valid. Selection bias due to unmeasurables is small. 
Controlling for changes in major explanatory variables such as pre-program 
employment is crucial. It shows that the CETA data were inadequate to control 
for these changes.
This thesis reports the finding that 25% non-response in a survey can lead to 
qualitative changes in the estimates of program impact. It illustrates the way in 
which undetected non-linearities can bias estimates.
It reports estimates of the impacts of a range of programs. Wage subsidies w ith 
the private sector have a large (ten percentage points) sustained beneficial 
impact on subsequent welfare dependence and employment. On-the-job 
training in community projects (make-work) has no long-term impact on welfare 
dependence or employment. Within classroom training, upgrading (adult basic 
education) has no impact on subsequent welfare dependence. Vocational 
training has a large (15 to 20 percentage points), and sustained beneficial impact 
on subsequent welfare dependence. The job club studied in this thesis had a 
significant short term beneficial impact, but no long term impact.
3Notice to Readers
The opinions expressed in this thesis are those of the author, and do not 
necessarily represent the official policies or positions of the the British Columbia 
Ministry of Social Services, the British Columbia government, Human Resources 
Development Canada, or any other organization.
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1. Introduction
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This thesis addresses the issue of estimating the impacts of employment and 
training programs for disadvantaged workers without the use of random  
assignment. This issue is important for three reasons. First, employment and 
training programs are of wide policy interest. If they are effective, they can 
return individuals to employment thereby simultaneously reducing poverty, 
reducing government expenditure and increasing government revenue. Second, 
random  assignment studies in the United States have shown that at least some 
programs are ineffective and that programs with identical descriptions can have 
very different impacts ( See e.g. SRDC/MDRC 1995). Third, while these two 
findings point to the need for estimates of impacts of programs as they operate 
in other jurisdictions, it might not be possible to use random  assignment to 
produce the estimates because random  assignment is difficult to implement, 
raises difficult ethical issues, and may not produce results that are generalisable. 
(See e.g. Heckman, and Smith, 1993a and 1993b and Heckman, Clements and 
Smith, 1993)
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This thesis contributes new facts both about the effectiveness of employment and 
training programs for welfare recipients in British Columbia, Canada and about 
the data that is needed to produce reliable estimates. The findings in brief are as 
follows.
• On-the-job training placements with private sector firms have large, 
sustained beneficial impacts on the employment and welfare dependence of 
participants. Even three and four years after the placement, roughly ten 
percentage points more participants were independent of welfare than would 
have been expected in the absence of the program.
• On-the-job training placements in temporary public sector projects had 
very little impact on welfare dependence in the medium to long run. Beyond 18 
months after placement in this type of program, less than 3 percentage points 
more participants were independent of welfare than would have been expected 
in the absence of the program.
• Job clubs had a small, short-term beneficial impact on welfare 
dependence.
• Adult basic education had no beneficial impact on the subsequent welfare 
dependence of enrolees.
• Vocational training had a large, long-term beneficial impact on the 
welfare dependence of participants. Four to five years after enrolling, 10 to 15 
percentage points fewer enrolees in short duration (less than one year) programs 
were dependent on welfare than would have been expected in the absence of the 
program. Longer programs (two years) had an even larger impact (20 
percentage points after 5 years).
These estimates were produced using a variety of techniques. In each case the 
value of the variable of interest, (welfare dependence, Unemployment Insurance 
dependence, or employment) averaged across program participants, was
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compared with the value of the same variable, averaged across non participants. 
The groups of non participants used were variously:
• a control group (the remainder of a group of welfare recipients from 
which program participants were randomly selected);
• welfare recipients as identified by administrative data, but who had not 
participated in a training program; and
• welfare recipients, identified by Ministry staff as likely candidates for 
employment and training programs, but who did not participate.
Measured differences between program participants and the comparison groups 
were controlled for variously by regression analysis and by collecting the non 
participants into groups with similar characteristics and weighting the within- 
group averages by the number of participants who would have belonged to that 
group. (The latter technique is often referred to as cell matching.)
The central methodological issue in the production of estimates without the use 
of random  assignment is selection bias. Are the differences in outcomes the 
result of program participation, or the result of unmeasured characteristics that 
are correlated both with program participation and the outcome variable? Five 
separate tests were conducted to estimate the extent to which selection bias 
would affect these results. The tests indicate that:
• with the data used, and with the selection mechanism used for these 
programs, the amount of selection bias is less than five percentage points. In 
most cases the bias results in an over-estimate of program impact.
This thesis provides detail on the way in which these estimates were produced 
in the next chapters. The rest of this chapter provides background in four
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sections. The first section describes the income support system and economy of 
British Columbia. The second section describes the programs which are the 
subject of analysis, and the third section provides a road map to the rest of the 
thesis.
1.1 Background on British Columbia__________________________
British Columbia (BC) is Canada's westernmost province, third largest in size 
and population. Although it covers roughly four times the area of Great Britain, 
its population is only 3.5 million. The vast majority of its people live in the 
south-western part of the province where the climate is comparable to the 
climate of southern England.
1.1.1 Income Support System Overview
Income support in Canada is provided through several separate systems. For 
those aged 18 to 64 the two principal systems are the federally administered 
Unemployment Insurance (UI) system and provincial welfare systems. UI 
provides a relatively high level of benefits to workers who have recently left 
their jobs. Currently, (March 1994) people qualify for UI if they have worked for 
a minimum of from 12 to 20 weeks within the previous 52 weeks. Minimum 
requirements vary with the regional1 unemployment rate. Having qualified they 
receive benefits equal to 55% of their insurable earnings2 for from 20 to 50 weeks 
depending on the unemployment rate and the number of weeks worked. 
Average UI benefits per week were $258.63 in August 1993 [Statistics Canada 73- 
001].
1 Statistics Canada estimates an unemployment rate for about 60 economic regions for this 
purpose.
2 UI claimants with dependants and low family income may receive benefits equal to 60% of 
insurable earnings. Currently the maximum insurable earnings is $780 per week. For 
comparison, Statistics Canada reported average weekly earnings, industrial aggregate $563.07 in 
August 1993 [Statistics Canada 72-002].
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Those who don 't qualify for and those who have exhausted their UI m ust rely on 
provincially-administered3 welfare systems for income support. Eligibility for 
welfare is needs tested (assets and income must be below prescribed limits) and 
benefits are based on family size and structure. Average welfare benefits in 
British Columbia in August 1993 were $695 per case per month, roughly 60% of 
Unemployment Insurance benefits.
1.1.2 Trends in Welfare Since 1980
Figure 1-1 shows the dramatic increase in welfare caseload in British Columbia 
since 1982. However, this is only part of the story. The characteristics of the
caseload have also changed markedly over the past decade.
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Figure 1-1 Welfare caseload, 1980 to present
In August 1980 there were 63,004 welfare cases in BC, excluding the 
handicapped4 and the aged. At that time, the majority were not considered to 
have good prospects for employment:
• 37,029 were classified as unemployable5
3 The federal government shares in the cost of the provincial welfare system and sets 
guidelines. For example, provinces must provide appeal mechanisms and cannot require 
participation in any program as a condition of receipt of benefits.
4 to be classified as handicapped, dients must, in the opinion of a physidan, be permanently
unable to hold employment.
__________________________Introduction__________________
Of those classified as employable 5,281 were single parents.
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The remainder, 20,694 cases was less than a quarter of the 88,000 unemployed in 
1980 as measured by Statistics Canada using the Labour Force Survey [Statistics 
Canada, 71-201,1988, annual average] and less than one third of the 65,000 who 
received UI in 1980 [Statistics Canada 73-001]. But with the recession of the early 
80's the num ber of employables tripled, reaching 75,859 in August 1986. The 
ratio of employable people on welfare to the number of unemployed had 
increased to more than .4.
This trend has continued with the recession of the early 90's. In August 1993 
there were 130,187 cases headed by an applicant who was classified as 
employable compared with an average of 107,650 who received regular benefits 
under Unemployment Insurance program and 163,000 total unemployed as 
estimated by Statistics Canada based on the monthly Labour Force Survey6. In
5 The definition of "unemployable" changes frequently. For single parents, it depends on the 
ages of their dependent children. For others it depends on their ability to hold employment. 
Before 1989 this determination was made by Ministry employees, financial assistance workers. 
After 1989 this determination was made by a physician. This is not a particularly meaningful 
variable. For example a derelict might not be willing to approach a physician to secure the 
necessary certificate, and so would be dassified as employable. As a result people in the 
Ministry refer to an individual as "job-ready" rather than employable if they wish to indicate 
that an individual is suitable for employment.
‘ We cannot tell what percentage of the LFS unemployed receive welfare and what percentage 
receive UI directly because self declaration of welfare under-reports welfare by half (according 
to documentation that comes with the Survey of Consumer Finances micro data tapes.) 
Nonetheless, we can produce a rough estimate by a roundabout means. There are three reasons 
why the number of UI redpients plus the number of welfare recipients exceeds the number of 
unemployed.
1. About 14,000 cases received both welfare and UI simultaneously. This includes those who 
receive welfare while awaiting their UI (10,000) and those who receive a top-up to their UI 
(4,000).
2. a number of individuals on welfare are working and therefore would not be reported as 
unemployed in the labour force survey. About 24,000 declare earnings each month. In 
August 1993 17,000 employable cases closed. Very few of the closing cases will have been 
unemployed in August. They received benefits as a result of reporting delays.
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1993 over 300,000 different cases7 were paid welfare benefits although the 
average number of cases per month was 165,648. As these numbers imply, the 
caseload of welfare recipients is not static. In fact, in BC 75% of welfare spells 
were shorter than 6 months (Cragg 1994).
1.1.3 Trends in British Columbia's Economy
The province is extensively forested, and the presence of this natural resource is 
reflected in the economy. More than one third of manufacturing employm ent is 
related to wood products, including pulp and paper. However, employm ent in 
this field proved to be volatile and vulnerable to automation in the 80's and this 
has had significant implications for the provision of welfare in BC.
Housing starts in the United States fell from a high of over two million per year 
in 1978 to 1.1 million in 1981. (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1983, Table No. 328.) 
Wood products production in BC followed this trend and although employment 
in the wood products industry followed the trend down, it did not follow it up  
again. In 1981 59,000 people were employed in the wood products industry. 
This fell to 43,000 in 1982, and although by 1985 production, at 77 million cubic 
metres exceeded pre-recession levels, employment remained low at 40,000 
(Central Statistics Bureau, 1991).
3. a number of individuals would not have reported actively seeking employment to the
labour force survey and so would not be counted as unemployed. About 17,000 employable 
welfare recipients reported participating in training programs.
Combining these, ignoring overlap, accounts for 72,000 of the 75,000 difference between the sum 
of employable welfare plus regular UI and total unemployed. These numbers suggest that 
roughly two thirds of the LFS unemployed received UI, 44% received welfare and 10% received 
both.
7 Excludes Handicapped, and those over 60 years of age.
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A study* of sawmill workers found that 56% of them read at a grade 4 level or 
less9 indicating that this group of workers would be particularly vulnerable in 
the event of a permanent layoff.
Although employment in the primary industries and manufacturing only m ade 
up 21.4 % of total employment in 1980, the economy, as measured by the GDP, 
reflected this pattern. It fell dramatically between 1981 and 1983, but had 
regained its pre-recession level by 1985.
The state of the economy relative to the rest of Canada also shows up in the 
migration statistics. In-migration from the rest of Canada fell between 1980 and 
1986, and has grown since.
When it had become apparent that the nature of welfare had changed, the 
governm ent moved to increase access to training programs. In September 1985 
federal, provincial and territorial ministers responsible for social services 
(including welfare) agreed in principle10 to new means of funding programs 
designed to provide welfare recipients with employment training and work 
experience. The agreement was implemented in April 1986 in BC by a letter of 
understanding signed by two federal ministers (National Health and Welfare 
and Employment and Immigration) and two provincial ministers (Human 
Resources and Labour)11. In a separate document, federal officials offered 
funding for enhancements to evaluations of these initiatives.
' Unpublished study by the BC Council of Forest Industries and the International 
Woodworkers of America 
’While working in a logging camp, one of my co-workers told of taking an aptitude test at a 
Canada Employment Centre. "I must have done very badly," he said, "She just looked at me 
and said, "You're going to have to be a logger.'"
10 This agreement is generally known as The Four Comers Agree?neiit.
"Despite reorganisations affecting all four departments, the agreement remains in place.
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1.2 Description of Programs_________________________________
Two new types of program were implemented as a result of the letter of 
understanding: on-the-job training in private sector positions and on-the-job 
training in public sector positions. These supplemented two other types of 
program  that were available to welfare recipients at the time: classroom training, 
mainly through community colleges, and job clubs.
The range and nature of programs offered to welfare recipients varies 
considerably from year to year as political direction and the ministry responsible 
for implementing the programs change. However, the programs did remain 
relatively constant between 1988 and 1991. This section describes the programs 
as they existed in that period.
1.2.1 On-the-Job Training: Private Sector
British Columbia's on-the-job training program with the private sector offered 
private-sector employers a subsidy if they would hire and train welfare 
recipients. The subsidy was equal to half the wage, to a maximum of $3.50 per 
hour. In practice this led to most of the positions being filled at a wage very 
close to $7.00 per hour. The minimum wage in 1987 was $4.00 per hour. (This 
was raised to $4.50 in 1988, $4.75 in 1989, and $5.00 in 1990.) The average weekly 
earnings in BC, April 1989 was $483. (Statistics Canada 72-002)
Only full time positions were eligible for the subsidy, and the employer was 
required to certify that the creation of the subsidised position would not result in 
the layoff of any existing employee. The subsidy could last from two to twelve 
months, and there was a presumption that the employee would remain with the 
employer after the subsidy had ended.
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The training positions were generated by Ministry employees who would 
approach businesses either individually or in groups (e.g. Chamber of 
Commerce meetings) and appeal to them to open positions for welfare recipients 
in exchange for the subsidy. The limiting factor seemed to be the num ber of 
employers who were willing to open positions for the program. At its peak, this 
program  provided positions for about 6,000 welfare recipients, about 2% of the 
270,000 cases open at some point in 1991/92. Similarly its $12 million budget 
was about 1% of the total welfare budget.
1.2.2 On-the-Job Training: Public Sector
At the same time British Columbia had three programs that offered welfare 
recipients employment with on-the-job training on government projects. The 
Ministry of Social Services supplied the wages (up to $7 an hour for labourers 
and up to $10 an hour for supervisors), the employers' contributions to employee 
benefits, and an additional amount for administrative overhead. The positions 
normally lasted six months but were sometimes extended to 12 months.
I Table 1-1: Public Sector Programs (1991/92)Clients Budget 1 
($M)
CTETP 961 5.3
PEP 508 4.1
EYC 350 3.0
Total 1819 12.4
The three programs were as follows:
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• The Community Tourism Employment Training Program (CTETP) 
funded work with non-profit organisations on community tourism development.
Projects included heritage site restorations, parks development, and festival 
start-ups.
• The Forest Enhancement Program (FEP) funded work on silviculture 
projects throughout the province. The FEP was administered by the Ministry of 
Forests.
• The Environment Youth Corps (Income Assistance Component EYC) 
funded work for welfare recipients aged 17-24 on such outdoor projects as trail 
improvement and salmon enhancement. The EYC was operated in conjunction 
with the Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks.
These three public-sector programs taken together had a budget comparable to 
the budget of the Employment Opportunity Program, but they assisted only 
about one-quarter the number of people. Fewer than one percent of all Income 
Assistance recipients participated in the public-sector programs, and the average 
cost of the program was about $6800 per participant.
1.2.3 Classroom Training
The Ministry refers welfare recipients to educational and vocational classroom 
training programs as employment preparation. Funding for tuition is provided 
by the Ministry, by the federal government, and by student grants and loans. 
Community colleges, institutes and universities receive general funding equal to 
about five times the tuition. Typically, the participant would be required to take 
out a student loan to cover tuition and the cost of books, while the Ministry 
would continue to provide welfare benefits. However in some circumstances, at 
the discretion of the worker, the Ministry might pay the tuition and or expenses 
directly. The training programs are provided mainly by community colleges
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and institutes. In 1991/92, more than 20,000 recipients registered for these 
courses. The Ministry's contribution to tuition and books was about $3 million.
In this thesis, analysis focuses on individuals who received welfare benefits in 
August or September 1986 and who enrolled in Camosun College in September 
1986. An information sharing arrangement with Camosun made it possible to 
estimate the impact of four separate types of classroom training.
• Vocational training: 6-12 months in duration, e.g. plumbing, welding, 
secretarial, dental hygienist;
• Career Technical Training: 24 months in duration, e.g. criminal justice, 
visual arts, electronic technology;
• Adult Basic Education: from basic literacy and numeracy to high school 
equivalence; and
• Academic: university transfer courses.
1.2.4 Job Clubs
The Ministry of Social Services has given the name Job Action to its job search 
assistance initiatives. Job Action encompasses a range of short programs of the 
kind called "job clubs" found widely across Canada and the United States. Their 
purpose is to improve the intensity and effectiveness of the job search of 
job-ready welfare recipients. The Job Action programs, which run up  to five 
weeks in length, combine classroom learning with actual job search. Participants 
learn to assess their skills, obtain job interviews, and present themselves 
effectively in interviews. They also receive an allowance of up to $150 for 
program-related expenses such as transportation, clothing, and personal 
grooming. Job Action is brief, inexpensive, and targeted at recipients with no 
apparent barriers to immediate employment.
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The Job Action programs in 1991/92 had total expenditures of $3 million, a total 
enrolment of 6,233 recipients, and a cost per participant of about $480.
This thesis reports on only one job club, the Region A Job Action Pilot Project. 
Random assignment of participants was an integral part of the project.
1.2.5 Origins of this study
The work reported in this thesis had its origins in the 1985 Canadian federal- 
provincial Four Corners Agreement on training for welfare recipients. 
Implementation of the agreement in BC in 1986 resulted in the development of 
new training programs and called for greater emphasis on evaluation. Funding 
for the evaluation of these programs was offered by the federal government in 
December 1986, and a successful application was made by BC in 1987. Over the 
subsequent five years, the federal government contributed over one-half million 
dollars to the support of the evaluation of these training programs.
1.3 Roadmap____________________________________________
The environment in which this study was born was affected by the Americans' 
experience in estimating the impacts of the Comprehensive Employment 
Training Act (CETA) programs. There, different researchers, using the same 
data, and trying to estimate the impacts of the same programs, came up with 
qualitatively different results. Selection bias was identified as the culprit. For 
this reason, the second chapter of this thesis provides a review of the literature 
relating to the CETA studies.
There have been a number of recent attempts to assess and deal with the 
selection bias problem. Chapter 3 provides a summary.
Introduction 27
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the BC study, including a description of the 
conceptual framework, a description of the data, and a description of the 
approach taken. It also includes a preview of the results.
Experts advised the US Department of Labor to address the selection bias 
problem by relying more heavily on random assignment in the estimation of 
impacts of programs, but for reasons which are beyond the scope of this thesis, 
random  assignment was not a practical alternative in British Columbia. 
Nonetheless, the failure of top flight researchers such as Ashenfelter and 
Heckman to bring about consensus on the impacts of CETA programs, combined 
with a prohibition on the use of random assignment, dictated that the question 
of selection bias be addressed head on. This is done in Chapter 5, "Is Selection 
Bias the Bogeyman?" It finds that the worst problems in the CETA studies 
resulted from the use of annual data. It also reports the results of a num ber of 
tests for selection bias which, given the data and selection mechanism in BC, 
indicate that selection bias is less than five percentage points. An implicit 
conclusion of the chapter is that selection bias is devilishly tricky.
Estimates of impact are presented in Chapters 6 (on-the-job training in the 
private sector) and Chapter 7 (all other programs).
Chapter 8 provides a short summary and recaps the conclusions.
1.4 Summary______________________________________________
This chapter provided an introduction to the thesis. It provided background for 
the thesis by describing the income support system that exists in the province, 
and trends in welfare dependence and in the economy as a whole. It also 
described the four types of program that will be the subject of analysis: wage
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subsidy in the private sector, temporary employment in community projects, 
classroom training and job clubs.
2. Lessons from CETA
29
The literature relating to the methods used to estimate the impact of the 
American Comprehensive Employment Training Act (CETA) programs is not 
encouraging to those who wish to estimate the impact of employment and 
training programs, but who cannot use random assignment to do so. Many 
estimates of the impact of CETA programs were published but although they 
started with the same data and were estimating the impact of the same 
programs, the estimates showed an alarming lack of consistency. They seemed 
to be quite sensitive to model specification. For example, Ashenfelter and Card 
found that "different models lead to very different estimates of training effects." 
and concluded "that randomised clinical trials are necessary to reliably 
determine program effects." [Ashenfelter and Card, 1985, pages 659,648]
The US Department of Labor (DOL), with responsibility for administering 
CETA, and its successor, the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA, 1982) was at 
the centre of the controversy. It responded by striking a panel of experts to 
recommend methods of estimating the impacts of JTPA programs. The panel, 
with the sesquipedalian name, Job Training Longitudinal Survey Research 
Advisory Panel, concluded
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State-of-the-art statistical techniques simply cannot overcome 
certain data or design problems. [Stromsdorfer et al., 1985 page III- 
J-58]
and recommended that the DOL put its non-experimental data collection efforts 
on hold and estimate the impact of the Job Training Partnership Act programs 
using a limited number of classical experiments1.
2.1.1 Road Map
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the difficulty that researchers had in 
estimating the impact of the CETA programs. It reviews the literature that led to 
the Panel's conclusion that even very sophisticated statistical methods are 
unsuccessful in dealing with selection bias. Developments subsequent to the 
Panel's recommendations are reviewed in Chapter 3, and the reasons for the 
ongoing problems with selection bias are explored in Chapter 5.
A subsidiary goal of this chapter is to glean information that would be useful in 
an observational study. Specifically, the chapter will also
• describe a number of methods of approaching the selection bias problem, 
and
• identify sources of frailty of non-experimental estimates of the impact of 
employment and training programs.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. The next section, headed Background, 
gives a brief description of the data used to estimate the impact of the CETA
'Classical experiment is used here to refer to a study in which estimates are produced using 
random assignment. The term non-experimental is used to refer to studies that estimate impacts 
without using random assignment.
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programs and describes the challenge of selection bias. This is followed by a 
section that reports the Panel's recommendations and the Panel’s findings on the 
success that researchers had had in addressing selection bias. Next come short 
descriptions of eight studies that influenced the panel, each headed by the 
author's name. The concluding section summarises the lessons learned.
2.1.2 Background
The Job Partnership Act (JTPA) was enacted in 1982 to replace the 
Comprehensive Employment Training Act of 1974 as the principal vehicle for 
employment and training programs for unemployed and disadvantaged 
workers in the United States. The JTPA required the U.S. Department of Labor 
(DOL), which administered the Act, to "evaluate the effectiveness of programs 
authorised under this act." [JTPA Section 454 (a).]
In order to meet its evaluation obligations under the earlier Comprehensive 
Employment Training Act (CETA), the DOL had assembled an impressive 
collection of data on participants and non-participants. The CETA data set had 
three components:
• the Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey (CLMS),
• the Current Population Survey (CPS) for March of each year and
• Social Security Administration earnings data.
The CLMS captured data on a sample of CETA enrolees shortly after they 
enrolled and two or three times later. The CPS collected demographic and 
labour market data for a sample of the general population. Annual earnings 
reported to the Social Security Administration, beginning in 1951, (referred to in 
most of the studies as SSA earnings) were added to these sets of data to produce 
longitudinal earnings records for all individuals on the file.
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These data could be used to estimate the impact of the CETA programs on the 
earnings of participants in the following manner. The CLMS would identify 
participants in the programs and collect information on characteristics thought to 
affect their earnings. The CPS would collect similar information on non­
participants, and SSA records would provide information on earnings on both 
groups, both before and after program participation. Impacts on earnings would 
be estimated by the difference in post-program SSA earnings between the 
participants and the comparison group, after statistical techniques had been used 
to control for differences between characteristics and pre-program earnings 
histories.
Although the data are impressive, they have 3 major limitations:
1) The earnings data are annual, and so do not give information on earnings 
fluctuations within the year.
2) The CPS file does not have information on location, so it was not possible to 
match participants with non-participants in the same labour market.
3) Participants were not necessarily excluded from the sample of non 
participants.
The U.S. DOL commissioned a number of studies to produce estimates of the 
impact of the CETA programs, and the Congressional Budget Office 
commissioned a separate study. All started with the same data, but many came 
up  with substantially different results. Although some of the differences can be
Lessons from CETA 33
attributed to different samples2 there remained unexplained differences. These 
remaining differences were felt to be due to selection bias.
2.1.3 Selection Bias
Selection bias occurs when an unmeasured variable is correlated both with 
program  participation and with the outcome of interest. The threat of selection 
bias is always present unless random assignment is used in the estimation of the 
impact of a program.
If randomisation is absent, it is virtually impossible in many 
practical circumstances to be convinced that the estimates of the 
effects of treatments are in fact unbiased. This follows because 
other variables that affect the dependent variable besides the 
treatment may be differently distributed across treatment groups, 
and thus any estimate of the treatment is confounded by these 
extraneous x variables. [Cochran and Rubin, 1973, page 417]
The extent to which statistical techniques, either matching or regression analysis, 
can ameliorate selection bias, depends on the data. If the functional form is 
known, and the researchers can ensure that there is no correlation between the 
error term (which includes unmeasured variables) and the explanatory variables 
(which include program participation), regression analysis can be used to 
produce unbiased estimates. Similarly, if the researcher can draw  a comparison 
group that matches participants on all characteristics that affect the dependent 
variable but are not evenly distributed between the treatment and non-treatment 
groups then a comparison between the treatment and comparison groups will 
yield an unbiased estimate of program impact.
1 Some researchers eliminated some youth from their samples, and others dropped 
participants who remained in the program for less than a week. Most researchers provided 
separate estimates for males and females, and for whites and non-whites. One consistent 
finding was that estimates of impact were higher for women than men.
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At first glance, the CETA data appear to be inadequate to deal with selection 
bias because some variables thought to affect post-program earnings, and to be 
correlated with program participation, are unmeasured, and perhaps un ­
measurable, (e.g., motivation, intelligence). However, the extensive history of 
earnings included in the CETA data can, in some circumstances, be used to 
remove selection bias even when there are important missing variables.
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Figure 2-1 The "pre-program dip" in earnings
Ashenfelter (1978) describes a method for dealing with fixed unm easured 
variables in the context of an earnings function. If motivation, intelligence or 
other unmeasured characteristics are constant, and the form of the earnings 
equation is known, then their effect can be eliminated algebraically. In the 
simplest case, where the unmeasured variables shift the earnings function up  or 
dow n without changing its slope, a first difference will eliminate the impact of 
the unmeasured variables. In estimating the impact of CETA programs, the 
confounding effect of the unmeasured but constant variables would be 
eliminated by comparing the difference between pre- and post-program 
earnings for participants and non-participants. This technique is known as the 
difference-in-differences estimator.
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Unfortunately, researchers estimating the impact of CETA face more difficult 
problems than constant unmeasured variables. Some of the additional problems 
are reflected in the pre-program dip. Figure 2.1 shows average annual earnings 
for the 15 year period 1964 to 1978 for males who enrolled in CETA in 1975 and 
1976 together with the average earnings of the comparison groups. Clearly some 
transitory characteristics are correlated both with program participation and 
earnings.
In the studies of the estimates of the impact of CETA, in addition to controlling 
for a wide range of measured variables, researchers attempted to control for 
unm easured characteristics that were variously: permanent, transitory, serially 
correlated and growing. With regard to Figure 2.1, the differences between 
participants and the comparison group between 1964 and 1968 might be due to 
m easured differences (e.g., age), or unmeasured differences (e.g., the intercept 
or coefficient on the variable time in the individual's earnings function). 
Differences between the earnings of participants and comparison group 
members in the immediate pre-program years might be due to measured or 
unm easured transitory differences.
Despite the number of attempts to deal with the wide variety of measured and 
unm easured, permanent and transitory differences, uncertainty remained for 
two reasons. First, there was uncertainty regarding the functional form. Second, 
as is pointed out by Bloom and others, there can be no way of distinguishing 
between the effects of the training program itself and the effect of an undetected 
change in the earnings functions that coincides with participation in a training 
program .3 Researchers can alleviate the first source of uncertainty somewhat by 
devising ways of using the extensive earnings histories in the CETA data to test
3 Bloom (1987) cites women returning to the labour force at the same time as they enrol in a 
training program as an example of an undetected (by other researchers) change in the earnings 
function.
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their earnings functions. Researchers attempt to alleviate the second source of 
uncertainty, by attempting to replicate the results of random assignment studies 
using comparison group methods. However, the Advisory Panel concluded that 
too m uch uncertainly remained.
2.2 Advisory Panel Report__________________________________
The JTPA was passed in 1982, and by 1985 the DOL was already collecting data 
in order to produce estimates of the impact of the JTPA programs as it had for 
the CETA programs. In view of the controversy surrounding the CETA 
estimates, it decided to seek advice on the reasonableness of continuing down 
that path, and struck the Job Training Longitudinal Survey Research Advisory 
Panel. A summary of the Panel's findings and recommendations and a comment 
on the consequences of the recommendations follow.
2.2.1 Findings
The findings of the panel can be summed up as follows:
1) there is unacceptable variation in the estimates of the impacts of CETA 
programs;
2) the sources of that variation are not fully understood; and
3) it is unlikely that the controversy will be resolved in the near future.
Parts of the report are excerpted below to illustrate these findings.
the estimates of the net impacts of CETA are not reliable and the 
true net impacts of CETA are still open to question. [Stromsdorfer 
et al, page III-J-47]
the range of results within and across studies is disturbingly large 
and no particular point estimate can be said to be the correct one.
[ibid. page III-J-55]
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no such study using a quasi-experimental design can be said to 
have controlled adequately for selection bias. [ibid. page III-J-66]
Given the methodological problems with the CLMS and CPS data 
sets, there is currently little consensus on the choice of methods to 
estimate net program impacts using these particular data. [ibid. 
page III-J-55]
it will not be possible to solve the problem of selection bias within 
the context of a quasi-experimental design ... in a short enough 
time to meet Congress' need for valid information to guide policy.
[ibid. 1985, page III-J-65]
2.2.2 Recommendations
The Panel's key recommendation was that
The JTLS/SHOW sample [which is analogous to the CLMS] should 
be placed on hold [ibid. page III-J-71]
and
the DOL should perform a selected set of classical experiments 
over the next several years that involve random assignment of 
program eligible individuals to the treatment (experimental) group 
and to the non-treatment (control) group, [ibid. page III-J-68]
The panel did not recommend that the DOL abandon non-random assignment 
techniques altogether, recommending instead further research.
...it is intended to use these experimental results and the 
understanding of the selection process gained thereby to improve 
the effectiveness of quasi-experimental design as a strategy for 
program evaluation, [ibid. page III-J-68]
The process analysis should investigate the process of selection in 
particular, [ibid. page III-J-77]
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[the DOL] experiment with possible data sets such as the 
Continuous Work History Sample of the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation to serve as a comparison group, [ibid. page 
III-J-67]
further analysis of the CLMS data should be conducted with the 
express purpose of analysing the problem of selection and other 
data handling issues, [ibid. page III-J-77]
2.2.3 The National Research Council Recommendation
Random assignment was also recommended to the DOL by the Committee on
Youth Employment Programs of the National Research Council. This committee
was given the daunting task of reviewing 400 reports on programs funded under
the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act (YEDPA) of 1977 in
order to draw  conclusions and make recommendations. Like the Job Training
Longitudinal Survey Research Advisory Panel, the committee found it easier to
draw  conclusions and make recommendations about the nature of evaluation
research than about employment and training programs.
Their comments on random assignment were unequivocal.
O ur review of YEDPA research strongly suggests that much more 
could have been learned, and more confidence placed in the 
results, if random assignment had more frequently been used. We 
believe that not only has the feasibility of random assignment in 
program  research been demonstrated, but that in situations in 
which program resources are scarce and program effectiveness 
unproven, it is ethical (see appendix C).
RECOMMENDATION: Future advances in field research on the efficacy 
of employment and training programs will require a more conscious 
commitment to research strategies using random assignment.
Randomised experiments should be explicitly authorized as a device for 
estimating the effects of new projects, program variations and program 
components. Furthermore, funding authorities should back this explicit 
authorization with firm indications that this is the method of evaluation 
which is expected, [original emphasis, Betsey et al, 1985]
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2.2.4 Implications
A fundam ental change in the way in which impacts of employment and training 
program s were estimated followed quickly after the submission of the reports of 
these two panels. The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) accepted the 
recommendations of the Job Training Longitudinal Survey Research Advisory 
Panel, renouncing its 20 year practice of using quasi-experimental methods and 
launched an evaluation of its Job Training Partnership Act programs using 
random  assignment.
In the Family Support Act of 19884 Congress required the use of random  
assignment to evaluate another national employment and training program, the 
Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) program. The report may also have 
had an impact in Canada where random assignment is much less common in the 
evaluation of employment and training programs. The federal Ministry of 
Hum an Resources Development decided to evaluate its Self Sufficiency Project 
using random assignment in 1990.
2.3 Eight Influential Studies_________________________________
Descriptions of eight studies that are cited by the panel, or grew out of work 
cited by the panel follow5. In each case the technique used is described and 
some lessons learned are extracted. The studies fall into four groups.
'The Family Support Act is American legislation that enables welfare payments to parents of 
dependent children. It also enables the JOBS program which provides funding for and specifies 
some parameters of training programs that states provide for welfare redpients. The Family 
Support Act is administered by the Department of Health and Human Services.
5 Later versions of reports of these studies are used since the authors will have had time to 
improve their papers. The fact that the panel might not have had the benefit of these revisions is 
not considered relevant here since the purpose of this review is to understand the problems 
involved in estimating the impacts of programs without the benefit of random assignment It is 
not an attempt to understand the decision making process.
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1) The Westat and Dickinson, Johnson and West studies use relatively 
straightforward matching plus regression to estimate the impacts of CETA.
They provide an excellent introduction to the data and problems.
2) Papers by Bloom and Bassi illustrate methods for eliminating bias in the 
face of earnings functions that have error terms which are correlated both with 
program participation and post-program earnings. Their primary intent is to 
produce estimates of the impacts of CETA programs.
3) The paper by Ashenfelter and Card tests and compares various methods 
for obtaining unbiased estimates of program impacts using information within 
the CETA data set.
4) LaLonde (1986), Fraker and Maynard (1987) and Heckman and Hotz 
(1989) apply CETA techniques to the Supported Work data6. They compare the 
results produced by various methods with the results produced using the control 
group.
2.3.1 W estat, Inc. (Bryant and Rupp, 1987)
Westat, Inc. had the contract to manage the CETA database and produce 
estimates of the impact of CETA, and under that contract they produced a 
num ber of reports for the U.S. DOL. Westat first screened the data and then 
used matching, followed by regression analysis.7
‘ The Supported Work project offered from 12 to 18 months of stable employment with 
support and close supervision to four groups of severely employment disadvantaged 
individuals, long term welfare recipients, ex addicts, ex-offenders and young school dropouts.. 
The Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC), formed by the US federal 
government to run the Supported Work demonstration, used random assignment to estimate 
the impacts. The total sample size (both treatment and control) was 4,665. The demonstration 
ran between 1975 and 1979.
7Cochran and Rubin (1973) find
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2 . 3 . 1 . 1  S c r e e n i n g
W estat began by screening the CLMS and the CPS to exclude:
• those under 14 or over 60 years of age;
• those with personal earnings over 20,000 in the prior year, or family 
incomes of 30,000 or more;
• those without Social Security Numbers and those whose interview 
records did not match the Social Security records on at least three of five 
identifying characteristics: year of birth, month of birth, six characters of 
surnam e, sex and race;
• participants who had been in the program for less than one week.
2 . 3 . 1 . 2  M a tc h i n g
Next they matched program participants with comparison group members from 
the CPS. Five separate comparison groups were created, one for each program 
activity: classroom training, on-the-job training, public service employment, 
work experience, and combinations of activities. Eleven variables were used to 
create the comparison group for people who enrolled in a CETA program 
between July 1,1976, and June 30,1977:
1 sex
2 SSA earnings in 1976
3 change in SSA earnings, 1975 to 1976
4 change in SSA earnings, 1974 to 1975
5 race/ethnicity
Overall, linear regression is recommended as superior to matching alone when x is 
continuous and only a moderate reservoir is available... However, it appears that the 
approach of pair matching plus regression adjustment on matched pairs performs best. 
[Cochran and Rubin, 1973 page 445.J
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6 age
7 educational attainment
8 family income
9 prior year labour force experience
10 head of household
11 poverty status
Each variable was divided into discrete categories, (e.g. Educational attainment 
was divided into six categories.) The divisions chosen resulted in more than 6 
million possible combinations of characteristics. Westat refers to each possible 
combination as a cell. Ideally, W estat would have chosen its comparison group 
as the members of the CPS file that were in the same cell as program 
participants. But with millions of cells and only thousands of observations, most 
of the cells were empty, so they combined cells in reverse order of priority listed 
above. First, they combined cells with similar values of the first ten variables but 
with differing poverty status. If this did not produce a match, then they 
combined cells with similar values of the first nine variables, and so on, until a 
match was produced. In cases where several non-participants matched a single 
participant, they weighted comparison group observations by the ratio of 
participants to non participants in the cell. In practice, Westat was able to get 
exact matches on the first five variables in every case.
2 . 3 .1 .3  Regression A n a lys is
They augmented this matching technique with a set of 12 regressions, one for 
each sex and program type8. The dependent variable in each case was post- 
program  earnings. Explanatory variables were: a dum my variable for program  
participation, three years of pre-program earnings, and variables describing
* The program Work Experience was subdivided in to Adult Work Experience and Youth 
Work Experience.
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personal characteristics and employment experience in the immediate pre­
program year.
Using these techniques they draw four conclusions:
2 . 3 . 1 . 4  Matching i s  important.
They calculate F-statistics to test the hypothesis that the earnings functions of 
comparison groups are the same as the earnings functions for program 
participants. This hypothesis is rejected for both the unmatched sample from the 
CPS and the matched, but not weighted sample9. It is not rejected for the 
matched and weighted sample.
2 . 3 . 1 . 5  S t r a t i f i e d  matching i s  p r e fe r r e d  to  one- to-one  
matching.
They cite the results of Dickinson, Johnson and West, whose one-to-one matched 
samples failed an F-test of pre-program comparability, while the weighted 
comparison groups produced by Westat did not.
2. 3 . 1 . 6  Program impacts vary  with age.
They report overall impacts by age group that vary from $-119 (for 14 to 16 year 
olds) to $920 (for those age 45 and older).
2 . 3 . 1 . 7  Length o f  time in the program m a t te r s .
They report large variations in the impacts of program for people enrolled for
different periods. The most striking example occurs with the impact of
classroom training on females. That impact increases monotonically from $85
9 Where the functional form is known, ordinary least squares regression will be robust to 
weighting. When Bryant and Rupp report different results for the weighted and unweighted 
samples, they are implicitly reporting undetected non linearity in the functional form of their 
equation. (See discussion on page 98 and following.)
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for those enrolled for fewer than 11 weeks to $1,611 for those enrolled more than 
40 weeks.
2.3.2 Dickinson, Johnson and West (1986)
The Dickinson, Johnson and West (DJW) paper is particularly useful because it 
reports the results of a number of different techniques in order to illustrate the 
factors to which non-experimental estimates are sensitive. From the perspective 
of someone interested in the weaknesses of observational studies of employment 
and training programs, they have four important findings.
2 . 3 . 2 . 1  Matching i s  important.
Following Cochran and Rubin (op. cit.) DJW estimate the impact of CETA using 
regression analysis on a matched comparison group and the participant group. 
When they re-estimate the impact using an unmatched comparison group from 
the Current Population Survey, they find the estimates change by a statistically 
significant amount, from $-690 to $-422 for men and from $13 to $537 for 
women10.
However, in direct contrast to Westat, they conclude that the m ethod of 
matching is not important. They show that estimates of the impact using their 
modified-Mahalanobis-distance11 matched comparison group produces results 
that are not statistically significantly different from those produced using
10 DJW themselves draw the opposite conclusion, but the difference is one of semantics. In 
their article in the Evaluation Review (1987) they conclude that regression alone is sufficient to 
control for pre-existing measured differences, but they also conclude that regression results are 
sensitive to the inclusion of individuals who were out of the labour force in the CPS sample. I 
define the process of ensuring that both members of the comparison and treatment groups have 
the same labour market status as matching, but they define it as "choice of sampling frame."
" The Mahalanobis distance between two observations is:
D-(XlX2VsHXtX2)
The distance is modified by weighting the matching variables by their association with 
variations in earnings.
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W estat's cell matched groups. They also show that the sensitivity of the 
estimates of the impacts to weighting disappears when they include pre­
program earnings in the regression equation.
2 . 3 . 2 .  2 Including no-shows i s  not im por tan t .
When DJW change their sample to include no-shows, the overall estimate of
impact changes from $-260 to $-27312. This result is surprising since no-shows
are often felt to have lower than average motivation, and unmeasured
characteristics such as motivation often are cited as sources of selection bias.13 If
no-shows do have low motivation, and if motivation is positively correlated with
income, then systematically excluding no-shows from the participant group will
bias estimates of program impact upward. But DJW's findings indicate that
either no-shows are no different in terms of unmeasured characteristics, or the
presence of unmeasured characteristics is relatively unimportant given other
variables such as history of earnings that may act as proxies for them.
2. 3. 2. 3 Timing i s  im por tan t .
Pre-program earnings are felt to be correlated with program participation and 
with post program earnings, so in order to avoid bias, researchers needed to 
include a measure of pre-program earnings in their regression equations.
Because earnings data in the CETA studies were annual, this was not 
straightforward. The relevant pre-program earnings for individuals who 
enrolled in late 1976 might be early 1976 earnings, while the relevant earnings of 
enrolees in early 1976 are more likely to be 1975 earnings. To test the sensitivity 
of their model to the choice of year for pre-program earnings, DJW estimated the 
model separately for those who enrolled in the first and the last half of 1976 
separately. For adult men the estimate of the impact for early enrolees was $-458
12 This change is not statistically significant.
13 See e.g. Bloom et al. 1993 page 8.
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and for late enrolees $-971. For women, the estimate for early enrolees was $246, 
and for late enrolees, $-220.
2 . 3 . 2 . 4  Labour fo rce  s ta t u s  i s  important.
Again, DJW estimate the impact of CETA programs first with comparison group 
members who were not necessarily in the labour force in March 1976, and then 
restricting the comparison group to those who were in the labour force in March 
1976. (CETA participants are by definition in the labour force.) The restriction 
decreased the estimate of the impact of the CETA programs from $-385 to $-529 
for men and from $488 to $299 for women.
2.3.3 Bloom (1987)
Bloom, reporting the work of Bloom and McLaughlin, suggested estimating the 
impact of CETA by running a regression of the form 
Yu = Qi + bit +  YtjBjXji  + CTy  + et + eu
and
6 it =  reit.i +  v„
where
Ya = person i's earnings in year t;
ai and bi = person i's pre-program earnings intercept and slope;
Xp = the jth personal characteristic for person i;
T„ = one for post-program years for participants and zero otherwise;
e, = a year-specific error component reflecting economic conditions;
eft = an individual error component for person i in year t;
v„ = the random portion of person i's error component in year t;
Bj = the coefficient for the jth personal characteristic;
C = average annual program-induced, post-program earnings gain;
and
= a first order serial correlation parameter.
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Bloom acknowledges that his method, using earnings growth equations, cannot 
resolve the fundamental question of selection bias. This method w on't 
distinguish between program impact and self motivated return to the work force 
which occurs at about the same time as program participation, a likely source of 
selection bias in the estimates of program impact on women. Nor will it 
distinguish between permanent and temporary pre-program dip, a likely source 
of selection bias in the estimates of program impact on men. He says, "Without 
a randomised field experiment, there is no definitive way to determine the 
magnitude of these potential biases." [Bloom 1987, page 516]
Nonetheless, he argues, separate analyses can shed light on these two issues. For 
women, he looks at the changes in labour force participation, employment, hours 
worked while employed, and wage between the pre-enrolment and post 
program years. He finds that only 20% to 31 % of the change in earnings is 
attributable to changes in labour force participation, indicating that the impact of 
this source of selection bias is significant, but not sufficient to overturn the 
results.
For men, he looks at fluctuations in incomes of the participants in the pre-pre­
program dip period to see whether their income streams had been characterised 
by similar deviations from trend in the past. He found that they had, and that 
the dips had decayed quickly. He also looked at the experience of comparison 
group members who experienced earnings dips in the program year to see if 
economic conditions at the time of the program might have made the pre­
program  dip longer in the program year than in previous years. He found that 
the comparison group's dips were more prolonged, but that this would only 
increase the estimates of the impact of CETA on men by $130 in the first post 
program  year and $50 in the second post-program year.
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Bloom's paper is helpful in three ways. First, it emphasises the importance of 
individual-specific growth rates in earnings. Second, it illustrates a method for 
investigating the sources of selection bias. And third, it reinforces the finding of 
Dickinson, Johnson and West, that labour force participation is an important 
explanatory variable.
2.3.4 Bassi (1984)
Bassi (1984) extends the work of Ashenfelter (e.g. Ashenfelter 1978) by allowing 
the change in earnings to be related to transitory changes in income in the pre­
program  period. Her earnings function takes the form 
Y u = Xit'i + P,(3 + £,- + £» + Eif
Where
Y„ = earnings of individual i in year t
Xtt = measured characteristics affecting earnings
Pi = a dum my variable measuring program participation
e, = an error term specific to individual i, and constant over time
et = an error term specific to period t, and constant across individuals
eH = an error term specific to individual i at time t. This is later
allowed to vary according to the formula, 
e» = r e*.i + V,.
If the model is correctly specified then:
• in a simple regression of Y on X and P, the coefficient on P in pre-program 
periods will be zero; and
• the earnings functions in the pre-program periods will be the same for the 
participants and the comparison group.
W ithin this framework she tests four assumptions:
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i) That selection into the program is random with respect to unobserved 
variables,
ii) That selection is based only on fixed unobservables (tested for two base 
years),
iii) That selection is based only on fixed unobservables, but there is serial 
correlation of the error term, and
iv) That selection is based on transitory characteristics in the immediate pre­
program  year.
She gets different findings on the reliability of the estimates for each of four 
groups.
• None of the assumptions is rejected for white women.
• Assumption ii with a base year two years prior to training and 
assumption iv are not rejected for minority women.
• All assumptions are rejected for white men.
• Only the first assumption is rejected for minority men.
She then reports remarkably stable estimates of impact on white women, $740 to 
$987 increase in 1977 earning and $1108 to $1452 in 1978. For minority women 
and models that passed the specification tests, the estimates range from a not- 
statistically-significant $426 to $626 and from a not-statistically-significant $531 
to $947 in 1978. For minority men and models that passed the specification tests, 
the estimates are again remarkably stable. None are statistically significantly 
different from zero, and over the two years they range from $27 to $271.
This paper is useful because it illustrates a method for recovering pre-program 
transitory earnings as a means of controlling for selection bias. It also illustrates 
a num ber of specification tests for choosing among competing estimators.
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2.3.5 A shenfelter and Card (1985)
Ashenfelter and Card use the CETA data to test a number of different forms for 
the earnings equation. They begin with:
y it -  <Di + dt + D itp  + Sit
where
yit = earnings of individual i in period t,
©i = a perm anent component for individual i,
d t = an economy wide component,
Du = is a dum my variable which takes the value 1 for participants in
post-training periods,
P = the effect of training, and
Sit = a serially uncorrelated transitory component of earnings.
If this is the correct specification of the earnings equation and selection into the 
program is uncorrelated with a>i and eu then a simple post-training difference in 
earnings will estimate the training effect, p. These assumptions also imply that 
there will be no difference between the incomes of the participants and the 
comparison group in the pre-program years. The second implication is easy to 
test, and since comparison group earnings are higher than the participants' 
earnings in each year, and grow at a faster rate over the pre-program period the 
model is rejected.
A slightly more sophisticated model allows participation in the program  to be 
governed by the perm anent component, cot. If this is the correct model then a 
"differences in differences" estimator will provide an unbiased estimate of 
program impact. As well, the differences in differences estimator will provide 
identical estimates regardless of base year chosen. Again, this second 
implication provides a test of the model. Ashenfelter and Card find that the
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estimates for men vary dramatically depending on base year and post program  
year chosen (from $-1,519 to $+813) and so the model is rejected.
Next they allow the transitory income component to be serially correlated. 
Heckman and Robb (1986) have shown that with this type of earnings function, a 
symmetric (about the time period in which selection into the program occurs) 
differences in differences estimator will give unbiased estimates of the impact of 
training. It should give the same estimate of program impact whether the 
researcher bases the estimates on one, two or three years before and after the 
selection year. They report four estimates of the impact of the program based on 
two assumptions about the year in which selection occurred, and based on 
symmetric differences of one and two years. With 1976 as the selection year, the 
estimates were $9 and $439, and with 1975 as the selection year, the estimates 
were $-736 and $-873. Although, with 1975 as the selection year the estimates 
are very similar, there is no way within this model to choose between selection 
years.
Next, by modelling the selection decision as a function of selection year 
earnings, they are able, in theory to test assumptions about the year in which the 
selection decision occurs. In their model training occurs if
Zi  =  ( C O , -  C O )  +  Eix-k  +  V ,  <  y  -  CD -  d z - k  =  z  
where the variables are defined as above, and v, is an additional random  
component associated with the selection of training. Training occurs in period t, 
and selection for training occurs k periods before that.
In a variant of this model, the earnings equation is supplemented by a person 
specific growth rate like that specified in Bloom (above). They find that the 
inclusion of a trend component of earnings greatly improves the fit of the model.
Lessons from CETA 52
Since the training decision is based on the permanent, transitory, and growth 
components of earnings, and since average earnings of trainees are different in 
1975 and 1976, assumptions regarding the decision year have implications for 
the earnings streams of trainees in the pre-program years. Unfortunately, 
although the estimates of training impact change from $41 when 1975 is the 
selection year to $747 when 1976 is assumed to be the selection year, the 
differences between the predicted pre-program earnings based on the two 
selection years do not differ sufficiently to enable them to reject either of the 
models.
The estimates of the impact of CETA programs on women are much more 
robust. The four estimates produced by allowing a person specific growth rate 
and by choice of selection year vary from $298 to $713. Nonetheless, they 
conclude that they cannot draw a firm conclusion regarding the impact of the 
program and call for more work and for more use of random assignment in the 
evaluation of programs.
This paper is useful because it illustrates a method for controlling for selection 
into programs based on permanent, transitory and trend components of income. 
It also underscores the importance of including a trend component in the 
earnings equation.
2.3.6 Fraker and Maynard (1987)
Fraker and Maynard drew comparison groups from the Current Population 
Survey (CPS) in order to make comparison-group-based estimates of the impact 
of the National Supported Work Demonstration. They then contrasted these 
results with the results obtained using the control groups developed as part of 
the Demonstration.
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The National Supported Work Demonstration was a training program for four 
hard-to-employ groups: long term AFDC recipients, school drop outs aged 17 to 
20, ex-addicts and ex-offenders. It provided employment and job coaching to 
566 youths and 800 welfare recipients between 1975 and 1979. Program 
participants were randomly selected from a pool of eligible candidates, with the 
rem ainder forming a control group. Data from surveys of Supported Work 
participants were augmented by Social Security Earnings data, that were only 
available in aggregated form for groups of from five to ten individuals. The 
source for comparison group data was the public use tape developed for Westat.
Fraker and Maynard selected a comparison group from the CPS using cell 
matching. For youth the cells were based on gender, pre-program earnings, 
change in pre-program earnings, race/ethnicity, education and age. For welfare 
recipients the cells were based on changes in pre-program earnings, age, pre­
program  employment experience, pre-program earnings, and race/ethnicity. 
They supplemented this matching with an earnings equation regression model. 
They concluded that
"had we chosen the /basic/ comparison-group construction 
procedure and analytic model, we would have arrived a 
qualitatively similar conclusions to the experimental study findings 
for AFDC recipients... However, the comparison group methods 
would have led to quite misleading conclusions about the effects of 
Supported Work on youth." [Fraker and Maynard, 1987 page 201.]
They also explored a number of different matching techniques14 and functional 
forms. The welfare group was fairly robust to the different matching techniques. 
Estimates of the impact on 1977 earnings ranged from $1,266 to $1,696 compared 
w ith $1,423 made using the control group. By contrast comparison-group
14 In one case, matching was based on predicted earnings. Unfortunately this method could 
result in the matching of individuals with widely different characteristics, if their predicted 
earnings were similar.
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estimates of the impact on youth in 1979 varied from -$687 to -$1,937 compared 
to the control group based estimate of -$18. The results for the welfare subgroup 
were also robust to changes in analytic model, and again the results for the 
youth subgroup were not.
This paper provides several lessons. First, attempting to estimate impacts of 
training on youth (in this case 17 to 20 year olds) using a comparison group 
developed from the current population survey is extremely risky. However, for 
AFDC recipients the results are much more encouraging. The 'basic' matched 
comparison group generates estimates of the impact of Supported Work that do 
not appear to be statistically significantly different from the estimates based on 
the control group. However, they find that estimates do vary considerably when 
the treatment group is not matched with the comparison group.
2.3.7 LaLonde (1986)
LaLonde also compares estimates of the impact of Supported Work on 
participants' earnings produced using control and comparison groups. He 
draw s seven comparison groups each from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID) and the Current Population Survey, four for women and three for men. 
The sample sizes in the male PSID comparison groups range from 2,493 for the 
broadest, to 128 for the narrowest. The female PSID comparison groups range 
from 595 to 118. The CPS sample sizes range from 15,992 to 305 for males and 
from 11,132 to 87 for females. Each selection restricts the sample to individuals 
who are more similar to the participants than the previous one. For example, the 
narrow est selects unemployed males who were heads of households, less than 
55 years old, unemployed in 1976 and had incomes below the poverty line in 
1975.
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He points out first that a simple p re /post design would produce inaccurate 
estimates of program  impact. The average earnings of the welfare control group 
grew by $700 per quarter during the 18 months of treatment.
He then reports four different econometric methods for estimating the impact of 
Supported Work using these 14 comparison groups and contrasts the results 
w ith the same methods applied to the control group. The four methods are:
i differences between treatment and comparison groups' p re /p o st earnings 
growth, the difference in differences estimator;
ii the same difference in earnings growth, but controlling for pre-training 
earnings;
iii the same as ii above, but including additional explanatory variables; and
iv Heckman's two stage technique for controlling for selection bias.
In each case the estimates based on the Supported Work control group are 
remarkably stable. By contrast the estimates based on the CPS comparison 
group fluctuate widely.
He finds very different results for the same estimation technique, but different 
comparison groups. He points out that many of his estimates are straw m en in 
that they w ould not have been reported since they failed simple specification 
tests. LaLonde suggests that a researcher might reasonably not reject the second 
or third methods, yet he points to large variations in the results they m ight 
obtain depending on the comparison group used and the variables used in the 
regression equations.
The last procedure is Heckman's two step procedure in which the likelihood of 
participation is estimated first, then the predicted likelihood from that equation 
is used as an instrum ent for participation in the earnings equation. This method
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produces estimates that range from $439 to $1,564 for women and from $-1,333 
to $213 for men depending on the comparison group and which variables were 
used in the participation equation. The estimates based on the control group 
ranged from $837 to $861 for women and from $889 to $899 for men. He 
concludes that,
even when the econometric estimates pass conventional 
specification tests, they still fail to replicate the experimentally 
determined results. [LaLonde 1986, page 617.]
This paper compares estimates of the impact of a program using a control group 
and various comparison groups. It finds that the results produced with the 
control group are remarkably stable across different econometric specifications, 
while the estimates using comparison groups are not. Unfortunately, the data 
used in this analysis have only one year of pre-program earnings, so it was not 
possible to test any of the earnings functions.
2.3.8 Heckman and Hotz (1989)
Heckman and Hotz also use data from the National Supported Work project to 
test non-experimental estimators of program impact’5. They test their estimators 
in three ways. First, they estimate their models using pre-program earnings as 
the dependent variable, and look for significant coefficients on program 
participation. Next, they look for significant coefficients on incomes for years 
that would be superfluous if the earnings were specified correctly. Finally, they 
look for significant coefficients on a dummy variable indicating that the 
observation is for a member of the control group, rather than the comparison 
group.
13 They use the same data as Fraker and Maynard. This includes extensive income histories 
from the Social Security Administration, but is grouped. The data used by LaLonde were for 
individuals, but only had four years of earnings data, including only one year of pre-program 
earnings.
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They perform their tests on two versions of each of three models. The three 
models are:
1. Linear control function estimator which embodies the assumption that 
selection into a program is based on observed characteristics, and therefore an 
unbiased estimate of program impact can be recovered from the coefficient on a 
dum m y variable for program participation in an OLS estimation of an equation 
of the form
Yu ~  O S t  +  d i  a t +  Vu
2. Fixed effects estimator that embodies the assumption that although selection is 
based on unobserved characteristics, those characteristics do not change over 
time. In that case unbiased estimates could be recovered from an OLS 
estimation of the form
Yu - Yw ~ di(Xi + (Xu - Xu )P  + (vu - Vw)
3. Random Growth estimator that allows the unobserved characteristics that are 
related to selection into a program to grow at a constant rate over time as well as 
a fixed component. In this case a consistent estimate of the impact of the 
program  will be given by the coefficient on a dum m y variable for program 
participation in an equation of the form:
(Yu - Yw) - (t - t')(Yu - Yw-i) = diCCt + [(Xu - Xu)
- (t - t')(Xvt - Xw-i)]P + [Vu ~ Vu) - (t - t'Xvu - Vw-i)]
In each case
Yit = income of individual i in period t;
Xit = a vector of explanatory variables for individual i at time t  and
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vit = an error term for individual i at time t
The second variant for each model is obtained by replacing the dum my variable 
for program participation by a vector of personal characteristics so that program 
impacts are not constrained to be identical for all individuals.
The results of these tests are damning for studies that do not use random 
assignm ent For youth there is only one model that has a greater than 5% chance 
of not being rejected in each of the tests27. This is the random  growth estimator 
w ith the full set of control variables and with program impacts that are allowed 
to vary with personal characteristics. Even this model has only a 12% 
probability that the coefficients on program participation are zero. These data 
and techniques are not likely to give researchers much confidence in the 
estimates.
The results are even worse for AFDC recipients. In that case one model does 
quite well on the pre-program earnings test, with an 82% probability that the 
coefficients on program participation are zero. A researcher would be justified 
in placing some confidence in this model, but the point estimates of the impact 
produced by this model are twice as high as the estimates produced using the 
control group.
2.4 Lessons Learned_________________________________________
The m ain lesson from CETA is clear. The CLMS and CPS data, even w hen 
augm ented w ith 20 years of earnings history and extensive statistical analysis
271 would like to see the probability that a model is not rejected to be 95% in each case in 
order to have confidence in the model.
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were not sufficient to produce estimates of the impact of CETA that engendered 
confidence. The Advisory Panel recognised this, saying,
State-of-the-art statistical techniques simply cannot overcome
certain data or design problems. [Stromsdorfer et al., 1985 page III-
J-58]
Clearly, observational studies must be viewed with a great deal of scepticism. 
Although the CETA results apply directly to estimates of training programs, 
pessimists must wonder how other observational studies would fare if random  
assignment studies to which they could be compared existed. The main lesson 
from CETA is that a greater understanding of the nature of selection bias is 
needed.
The many excellent analyses of CETA identified some factors to which estimates 
of the impact of the CETA programs were sensitive. Four of these are listed 
below.
1) The treatment of pre-program dip is central. Bloom examines the 
characteristics of the pre-program dip and finds that male program participants 
have had similar dips in earnings in the past, and that some females changed 
their labour force status in the pre-program period. Ashenfelter and Card find 
different growth rates in earnings between program participants and the 
comparison group. Dickinson, Johnson and West find that it is important to 
select a comparison group with characteristics (such as labour force 
participation) like those of the participants at the date of enrolment. In the 
CETA data the year defined as the pre-program year, and therefore the year 
expected to contain the preprogram  dip in earnings, ended up to 11 months 
before entry into the program. For the comparison group, dips in earnings 
always referred to dips in earnings in the year that ended 3 months before the 
interview.
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The lessons learned are:
i Comparison groups for males should be composed of individuals who 
have had similar variations in earnings in the past.
ii Comparison groups for females should be composed of individuals who 
have a similar attachment to the labour force at the time of enrolment.
iii The pre-program dip of the comparison group and the treatment group 
should be measured in the same way.
2) Matching is important. Dickinson Johnson and West find that their estimates 
were not sensitive to matching, except when they had not screened out 
individuals who were out of the labour force. However, LaLonde finds that his 
results are very sensitive to the choice of comparison group, even when 
regression is also used. Fraker and Maynard find the estimates for youth to be 
very sensitive to the comparison group used, and the estimates for AFDC 
participants to be sensitive to matching.
The lesson learned is:
Comparison groups should be matched to participants.
3) Program impacts vary with personal characteristics. Every researcher found 
different impacts for different groups of participants. Impacts varied with sex, 
age, minority status, and duration of time spent in the program. They also vary 
over time.
4) Specification tests are not sufficient. Bloom has pointed out that a change in 
the earnings function that coincides with enrolment in the program cannot be
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distinguished from program impacts17. Heckman and Hotz report models that 
pass tests based on pre-program information, but that produce different 
estimates than those produced using random assignment. And Dickinson, 
Johnson and West point to the issue of timing. If the pre-program dip in 
earnings is undetected because it occurs in the year of program participation, 
then the earnings functions of participants and comparison group members can 
appear to be identical, and yet be very different.
17 Heckman and Hotz include post-program tests of the functional form of the eamings 
equation. However, if the purpose of the training is to change the eamings function, failing a 
post-program test does not necessarily indicate bias.
3. Recent Developments
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The decade since two separate blue ribbon panels advised the US Department of 
Labor to use random assignment to estimate the impacts of employment and 
training programs has seen some progress in our understanding of both the 
effectiveness of programs and the difficulties in estimating their impacts. The 
use of random assignment has become much more common. The leader in the 
field, the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC) has been 
involved in 20 projects that involved the assignment of over 100,000 individuals. 
These studies have given us fairly reliable estimates of the impact of a num ber of 
programs on a number of groups in a number of sites, however, the 
generalizability of the findings has not been established. On the other hand, 
although our knowledge of the selection process into the American JTPA 
program s has improved, no convincing observational technique for estimating 
impacts has emerged.
This chapter summarises the post-CETA debate on observational studies of 
employment and training programs in order to identify gaps in our 
understanding of the extent and sources of uncertainty. It has six sections. The
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introduction sets the stage by drawing a few lessons from a num ber of studies 
that used random  assignment. This is followed by four sections, each of which 
summarises a recent study. The four studies are:
1) Heckman and Smith's (1993a) assessment of the case for random assignment;
2) Friedlander and Robins' (1994) assessment of a number of attempts to estimate 
the impacts of programs without the use of random assignment
3) Cain, Bell, Orr and Lin's (1993) attem pt to estimate the impacts of programs 
without the use of random assignment, and
4) Park, Power, Riddell and Wong's (1994) assessment of other estimates of the 
impact of Canadian federal training programs together with their own estimates.
The first study is included because it provides a good summary of the reasons 
that the need for observational studies remains. The second and third studies 
are the most recent assessments of observational studies. They show that none 
of the sources of comparison groups, when combined with the data available, is 
sufficient to generate unbiased estimates of program impact. The final paper is a 
good overview of the state of estimates of program impact in Canada.
The chapter concludes by identifying four questions that will be addressed in 
Chapter Four, but that remain unanswered in the literature:
3.1.1 Random Assignment Studies
Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC) is the leader in the 
implementation1 of studies involving random assignment in employment and
1 Researchers external to MDRC carried out much of the analysis. Mathematica Policy 
Research Inc. carried out much of the analysis associated with the Supported Work 
Demonstration. Abt Associates Inc. is carrying out the analysis associated with the National 
JTPA Study. More recently MDRC has increased its in-house analytical capacity.
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training programs. It has been involved in 20 studies in which, in aggregate, 
over 100,000 individuals have been assigned to treatment or control groups. The 
m agnitude and breadth of these studies has changed the nature of program 
evaluation in the United States and has had a major impact on social policy in 
the United States. Greenberg and Wiseman (1992 p. 136) conclude that
there exists a substantial consensus among persons active in 
welfare policy that the OBRA demonstrations, particularly MDRC's 
evaluations of them, had a major effect on the course of the debate 
and, possibly the success of the effort,
A detailed examination of their many studies is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
However two of their findings provide particular insight into the evaluation of 
employment and training programs whether random assignment is used or not.
The first finding is that training can increase earnings and employment for 
welfare recipients. Although this finding is considered self-evident by many, 
attem pts to establish it in, for example, the CETA evaluations were unsuccessful. 
In addition, these studies illustrate the range of sizes of impacts that can be 
produced. For example, the largest impacts in any program, those in Riverside 
county, California, decreased welfare payments by an average of 15% in each of 
three years2.
The second finding of interest is that the variability of estimates of impact across 
sites within a program is as great as the variability across programs. For 
example, the impact of California's Greater Avenues to Independence (GAIN) 
program  on AFDC (welfare) payments varied from $+114 over three years in 
Tulare county to $-1,983 over three years in Riverside county. In contrast, seven
2 Impact is estimated across all member of the treatment group, 60% of whom received any 
services through GAIN.
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other welfare-to-work programs with a wide variety of approaches from 
supervised job search to intensive training had impacts ranging from zero to 
$-1,396. (figures from Gueron and Pauly 1991 and SRDC/M DRC1995.)
Although the results from random assignment studies are considered 
incontrovertible by policy makers3, social scientists have expressed concerns 
about their robustness and generalizability. Heckman and Smith (1993b) and 
Heckman, Clements and Smith (1993) find the estimates of the impact of the 
JTPA programs are sensitive to treatment of outliers4 and to the choice of sites5, 
suggesting that the results may not be robust. Hotz points out that in the JTPA 
program less than 10% of the sites that were invited to participate actually 
participated. He concludes that "the lack of a well defined sampling frame for 
the resulting sites makes it difficult to generalise from this set of sites to the 
population as a whole." (Hotz, 1992 page 97). This combined with the extreme 
variation across site, but within program identified by MDRC suggests that 
caution be used in generalising from the results of random assignment studies.
3.2 Heckman and Smith (1993a)_____________________________
Heckman and Smith use information from the National JTPA Study, a study of 
the American Job Training Partnership Act programs (that used random  
assignment) in order to assess the case for randomisation in the evaluation of 
social programs. They identify six problems with random assignment studies.
3 For example, Greenberg and Wiseman (1992, page 136) quote Dr. Erica Baum, Senator 
Moynihan's principal assistant for welfare policy as saying, "MDRCs findings were 
unambiguous... [and] not subject to challenge on methodological grounds."
'Estimate of aggregate impact on the eamings of youth falls from $-1,154 to $-588 with the 
exclusion of the top 1% of earners from the sample. (Heckman, Clements and Smith (1993).
’Estimates of the aggregate impact vary from $-310 to $-1,107 as each of the 15 sites is 
excluded in turn. (Heckman, Clements and Smith, 1993)
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• First, they point out that randomisation is likely to change the pool of 
participants, that will limit the generalizability of the results. In the vernacular 
of people estimating the impacts of programs, studies strive for internal and 
external validity. Random assignment, properly implemented, will guarantee 
internal validity. That is, a comparison between the treatment and control 
groups will generate an unbiased estimate of program impact6. External validity 
enables the application of the findings from the sample to the population at 
large. It can be guaranteed by using random selection to draw  the treatm ent and 
control groups from the population at large. This did not happen in JTPA. 
Doolittle and Traeger (1990 p ix) report "one objective of the original study plan 
has not been achieved: recruitment of a statistically representative sample of 
sites."
• Second, while random assignment can generate an unbiased estimate of 
the mean of the distribution of the impacts of a program, it can only generate 
bounds on the distribution of the impacts7, and in practice, they find that the 
bounds are rather wide. Using data from the JTPA evaluation, they find that the 
results are consistent with from 0 to 28% of adult male participants having had 
their employment prospects diminished by participating in the program.
• Third, randomisation will change the nature of the program. They quote 
Doolittle and Traeger (1990) in their report on the implementation of the JTPA 
study who say, "implementing a complex random assignment research design in 
an ongoing program providing a variety of services does inevitably change its
‘ This follows from the Central Limit Theorem which says that the mean of every random sample 
from a probability distribution (with finite mean and variance) will be normally distributed 
about the mean of the parent distribution with variance o2/VN where a 2is the variance of the 
parent distribution and N is the sample size. Since the treatment and control groups are both 
random samples of the same population the mean of any variable that describes them will be the 
same except for sampling variation and the effect of the treatment.
7 As noted above, the Central Limit Theorem provides the theoretical justification for the 
interpretation of the differences in means between the treatment and control groups as estimates 
of the impact of treatments. Clements, Heckman and Smith (1993) explore the extent to which 
the distribution of impacts can be recovered.
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operation in some ways." An example of this is referred to as the Hawthorne 
effect, named for a study at the Western Electric Hawthorne plant in Chicago 
that purported to find that a subject's awareness of being under study could 
affect the actions being studied.
• Fourth, they point to the problem of drop-outs. Fully one third of 
"participants" in the JTPA program received no services. As a result, the JTPA 
experiment will not generate an estimate of the impact of training on those 
actually trained without using non-experimental methods.
• Fifth, they point to the difficulties encountered in defining the treatment 
received. For example, in the JTPA experiment, of females included in the on- 
the-job training stream, just over half received any service, and only half of those 
receiving service received on-the-job training. Clearly, random assignment 
cannot, by itself, generate an estimate of the impact of on-the-job training in this 
case.
• Sixth, they cites problems with JTPA controls finding substitutes for the 
training that they are denied through randomisation. Overall 32% of controls 
reported receiving training compared with 48% of the treatment group.
They conclude with a call for greater use of non-experimental estimates of 
program  impacts that will simultaneously estimate the factors affecting program  
participation and outcomes.
3.3 Friedlander and Robins (1994)_____________________________
These authors assess four sources of comparison groups for their suitability by 
comparing the estimates of program impact produced by each with estimates 
produced using a control group. In addition, they assess the usefulness of pre­
program  tests in determining which of the estimates are reliable.
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Their information comes from four American employment and training 
programs for welfare recipients that were evaluated by MDRC in the m id 80's 
using random assignment. Although the four programs had the same goal, to 
increase employment and income, and the same target group, single parents, 
they took very different approaches (the average cost per participant varied from 
$118 to $953) and occurred in very different jurisdictions, Baltimore, Arkansas, 
Virginia and San Diego.
The authors construct four comparison groups for each of the four programs.
The first is simply the control group from a program in another state. The 
second is generated by selecting for each participant, the non participant who is 
most similar in measured characteristics. The third comparison group is selected 
from control groups in different program sites, within the same state. The final 
comparison group was selected from control groups in the same site, bu t from a 
different time.
Estimates of program impact are generated by estimating the param eters of a 
linear regression model8 across the treatment and control/comparison groups. 
Two models are estimated, each with bivariate dependent variables. The first 
takes the value one if the individual had any earnings in quarter three, quarter 
one being the quarter in which random assignment occurred. The second takes 
the value one if the individual had any earnings during quarters six through 
nine. The independent variables in the regression include employment in the
8 These authors may be criticised for using a linear regression model when their dependent 
variable is binary. In general heteroskedasticity will render OLS inefficient and some 
meaningless results may be generated (predicted probabilities greater than one or less than zero, 
or negative variances). Nonetheless, I doubt that these problems will jeopardise their results. 
Greene (1983) and Chueng and Goldberger (1984) and Stoker (1986 all cited in Greene 1990 p 693 
to 695) have, found that under many circumstances (e.g. if the probit model is correct, and if the 
regressors are multinormally distributed) then, in the probability limit, the OLS estimates are 
directly proportional to the probit estimates.
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immediate pre-program quarter, a vector of demographic variables, and a 
dum my variable which takes the value one if the sample member is in a 
treatment group and zero otherwise. Although they have four quarters of pre­
program employment and eamings, they find that including more than one 
quarter of pre-program data has little impact on the non experimental estimates.
Friedlander and Robins also re-estimate each model with pre-program 
employment as the dependent variable. A statistically significant coefficient on 
program participation in this model indicates mis-specification.
They present a summary table of 160 comparisons between estimates m ade with 
control groups and those made using comparison groups.9 The cross-state 
estimates did very badly. Seventy percent of the estimates were statistically 
significantly different from the estimates produced using random assignment. 
Matching only reduced this to 58%. Almost half (47%) of the estimates resulted 
in a different inference (38% for the matched comparison groups). The within- 
state estimates are much better, but hardly encouraging. Thirty-one percent of 
the cross-site and 4% of the cross-cohort estimates were statistically different 
from the estimates produced using random assignment. Thirteen percent of the 
cross-site and 29% of the cross-cohort estimates resulted in a different inference.
The specification test provided some help in discriminating between estimates 
that were similar to those made with control groups and those that were not, but 
they conclude that the test "was more effective in eliminating wildly inaccurate
9 They estimated 96 pairs of equations for unmatched cross-state comparisons. [Four 
programs times four comparison groups (each of the other three states individually, plus the 
three states combined) times two dependent variables (short-term and long-term 
unemployment) times three subgroups (short-term recipients, long-term recipients and the 
combined group)]. Similarly, they estimated 24 pairs of equations based on matched 
comparison groups and 40 pairs of equations for within state comparisons.
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'outlier' estimates than in pinpointing the most accurate non experimental 
estimates." (Friedlander and Robins 1994 page 18)
3.4 Cain, Bell, Orr and Lin (1993) _________________ _
Cain, Bell, Orr and Lin also make an assessment of an observational study 
design by comparing the results it produces with the results generated using 
random assignment. They draw their comparison group members from those 
who applied for, but did not participate in the program in question. On the 
basis of the analysis of Friedlander and Robins this is a promising group with 
which to start because the comparison group is both within-state and 
contemporaneous with the participants.
The data comes from the Homemaker-Home Health Aide Demonstration, a 
training and employment program for American welfare recipients. The 
demonstration took place in seven states. Of the 11,102 applicants, 9262 showed 
up, were determined to be suitable, and were randomly assigned either to the 
treatment or control groups. Of those assigned to the participant group, 725 did 
not attend. Of the 1,840 applicants who did not make it as far as random  
assignment, 909 dropped out and 931 were screened out by program 
administrators. Cain et al. assess these latter two groups as potential comparison 
groups.
By selecting their comparison group from applicants, the authors argue that they 
have dealt with a number of sources of selection bias. The applicants have 
demonstrated self-selection, they are participating in the same labour market as 
participants, and they will have experienced the pre-program dip in eamings. 
The remaining task is to model the self-selection of the drop outs and the 
administrative selection for those who were screened out.
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The principal technique for analysing the data is the estimation of the 
param eters of a model of earnings. The dependent variable is post-program 
earnings. The explanatory variables are personal characteristics; dum m y 
variables indicating that the sample member is a participant, control, no-show, 
screen out or drop out; and the administrators' subjective assessment of the 
sample member’s suitability for the program. They use the results to assess the 
suitability of each of the three groups of non participants, (no-shows, screen outs 
and drop outs) to serve as a control group. In addition they assess the usefulness 
of the subjective ranking variable.
They list a number of weaknesses in their data. First, their earnings information, 
which comes from income tax records, is grouped with a minimum group size of 
ten in order to protect the confidentiality of the income tax records. All groups 
are homogeneous with respect to the applicant groups, and "most are 
homogeneous with respect to race ... and the subjective ranking variable" (Cain 
et al. 1993 page 4). The values of the characteristics used in the regression are 
mean values. Second, the subjective ranking is not reported for 63% of the drop 
outs, and 36% of the screen outs. Finally, information on drop outs and screen 
outs is only available for one of the cohorts, comprising about half the sample.
They find first, that the conventional independent variables, age, marital status, 
education, etc. have very little impact on the difference between the earnings of 
the control group and of the other groups of non participants. In contrast they 
find that pre-program earnings are a very important explanatory variable (T=9) 
even four years later. These two findings are at least in part the result of 
grouping the data. They also find differences between the controls and each of 
the potential comparison groups that persist, even in the face of all of their
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explanatory variables. Although these differences are not always statistically 
significant, they range from 4.3% to 7.7% of control group earnings compared 
with a program impact of 13.9%.
Finally, they find that regression analysis reduces the control group estimates of 
the impacts of the program by $187 or 4.8% of control group earnings, 
suggesting that assignment might not have been completely random.
They conclude that the use of applicants who either are screened out, or who 
drop out from the program together with information on the subjective 
assessment of the suitability of applicants for the program shows promise for 
producing estimates of the impacts of programs where random assignment is 
not possible.
3.5 Park, Power, Riddell and Wong (1994)_____________________
This paper reports five estimates of the impact of five Canadian Unemployment- 
Insurance sponsored programs on subsequent earnings. The five estimates are 
produced as follows.
1) They compare the earnings of participants and the comparison group in 
the post-program period.
2) They compare the growth in eamings of the participants and the 
comparison group. They refer to this as a "differences in differences"10 
estimator.
3) They re-estimate the differences-in-differences estimator using different 
base years.
10 cf. Ashenfelter and Card (1985) discussed in Chapter 2.
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4) They use a two step estimator, in which the first step models selection into 
the program  and the second step uses these estimates to correct for selection bias 
in a model of earnings.
5) They compare the rate of growth of eamings of the participants and the 
comparison group.
The estimates are based on information on program participation, personal 
characteristics and earnings for 3,377 individuals, 927 individuals who were 
receiving UI, but who did not participate in any of the five programs (the 
comparison group) and 2,450 trainees. The information on personal 
characteristics, percentage of time employed and welfare dependence come from 
a series of mail-in questionnaires. The information on annual earnings comes 
from T4's, information slips that are produced by all employers for all 
employees, as required under the Income Tax Act.
Before proceeding with the estimation, they note four characteristics of the 
earnings data. First they note the absence of a pre-program dip in earnings, 
although they note that earnings were depressed in the year in which training 
occurs and the following year. They also note that a similar dip in earnings is 
"likely to be observed for some UI claimants." [op. cit. page 12] As a result, the 
comparison group will also experience a dip in earnings, at least in one year, 
since the comparison group is drawn from those receiving UI. Second, they note 
substantial growth in eamings among many of the trained groups that is not 
evident in the comparison group. Third, they note that average pre-program 
earnings vary widely across the programs and comparison group. Finally they 
note that although changes in eamings vary across the program groups with the 
rates of change correlated with levels of earnings, the changes in earnings are 
relatively constant across the pre-program years.
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The combination of these observations suggests to the authors that selection into 
program  is correlated with the level of pre-program earnings, but not the rate of 
change of pre-program earnings. This implies that:
1) The difference between the earnings of the comparison and treatment 
groups will be a biased estimate of program impact. If post-program earnings 
are correlated with pre-program earnings and with program participation, then 
estimates of post-program earnings that do not control for pre-program earnings 
will be biased.
2) The differences-in-differences estimator may produce unbiased estimates 
of program  impact. This estimator controls for differences in pre-program 
earnings and implicitly for the unmeasured fixed variables that caused the 
differences. If there are no transitory differences between the participants and 
the comparison group that are correlated with program participation and post- 
program  earnings, then this estimator will yield unbiased estimates of program  
impact.
They find that the simple difference between the post-program earnings of the 
comparison group with the trainees yields estimates of positive impacts of the 
programs in which participants had high pre-program earnings, and negative 
impacts for those in which the participants had low pre-program earnings.
When the second (the differences in difference) estimator is used the estimates 
change dramatically. For one of the programs the estimate changes from -$3,334 
to +3,458 per year.
Next, they estimate the impact using the differences in differences estimator for 
several groups and several base years. They find that the estimates of impact do 
not vary with the base year for those who received training in 1988, but did vary
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substantially for those who began in 1989. The results for the 1989 cohort 
suggest that program participation is correlated both with perm anent and 
transitory characteristics that are in turn correlated with subsequent earnings. 
This conclusion is tempered somewhat by the observation that sample sizes are 
reduced for the analysis by cohort, and although the differences are large (just 
under $4,000 for two of the five programs) they are not statistically significant 
(t ~ 1.4). They also find that the differences are greater the farther apart are the 
base years.
If these transitory characteristics have their impact through changes in the 
growth rate of earnings, then the fifth estimator will be appropriate. They find 
broad similarity between the results from this estimator and those produced 
using the differences in differences estimator. The most notable difference 
occurs for one cohort in one program in which the estimate of the impact was 
halved from a statistically significant $4,000 to a not-statistically-significant 
$2,200.
Finally, they estimate the joint determination of earnings and selection into 
training. They model selection into training using a multinominal logit model in 
which there are six possible outcomes, participation in each of the five training 
programs and no training. In addition to personal characteristics, they have four 
variables that are expected to affect the training decision:
• a dummy variable indicating that the individual received counselling 
related to training,
• a dummy variable indicating that the individual stated that he believed 
training to be important,
• a dummy variable indicating that the individual stated that those close to 
him believed training to be important, and
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• a dummy variable indicating that the individual expected to be recalled 
by his employer.
They use this model to form a selection bias correction term which is then 
included in an equation in which post-program earnings is the dependent 
variable and program participation dummies included as explanatory variables.
They report that cross-sectional OLS estimates of program impact yield negative 
estimates of the impact of programs that attract individuals with low pre­
program  earnings and positive impacts of programs with high pre-program 
earnings. The inclusion of the selection bias correction term changes the 
coefficients associated with the low pre-program earnings from negative and 
statistically significant to not significantly different from zero and those with 
high pre-program earnings from positive and statistically significant to not 
significantly different from zero.
The conclusions that one would draw from the two step estimator and the 
differences in differences estimators are clearly different. The two step estimator 
finds no significant impact of training on earnings, while the differences in 
differences estimator finds positive and significant impacts for three of the five 
programs in at least one cohort.
They conclude that the differences in differences estimator is more credible, and 
that the two step estimator is "not able to completely offset the very strong 
tendency of a cross-sectional analysis using data on post-training earnings 
alone11 to estimate a positive impact for programs whose participants have above
11 This is the technique used in earlier estimates of the impacts of these programs. See, e.g., 
Goss, Gilroy & Associates Ltd. 1989.
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average earnings in the absence of training and a negative impact for program s 
whose participants have below average earnings in the absence of training." 
(Park, Power, Riddell and Wong 1994, page 29)
3.6 Conclusions___________________________________________
This chapter has reviewed the recent literature on North American training 
programs for disadvantaged workers. Two conclusions can be drawn.
1) Random assignment has not provided all the answers needed to make 
informed policy decisions regarding employment and training programs. 
MDRC has found greater variation across sites than across programs. Clearly 
generalising from the results found at any particular site would be risky. 
Another jurisdiction implementing a program with a sequence of activities like 
those in GAIN could not determine whether it was getting results like those in 
Riverside county or Tulare county without estimating the impact in its own 
jurisdiction.12
2) Researchers have yet to come up with a set of guidelines for observational 
estimates of the impacts of employment and training programs that are likely to 
result in estimates that are free from selection bias.
12 This finding has led Greenberg, Meyer and Wiseman (1993) to call for the government to 
implement multi-level studies, with different strategies implemented at different sites in order 
to "pry the lid from the black box" of employment and training programs.
In their assessment of the case for random assignment in the evaluation of social programs 
Heckman and Smith point to the desirability of the structural approach. The specification of 
training inputs and the estimation of the relationship between outcomes of interest and these 
inputs makes it possible to predict the impacts of programs not yet operating. They also point 
to the need for knowledge of the program inputs in order to implement the structural approach, 
and so confine most of their attention to the problem of estimating the impact of existing 
programs.
Recent Developments 78
However, five pieces of information that would assist in producing such 
guidelines are not available in the literature. If we wish to estimate the impact of 
employment and training programs when random assignment is not feasible, 
then we m ust work to increase our understanding of selection bias. Testing for 
selection bias is clearly necessary to increasing our understanding. These tests 
are generally made by comparing the results of observational studies with 
random  assignment studies of the same program13 or by comparing the means of 
pre-program values of important variables for the treatment and comparison 
groups. The work of Friedlander and Robins (based on one year of pre-program 
data) concludes that pre-program tests for selection bias are not reliable when 
only one year of pre-program data is available. This suggests the first question.
1. Are pre-program tests for selection bias reliable when more than one year of 
pre-program information is available?
The work of Park, Power, Riddell and Wong, like the work of Ashenfelter and 
Card (1985) suggests comparing the estimates produced using different base 
years as a test for the reliability of differences in differences estimators. This 
suggests the second question.
2. Does robustness to choice of base year mean that differences in differences 
estimators are unbiased?
Clearly, it would be advantageous to be able to test for selection bias both in the 
absence of random assignment, but if pre-program tests are not valid, we need a 
different type of test.
13 See discussion on page 124.
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3. Can we conduct post-program tests for selection bias in the absence of random  
assignment?
Even if we have reliable tests for selection bias, we may find it difficult to 
generate unbiased estimates of program impact, if selection is based on 
unm easurable variables. Bloom et al. (1993 page 9) claim "without perfect 
measures of the unmeasured variables, one cannot be certain whether the 
selection bias has been removed," and they cite motivation as an unmeasurable 
that is likely to cause selection bias. (ibid. page 8)
4. Are unmeasurable variables the primary source of selection bias?
Finally, and perhaps mainly for rhetorical purposes, we have to be able to 
explain the reasons that different researchers come up with such different 
estimates of the impacts of the CETA programs. If we do not identify the 
sources of the discrepancies, then surely, anyone wishing to use the results of an 
observational study would have good cause to worry that if a different 
researcher were to analyse the data, the estimates would be substantially 
different. And yet this question remains unanswered in the literature.
5. W hy did different researchers come up with such different estimates of the 
impacts of the CETA programs?
The next chapter provides background on the BC study, including a description 
of the data and approach taken. Chapter 5 uses that data and approach to 
address these five questions.
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3A. The Character And Relative Advantages Of Random 
Assignment, Data Collection, One Stage Regression Techniques, 
Two Stage Regression Techniques And Matching In Estimating 
The Impact Of Employment And Training Programs.
3A.1 Introduction
Although there is a large number of interesting questions regarding the impacts of 
employment and Training programs (See e.g. Heckman and Smith, 1995), as indicated in 
Chapters 2 and 3, there has been little agreement on how to answer even the simplest of 
these questions, “What is the average impact of training on the trained?” Producing 
transparently reliable answers to that question without the use of random assignment is the 
fundamental goal of this thesis.
This chapter has three sections. The remainder of this section gives a definition of 
transparency and gives some reasons why transparency might be considered a desirable 
goal. This is followed by a listing of three of the obstacles that need to be overcome in 
order to achieve reliable estimates. The second section deals with the issue of undetected 
non linearity. Within that section is a discussion of ordinary least squares regression, its 
character and relative advantages. This is followed by a discussion of matching and its 
advantages and disadvantages relative to ordinary least squares. Finally, there is a 
discussion of the seriousness of undetected non linearities. The third section deals with 
selection bias. Within that section are discussions of random assignment, two stage 
regression techniques and collecting more data.
Regression Matching and Random Assignment 3A page 2
3A.1.1 Transparency
I define transparency as the ease with which an reader can grasp an argument. 
Transparency will decrease as the number of assumptions that must hold for the argument 
to hold increases. Transparency is not the same as reliability. A very complex argument 
that relies on a large number of assumptions, will be reliable if all of the assumptions have 
been tested. However, if an argument is complex, a policy maker will have to rely on 
others with expertise in the field to assure him or her that all the necessary tests have been 
completed. The argument is not transparent to the policy maker. Greenberg and Wiseman 
(1992) attribute the success of random assignment studies in influencing policy to this 
transparency.
Transparency is rarely a goal within economics. This would not be a problem if policy 
makers had demonstrated a willingness to rely on the advice of economists. But however 
willing policy makers may be to rely on advice of economists as economists elsewhere, 
they clearly are not in British Columbia. Here it is common for politicians when disputing 
the results of a study to say, “That was your economist who said that. I could hire one to 
say the opposite.” However unjust this type of comment, it bespeaks the need for 
arguments that can be expressed simply, arguments that are transparent.
3A.1.2 Notation
For consistency throughout this chapter, the following notation is used
j Y = g(X,U„T)
where Y is the outcome of interest; 
g is an unspecified function,
X is a vector of measured characteristics that affect Y 
Ui is a vector of unmeasured characteristics that affect Y
and T is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the individual participates in training.
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2 T = h(Z,U2)
where Z is a vector of measured characteristics that affect the decision to participate in 
training
h is an unspecified function,
U2 is a vector of unmeasured characteristics that affect the decision to participate in 
training.
3A.13 Sources Of Error
There are three sources of serious error that can affect estimates of the impacts of 
employment and training programs:
1. non response bias in the survey collecting the data.
2. undetected non-linearity.
3. selection bias.
As shown in Chapter 4, section 4.3.3, non response bias can qualitatively change the 
estimates of the impact of programs.1 This is a common source of error. Even with a 
response rate of 90%, Card and Robins (1996) estimated that non response could have 
biased their estimates by 10%.
Mathematically, this source of bias is indistinguishable from selection bias, and so is not 
discussed further here.
1 Typically, economists do not take responsibility for the data that they work with, trusting 
that the survey research organization has produced a clean an reliable data set with which 
to work. However, in my view, we are more likely to re-establish the trust of the policy 
makers by producing reliable estimates than by blaming others for their lack of reliability.
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3A.2 Undetected Nonlinearity 
3A.2.1 One Stage Regression
Once we have picked a form for the function g in equation 1, we can use regression 
techniques such as ordinary least squares, non-linear least squares or maximum likelihood 
to estimates its parameters. The Gauss-Markov Theorem shows that Ordinary Least 
Squares regression produces the lowest variance estimate among those that are linear and 
unbiased. Of the standard assumptions that underlie the classical linear regression model, 
the assumptions of
1. no correlation between the regressors and the residual;
2. residual has zero mean.
are sufficient to show that the OLS estimates are unbiased. Additional assumptions, that 
the residuals are independently, identically distributed are sufficient to ensure minimum 
variance of the estimates. The assumption of normally distributed error terms is used in the 
calculation of variances. When it holds, the OLS estimates are also maximum likelihood.
If the first assumption is violated the OLS estimates will be biased as follows.
First re-specify equation 1 in linear form and include T in the X variables.
Y = X p  + U8
The OLS estimate of P is 
( X X ) - ' X T  
Substituting for Y gives 
3 /3 + ( X X y ' X ' U S
Unless X'U = 0 or 8 = 0 the estimate of P will be biased.
X'U * 0 and 8 * 0  can occur if there are non linearities in the true functional form, that 
have not been captured in the specification. In theory this is not a serious problem. The 
inclusion of extraneous variables will not introduce bias so, with sufficient sample sizes, a
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cautious researcher can include terms for all expected non linearities. Alternatively, a 
flexible functional form can be specified if the researcher is particularly concerned that the 
true specification is log linear. The value of A, indicates whether the true specification is 
linear, log-linear, or somewhere in between. In addition any specification can be tested 
against any competing specification by means of, for example, Wald, Lagrange multiplier 
or likelihood ratio tests. In the final analysis, however, the judgement of the researcher is 
involved. Has the researcher included enough terms to capture the non linearities? Has the 
researcher tested enough alternate specifications?
3A.2.2 Can Undetected Nonlinearity be a Problem?
It may be true that policy makers in jurisdictions other than British Columbia are willing to 
rely on the professional judgement of economists with respect to tests of functional form. 
However, some evidence exists that such trust may be misplaced. In their analysis of the 
impact of the CETA programs, Dickinson, Johnson and West (1986) specify a functional 
form with 45 explanatory variables of which 17 deal with interactions and non linearities. 
Nonetheless, the estimate of impact on earnings changes from a not-statistically-significant 
$13 to a statistically significant $537 when the equation is estimated on the matched and 
unmatched comparison group. As indicated below, this indicates that even this elaborate 
functional form is mis-specified in such a way as to introduce bias.
Of the non linear terms included by Dickinson, Johnston and West, four had statistically 
significant coefficients: age cubed; age * education; age squared * education; and age * 
married. A quick perusal of functional forms reveals that the inclusion of these variables is 
rare. Payne (1991) could have included all of these but included none (although age was
2 For another view see Heckman and Robb (1986, page 289) who assert, “Recent claims 
about the robustness of matching methods in the case in which the functional form of a 
regression model unknown are not yet supported by systematic theoretical arguments or by 
compelling theoretical evidence.”
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specified as a categorical variable). Bjorkland and Moffitt (1987) included none of these 
variables, and Fraker and Maynard (1987) included only age cubed. It may well be that 
these variables were not significant in their data sets, or that there was no correlation 
between training and these variables, but we have no evidence to support these conjectures. 
Policy makers would have to take this on faith. In some jurisdictions, this faith does not 
exist.
3A.23 Matching 
3A.2.3.1 W hat is M atching?
Matching is the simplest method for controlling for observed differences between 
participants and non participants. Non participants whose characteristics most closely 
resemble the participants are selected to form the comparison group. One to one matches 
can be made by simple but lengthy searches through the pool of non participants. The first 
participant is selected, the distance between that participant and each potential comparison
3 • •group member is calculated . The potential comparison group member with the minimum 
distance to the participant is selected as a comparison group member and is removed from 
the pool of potential comparison group members. The process is then repeated for the 
second participant and so on until a comparison group member has been selected for each 
participant.
Cell matching is an alternative to one to one matching. In cell matching, each variable 
describing the participants is divided into discrete amounts. Each possible combination of 
these variables constitutes a cell. For example, if we have three variables to match on and
3 • •each is divided into seven categories, we would have 7 = 343 cells. Non participants are 
allocated to the cells according to their characteristics. The outcomes for the non 
participants are weighted by the ratio of participants to non participants in that cell.
3 1Often the distance is defined as (Xt - X2)'S' (Xt - X2) where X! and X2 are the vectors of 
explanatory variables and S is the covariance matrix.
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3A.2.3.2 Why M atch?
Matching is an alternative to specifying the functional form. The process involves 
selecting comparison group members who are similar to participants in measured 
characteristics. Clearly, matching is not an option in most cases because it is necessary to 
have a large pool of potential comparison group members from which to select the 
comparison group. Of course, even when it is possible it is not free. By selecting 
comparison group members, other potential comparison group members are discarded and 
so the variance of the estimates will be higher than if the entire pool of potential 
comparison group members were used.
Matching ensures that x^j = xtij + where x^ and xtij are values of the j th explanatory 
variable, Xj for the ith individual in the comparison and treatment groups, and riy is the 
matching error. If E(r|jj) = 0 then the matching is unbiased.
If the matching were perfect, then the values of all the explanatory variables for each 
participant would exactly equal the values for one comparison group member. The 
correlation between a variable describing program participation and all matching variables 
is zero by design.
3A.2.4 The Relationship Between Matching And OLS Regression
Suppose that we have a data set with N observations. Nj observations have had a treatment 
(participants) and N2 have not had the treatment (the comparison group). (Nj + N2 = N)
Y is the outcome of interest and X is a (kx 1) vector of explanatory variables.
We begin by specifying a linear functional form for equation 1. Because we are examining 
the functional form issue, we replace U-! with e which is assumed to be uncorrelated with X 
and T. In the next section we relax this assumption.
4 Y = Xp + T5 + e
T is a dummy variable indicating training, and 5 is the average training effect.
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We sort the observations so that T is an (Nx 1) vector with Ni 1 's followed by N2 0's.
The standard result for a partitioned regression (See e.g. Greene, 1990, page 182) gives
5 d = (T'T)'1 T’(Y - Xb)
where d and b are the OLS estimates of 8 and p.
As a result of the simple nature of T the following relationships hold.
(T'T)'1 = 1/N 
T Y = N J X 
T 'X =  NXY X
Where Yx and X x are the means of Y and X across the first Nj observations. 
Substituting, these relationships into 5 gives
6 d=Yx - Y xb
We also know that
7 Y = X  b + Td  since with OLS the mean of the estimated error is zero when a
constant is included among the regressors. Decomposing these means into the means for 
participants and comparison group gives:
8
then using 6 gives
9 X = X,b
or
10 b = ( x ' iX i \ - 'X '2 Y 2
Substituting this into 6 gives
11 d = Yx-X \ (x ,iXiY'X'iY1
Pre-multiplying both sides by X'i  gives
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12 X'2d = X ' i Y l - X ,2X , (x '2X i y'X'2Y2 .
If the means of the explanatory variables are the same for the treatment and comparison 
groups then any of the k equations can be solved to get
13 d  =  Yx- %
That is to say, if the means of the explanatory variables are the same for the treatment and 
comparison groups then the difference in means of the explanatory variables is equal to the 
coefficient on the dummy variable for treatment in an OLS (best linear unbiased estimator) 
regression.
There is an interesting large sample application of this result since it does not depend on 
the content of X, only that the means of the columns of X be the same for the treatment and 
comparison groups. If we apply the Slutsky theorem to the matrix X, [that plim g(X) = 
g(plim X)] and if our matching is unbiased, then in the probability limit, the mean of any 
continuous function of the explanatory variables will be the same for the treatment and 
comparison group. Thus, in the probability limit, if the treatment and comparison group 
have been matched on all explanatory variables, then the mean impact of training on the 
trained will equal the difference in the outcome variable between the treatment and 
comparison group, regardless of the underlying relationship between the explanatory 
variables and the outcome variable.
So if Y is any continuous function g(X) and we have matched on all elements of X, then 
the matched results will be equal to the regression results. If the regression results are 
statistically significantly different from the matched results, then the functional form in the 
regression equation must have been mis-specified.
3A.2.5 Switching Regression
The switching regression model is a special case of this result. Specify g from equation 1 
such that:
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YXi( -  X up x +  U Xit i f  the individual takes training 
Y0i( = X UJ30 +  U0it otherwise.
The parameter that w e are trying to estimate, the mean impact o f  training on the trained can 
be recovered from this specification. It is equal to E ( X lt \training)(p x - / ? 0) .
W e have already shown that matching will give an identical result to the OLS regression 
when training is included as a dummy variable and the means o f  the explanatory variables 
are the same for the trainees and the comparison group. It is straightforward to extend this 
result for this formulation.
Following Heckman and Robb, (1986, page 254) let d be a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 if the individual receives training. Then
5 =4ik+(i-<*,)!£■
= d, (Xup x + Uxu) + (1 -  dtx x Mp  o + u „ )
expanding and adding and subtracting E(Xu\d = 1 )(PX - /? 0) gives
Y„ = X Mfi t + dia  + [Xu - E { X u\d = 1)](/?, - p 0yd, + + d,{Uu, - Uou)
where a  = E(XU \d = \){px ~P0)- This gives the familiar result that even if the true
model has different coefficients for participants and the comparison group, OLS regression 
with a dummy variable for program participation will give an unbiased estimate of mean 
impact of training on the trained if the mean of the explanatory variable is the same for 
participants and the comparison group ( X u = E(Xit\d = 1)), a condition that will be true in 
the probability limit if the matching is unbiased.
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3A.2.6 Matching Plus Regression
We can use the same logic to show that the coefficient on program participation in 
regression analysis on a matched sample will not be inconsistent. Matching ensures that T 
is uncorrelated with each column of X. By a similar application of Slutsky's theorem, T 
will be uncorelated with any function of X in the probability limit.
Cov(g(x),T) = 2 ( g ( xi)-g (x i))(T -T )
Recall that matching ensures that xt = x<. + r|jj. Suppose for convenience that the matching 
is 1:1 so that the mean of T = .5. Then (T - T) = .5 for the treatment group and -.5 for the 
comparison group and
Cov(g(x),T) = .5 £  (g(xi,) - g(x„) )-.5]£ (g(xit + m ) - g(xi, + jfc ) )
Taking Plim's and using Slutsky's theorem 
=•52  (g(PlHnxit) - gCPlimxjt))-. 5 ^  (g(Plim xit + Plim^,) - g(Plimxt + Plim^.) )
If Plim r\ = 0 then the expression as a whole equals zero. So, even if there are undetected 
non linearities in the functional form that has been specified, the coefficient on a dummy 
variable for training will be consistent, if the regression is estimated across a matched data 
set. For this reason, matching is often used in conjunction with regression analysis rather 
than as a substitute for it.
3A.3 Selection Bias
Selection bias occurs when there is a correlation between unmeasured characteristics that 
affect the outcome of interest and program participation. The bias in the OLS regression 
with correctly specified functional form is given in equation 3. In this case unmeasured 
characteristics such as job loss affect eligibility for programs as well as the outcome 
variable of interest. Clearly matching offers no assistance in dealing with this problem. 
There are three possible solutions to this problem
1. Random assignment. Structure the program so that selection into the program is 
random and there is no correlation between program participation and any explanatory 
variable;
Regression, Matching and Random Assignment 3A page 12
2. Two stage regression procedures. Estimate two equations, one that models the 
enrolment decision and a second that models the outcome. Use either an estimate of 
the error term from the first equation to proxy the omitted variables or the predicted 
value as an instrument for program participation. Find a restriction that identifies the 
system.
3. Find more data. Including all elements of U that are correlated with training in the first 
equation will break the correlation between program participation and the residual and 
yield an unbiased estimate of program impact.
3A3.1 Random Assignment
In theory, random assignment can provide an estimate of the impact of training on the 
trained without any assumptions. The central limit theorem tells us that if y j , . . . ,  yn are a 
random sample from any probability distribution with finite mean p, and finite variance a  , 
and y„ =(1 / n ) ^ . y ,  then Jn{y„ -  ju) — —> N[0,cr2 ]. Random assignment means that
both the treatment and control groups are random samples of the parent distribution4. That 
is to say, the mean of any variable describing either population will be the same up to a 
sampling variation. Statistically significant differences between the means of the treatment 
and control groups can logically be ascribed to the treatment, so the calculation of the 
average impact of training on the trained is YT- Y C where YT is the is the mean of the 
outcome variable for the trainees and Yc is the mean of the outcome variable for the
4 If the sample that is randomly divided into treatment and control group is itself randomly 
selected from the population to which the results are to be extrapolated then the study can 
be said to have external validity. Random assignment, by itself will guarantee internal 
validity, an unbiased answer to the question, “What is the mean impact of training on the 
trained?”
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controls. The appeal of random assignment is that nothing else need be known about the 
participants in the programs, and no assumptions need be made.5
Clearly one stage regression analysis and random assignment address different issues. 
However, random assignment ensures that assumption 1 will hold. Once random 
assignment has been completed, it is common for researchers to increase the efficiency of 
their estimates by using regression analysis. In this case neither mis-specified functional 
form, nor errors in variables (except the dummy variable indicating training) will bias the 
coefficient on T. This result occurs because random assignment ensures that T is not only 
independent of U! but also of X. (See discussion in section 3A.2.6)
Conversely, if assumption 1 holds and program participation is measured accurately, then 
there is no need for random assignment.
3A3.2 Two Stage Regression
In the case of employment and training programs, there is good reason to believe a priori 
that there will be a correlation between program participation (a regressor) and the residual, 
and so the results of a one stage regression would be biased. It is still possible to produce 
consistent estimates of program impact in this event using a two stage regression technique.
If an excluded relevant variable exists, that is in this case, a variable that is known to affect 
program participation (is legitimately included in equation 2), but does not affect the 
outcome of interest and is uncorrelated with Uj (is legitimately excluded from equation 1), 
then two stage least squares can be used to produce a consistent estimate of program 
impact. To show this specify equations 1 and 2 as follows:
5 Heckman's comments on the limitations of random assignment are discussed in Chapter
3. They deal with practical problems that arise in the implementation of random 
assignment and its (limited) usefulness in answering questions other than the mean impact 
of training on the trained. The theory remains incontrovertible.
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14 Y = X(3 + T5 + e1
15 T = Zy+e2
The standard assumptions hold, except that covfo, e2) * 0 because for example, more 
motivated individuals participate in training and this motivation also increases their 
incomes.
16 d = {T'T- T'X{X'Xy' X'T)-'[T'X(X'Xy' X 'Y -  T'Y]
17 d  = S  + { T 'T - T 'X ( X 'X y l X'Ty'[T'X{X'X) ' X ’et -  T’e,]
Clearly if covfo , e2) * 0 then covfo, T ) *  0 and E(d) *  5.
A
Two stage least squares replaces T with T in equation 14. Where
18 f  = Zy , and y  is the OLS estimate of y. This gives the 2SLS estimator of 5,
19 d2SLs = ( F T - T ’X ( X X y xX'f)~x[ f 'X (XX)~ 'X 'Y-  T’Y]
Slutsky's Theorem and the consistency of the OLS estimate (plim f  =T) allow us to
substitute T for f  and (relying on the standard assumptions that
T'T X X  Xe/?lim( ) - Q x \p  lim( ) = Q2; p  lim(— -) = 0; where Q\ and Q2 are finite positive
n n n
definite matrices) obtain the result that
20 p\ imd2SLS =S + p \ i m ( f ' f - f X ( X ' X ) - l X ,T ) - ' [ T X ( X X y 'X '£ l - f ' e l ]
A A
This time, plim T e , = 0 because plim T s 2 = 0, a property of the OLS estimator.
The asymptotic variance of the two stage estimator is given by
21 o-2(f ' f - f x ( x x y ' x f ) \
We can compare the asymptotic variance of the two stage estimate with the one stage 
estimate in the specific case in which p l im ^ ^ )  = plim(A"£2) = 0. (This would occur if
  A
Z contained all the elements of X that were correlated with T.) Substituting T = T +e2 
into the formula for the asymptotic variance gives <j 2 (T'T + a \ 2 -  T’X ( X X y l X T ) 1
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which is clearly larger than equation 21 because the inverse contains the additional positive 
element g \ 2 .
Because the asymptotic variance of the OLS estimator is smaller in many practical 
circumstances, the question of which estimator gives the lower mean square error is not 
clear-cut. On the basis of his monte carlo studies, Cragg (1967 page 109) concluded “the 
choice of DLS [Direct Least Squares] also may be sensible, even for very simple models 
conforming to the assumptions under which the simultaneous-equation estimators were 
derived.” This conclusion has stood up over time. Greene, (1994 page 616) says, “The 
advantage of systems estimators in finite samples may be more modest than the asymptotic 
results would suggest.”
3A,3.2.1 Identification
Traditionally, identification is discussed in terms of either having been achieved or not. In 
this case we might say, for the order condition to be met, that is a necessary condition for 
equation 14 to be identified, there must be at least one excluded predetermined variable. 
That is, Z must contain a variable that is not in X and is not a linear combination of the 
variables in X6. Although this will show that equation 14 is identified, if the excluded 
relevant variables are not sufficiently powerful, and sufficiently independent of X, the 
variance will be so large that the estimate will be useless.
A A
For illustrative purposes, regress T on X to get T = Xg + co, substitute this into 21 and use 
the fact that co'X = 0 to get
22 <J2 ( 6 ) f6 ) )~ l .
6 AIn terms of our discussion, this will ensure that a regression of T on X will have non zero 
residuals.
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Although the presence of an excluded relevant variable means that an equation is 
technically identified, if a) 'co is not sufficiently large, it would not be identified in a 
practical sense.
3A.3.2.2 Non Linear Restrictions
An approach which has become very popular of late secures identification by imposing a 
non-linear relationship in the impact of the exogenous variables on program participation 
in equation 15. Re-write equation 15 as 
23 T* = Zy +s2
where T* is a latent variable. The variable indicating training takes the value 1 if T* > 0 
and 0 otherwise. In this model, the probability that the individual is selected for training 
will be 0(Zy), the probability that they are not selected will be 1- O(Zy). Suppose further 
that Si and e2 each have a standard normal distribution with correlation p. Then, using 
Theorem 21.4 in Greene (1990 page 740)
E(Y
E(Y
Z = 1) = XJ3 + S T+ — for the participants and
®(Zr)
Z = \ )  = XP + ST+ ~ ^ Zy)  
l - 0 ( Z y )
for the non participants.
d(Zy)
Consistent estimates of 6 can be obtained by including the terms —— — for participants
O(Zy)
-6 (Z y )an d ----------— for non participants in the regression equation.
1 -  O(Z^)
This particular technique has been criticised (Goldberger 1983) because it depends on the 
strong and untestable assumption that the errors are distributed normally.
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3A.3.2.3 M onte Carlo Experim ents
The relative advantages of various estimators when the sample is finite are not clear-cut. 
As Greene (1994 page 616) says on this subject, “Unfortunately there are few useable 
general results.” For this reason, when comparing estimators it is useful to perform monte 
carlo experiments.
The data sets used in this analysis of the earnings equations are modelled on that used by
Dickinson, Johnson and West (1986) (DJW) in their estimates of the impact of CETA on
women. They have 45 explanatory variables of which 18 are dummy variables and 11 are
interactions. Eight of the parameters are statistically significantly different from zero. The 
2 .
R m their equation was .19. They have 5,438 observations.
The data sets in the specification of the participation equation were based on personal 
experience. It included all variables specified in the earnings equation plus one excluded 
relevant variable. The model predicted participation correctly about 80% of the time.
The data set is set up as follows. There are 40 explanatory variables of which 25 are 
dummy variables. For simplicity the explanatory variables are independent. The dummy 
variables all had means of .5, the continuous variables were all uniformly distributed from 
0 to 60. 6j consisted of two parts. The first, well behaved, part had mean zero and 
standard deviation 500. The second, with mean zero and standard deviation 50, was 
included in e2, the error term of the selection equation. This gave an R2 of .13 in the 
earnings equation. The mean of the dependent variable averages just under 1,000, the 
effect of training is 100 and selection bias is just over 50. There is one excluded relevant 
variable in the selection equation which also is uniformly distributed between 0 and 60. 
When the sample size is 10,000 it has a t statistic of 15.
The parameters of equation 14 are estimated using 4 methods: ordinary least squares, two 
stage least squares, the method described in section 3 A3.2.2 on non linear restrictions 
above, first with the excluded relevant variable (A), and then without (B). The parameters
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of the models were estimated 100 times for each sample size, which increased in 
increments of 100 from 500 to 1,000 and in increments from 1,000 to 10,000. The results 
are shown in Figure 3A.1 below. For sample sizes of less than 5,000 OLS has the lowest 
mean squared error. For sample sizes greater than 5,000 the mean squared error for OLS is 
close to the mean squared error of the two stage techniques.
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This result reaffirms Greene's comment, (1994 page 616), “The advantage of systems 
estimators in finite samples may be more modest than the asymptotic results would 
suggest.”
3A.3.3 Getting more Data
This does not mean that it is impossible to estimate the impacts of employment and training 
programs without random assignment. An alternative is to get more data. Economists are 
taught in introductory texts
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The econometrician should always keep the inaccuracies of the data 
in mind. If an econometric study is not satisfactory in some sense, 
the temptation is typically to revise the model or tiy a different 
techniques. Only infrequently will the data be investigated more 
carefully and further refined or else alternative data be utilised, yet 
often the data, rather than the model or the econometric technique, 
may be the source of unsatisfactory performance. The alternative of 
improving the data or obtaining new data should be seriously 
considered in such a situation. [Intriligator 1978 page 71.]
There are three types of data that can help us make more reliable estimates. First, we can 
collect information on very large samples and use sophisticated two stage techniques. 
Second, we can collect information on additional variables that explain program 
participation as Park et al. did. Finally, we can try to collect more information on the 
variables in U.
4. Overview of the BC Study
80
The BC study, the results of 
influenced by the American 
programs. It began in 1986, 
concluded that the problem 
to use random assignment to produce useful estimates of the impacts of its 
employment and training programs. In additions the CETA studies urged 
caution in the use of econometrics. The articles by LaLonde(1986) and by Fraker 
and Maynard (1987), discussed in Chapter 2, found that some econometric 
techniques not only did not remove selection bias, but also could lead to false 
confidence in erroneous conclusions. As a result, the BC study focusses on the 
issue of selection bias and works to avoid all hidden assumptions by testing all 
techniques used.
To a young man in 1986, with no experience in estimating the impacts of 
employment and training programs, the problem of selection bias seemed 
relatively straightforward and simple. Selection bias is simply a name for a type
which are reported in this thesis was heavily 
experience in estimating the impact of the CETA 
just after the US Department of Labor had 
of selection bias was so severe that it was necessary
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of omitted variable bias, and two solutions are at hand to deal with it. One 
solution is to collect more information so that the omitted variables can be 
included in a regression equation. Another solution is to identify variables that 
are correlated with program participation but not with the outcome of interest, 
and use them to create instruments for the program participation variables. The 
instruments would be free from correlation with the omitted variables and 
would therefore generate unbiased estimates of program impact. Even if there 
were no such excluded relevant variable, Heckman (1976) had produced a 
method for securing unbiased estimates.Unfortunately, not only did the issue of 
selection bias turn out to be far from simple1, it was only one of many problems 
encountered. For example, a more fundamental problem involved finding out 
who was enrolled in the programs.
This chapter provides an overview of the BC Study, and in doing so, describes 
some of the other problems encountered. It has four sections. The first section 
gives the conceptual framework for the study, a discussion that arises from the 
difficulties in determining enrolment. The second section describes the data 
initially collected for the study, and the sources that were used/uncovered later. 
The third section reports the results of three tests that influenced the direction of 
the study. First, a test of Heckman's two stage method for correcting for 
selection bias; second, a test for non linearity, and third, a test for non response 
bias in the survey data. The final section gives a preview of the results. Three 
short appendices are attached to this chapter. The first is a brief chronology of 
the BC Study. The second gives some algebra showing the relationship between 
results produced by cell matching and those produced using regression analysis. 
The third reports regression results for survey respondents and the full sample.
1 Experience is a teacher, 
but here's what makes me bum. 
She's always teaching me the things
I do not care to learn.
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4.1 Conceptual Framework__________________________________
There is a large number of interesting questions that can be asked about a set of 
employment and training programs2, but this study is restricted to the 
examination of the subset related to the impacts of the programs on participants' 
subsequent welfare dependence and employment. Within this subset, the study 
is further restricted to estimates of the incremental impact of the programs in 
question compared with the status quo. The estimates are limited in this way as 
a direct result of the problem of identifying participants.
4.1.1 Identifying Participants
In 1986 program participants were identified by the Individual Opportunity 
Plan (IOP) code on their file. Welfare recipients who wished to take training 
would develop a plan (the IOP) in co-operation with their worker. The worker 
would make a record of the anticipated training by entering a one-digit code 
into the client's file at the time that the plan was signed. This method of tracking 
enrolment was very unsatisfactory for three reasons.
1. A busy worker might not record the plan on the system,
2. the recipients might not participate in the anticipated training, and
3. recipients without plans might participate in training. These individuals 
might receive funding through another agency such as Canada Employment 
Centres or Canada Student Loans.
The extent of inaccuracy is not trivial. In a joint project with Camosun college in 
Victoria3, 1,460 individuals were identified as students who were receiving 
welfare. Of these only 859 had an IOP code that indicated that they were
2 See e.g. Employment and Immigration Canada, 1987
3 See Chapter 7
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receiving any training, and only 716 had an IOP code that indicated that the 
individual was participating in classroom training. Another 486 individuals on 
welfare in Victoria had an IOP code that indicated that they were taking 
classroom training, although they were not at Camosun4.
4.1.2 Implications
Ignorance about program participation causes problems because members of the 
comparison group may actually be participants. This will bias the estimates of 
program  impact toward zero. Heckman and Smith (1993 p. 51) refer to this 
problem as substitution bias. Although Heckman and Smith present this as a 
mechanical problem, a conceptual distinction is also involved. Use of a 
comparison group that contains individuals who receive training results in a 
biased estimate of the impact of training compared with no training, but (as long 
as the comparison group receives a 'normal' amount of training) yields an 
unbiased estimate of the incremental impact of the new program compared with 
the status quo. Sometimes it is the comparison with the status quo that is of 
interest. For example, when we estimate the impacts of job search assistance 
programs we are interested in the incremental effect. The comparison between 
the effects of supervised job search and no search is not useful since individuals 
will do some search on their own.
The seriousness of this problem clearly depends on the likelihood of members of 
the comparison group participating in another program and the effectiveness of 
the programs in which they participate.
4 Some of these might well have been taking classroom training through another agency, for 
example the Read Society, the school board or the University. 486 puts an upper limit on the 
number coded as receiving training, but who did not actually participate.
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In the conceptual stages of the BC study, substitution bias was not considered a 
serious problem for three reasons.
1. The initial focus of the study was the new on-the-job training program s that 
were funded under the Four Corners Agreement. These programs were new, 
unusual in BC and expensive. Our discussions with our federal counterparts 
indicated that few such services were available to our clients through federal 
programs at that time.
2. The existing programs were felt to be ineffective. Abt had published a study 
that concluded "both BTSD [Basic Training and Skills Development] and 
Skill5 trainees show no significant benefit from participating in the training 
relative to a comparison group." [Abt Associates 1985, p. 7] We obtained 
similar results for welfare recipients in BC when we compared the rate of 
welfare dependence for those with IOP codes and those without. [Jamieson, 
1987]
3. Finally, the purpose of the study was not to decide whether welfare 
recipients should receive training or not, but rather to determine which types 
of training they should receive. For the former purpose, the appropriate 
comparison would be between training and nothing, but for the latter, a 
comparison with the status quo is acceptable.
Although the concept of comparing the new programs with the status quo was 
quite acceptable in 1986, its acceptability became less clear cut as time went on 
for two reasons. First, the scope of the study expanded to include all types of 
training, and second, the alternatives to the programs offered by the Ministry of
5 Both BTSD and Skill are federally funded classroom training programs.
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Social Services became more effective6. The effect of this bias (provided that 
programs do not harm participants) will be to lower the estimates of the impacts 
of the programs, so the estimates reported in this study will be conservative.
4.2 Data_______________________________________________
When the BC study was launched, two principal data sources had been 
identified, administrative data on welfare dependence and a survey of 
participants and non participants. By the end of the study, data had been 
collected from ten sources. This section describes each of these ten sets of data.
4.2.1 Welfare
The primary source of information is the administrative records of welfare 
dependence. The welfare payment records report whether a case received a 
benefit for each month since 1980. That is, up to six years of welfare history 
when the project began in 19867.
Benefits are paid to all people in need between the ages of 19 and 65; singles and 
childless couples as well as families with children. The files are linked and the 
applicant is identified by Social Insurance Number (SIN). About 1.5% of the 
cases do not have SIN's, and SIN's are not reported for dependants. (About 9% 
of adults receiving welfare are dependants.) The files also contain audited
‘ See Chapter 7 for an estimate of the impact of classroom training beginning in 1986.
7 Although these data existed, the cost of processing the data limited its usefulness, especially in 
the early stages. Considerable effort was expended in the production of estimates at minimal 
cost, and many promising areas were bypassed because they were simply too expensive. For 
example, early estimates compared partidpants with non participants whose welfare 
dependence was similar in the 25 months preceding enrolment. Data on UI dependence and 
Records of Employment were only available for a one-in-ten sample, and even that was not used 
until years after it became available. Later, longer pre-program information on welfare 
dependence was produced, but only for the one-in-ten sample that matched the UI and ROE 
samples in order to contain processing costs. This naturally had a cost in that the small 
programs and groups could not be analysed using the new data. (e.g. we did not assemble the 
long pre-program welfare histories of the RO selected group (data item 5) even though the data 
exists.)
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information on factors that affect benefits: age, sex, classification, handicapped 
designation and marital status. Welfare entitlement is determined and benefits 
are paid by month.
The administrative data used in this thesis is kept accurate by force of law. BC’s 
Ministry of Social Services employs ten auditors whose sole job is to ensure that 
payments made by the Ministry are approved under policy, are for the purposes 
recorded, and are made to the people indicated in Ministry records.
These data, by themselves, provide a means for estimating the impact of the 
programs on subsequent welfare dependence. The initial estimates of impact 
were made by drawing comparison groups from those on welfare who did not 
participate in the new programs, and who were similar to the participants in all 
recorded and audited variables, that is age, sex, marital status, classification 
handicapped status and history of welfare dependence. This method is limited 
in two significant ways. First, it only provides information on one outcome, 
welfare dependence, and many other outcomes are of interest (e.g. employment 
and earnings). Second, there are clearly many important explanatory variables 
that are missing and which could easily be correlated with program 
participation (e.g. education, employment and earnings history) and therefore 
cause selection bias.
4.2.2 The survey
An ambitious survey was launched to provide the missing information. The 
survey gathered data from four groups: one group of participants in the wage 
subsidy program, another group of participants in the public sector programs, a 
third group of participants in Job Action, and a fourth, comparison group of 
recipients who did not participate in any program. The eventual size was 1,905
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composed of: EOP 500, public sector programs 501, Job Action 389, (including 
control group) and non-participants 515. Of the 501 public sector program 
interviewees, more than three-quarters (376) came from the Community Tourism 
Employment Training Program, 20 percent (101) from the Environment Youth 
Program, and only five percent (24) from the Forest Worker Assistance Program.
From the start we were concerned about response rate. Lee Bawden of the 
Urban Institute, who provided advice on the project, told us that the standard in 
the United States required an 80% response rate, but when we let a request for 
proposals requiring an 80% response rate, no one would bid. We were fortunate 
in securing the assistance of Celia Homans, former head of NORC at the 
University of Chicago, in developing another RFP, selecting a contractor and 
providing advice in how to achieve an acceptable response rate. Information 
that would lead to increased contact rates was collected at the time the 
individual enrolled in the program (name of a contact person, normally a 
parent), this information was updated at each interview, response rates were 
monitored monthly, large numbers of attempts were made to contact by phone, 
and where these failed, face to face contact was attempted.
Interviews were conducted in three waves so that we would not lose 
respondents between waves. The first interview was conducted as soon as 
possible after the participant had entered the program or been identified as a 
comparison group member. In practice this was normally about two months 
after they had enrolled in the program. They were interviewed again six months 
later and again nine months after that. The final set of interviews was conducted 
about 17 months after the participants had entered their programs in order to
i
examine the circumstances of the interviewees after their program participation
i
had ended and after any associated UI eligibility had expired.
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The survey work was performed under contract by Campbell Goodell 
Consultants. The cost was about $180 per Wave 3 contact, but paid off with a 
75.1% response rate", the best response rate for this type of respondent yet 
achieved in Canada9.
The main source for the questionnaire was the questionnaire used in the Urban 
Institute's evaluation of Massachussets' ET Choices program (Nightingale, 1991.) 
additional questions were asked regarding barriers to employment, attitudes to 
themselves (the Nowicki-Strickland locus of control measure) and attitudes to 
work. Analysis of the attitudinal variables was extremely frustrating, since none 
of them was statistically significant in an equation predicting subsequent welfare 
dependence. Apparently, this finding is far from new. The technology for 
measuring these attitudes for these purposes apparently does not exist, and these 
attitudinal variables (motivation, determination, etc.) are generally referred to as 
unmeasurable10.
Interpretation of the results of the survey relating to earnings was also 
frustrating. Inconsistencies in the data were common with many individuals 
reporting more than 100 hours per week, overlapping employment etc. Sorting 
out these problems is a field of expertise in its own right", and this survey 
would have profited from the application of this expertise12. Nonetheless, the 
survey did produce measures of schooling, employment history, and 
employment subsequent to the program that were relatively easy to interpret.
*This response rate is calculated as the number of wave 3 contacts divided by the number of 
names initially supplied to the contractor.
9 By contrast, the response rate on the National Institutional Training Program Evaluation, 
reported above, was less than 35%.
10 D. Lee Bawden, personal communication.
11 Paul Decker, personal communication.
12 The strong impression that I came away with was that saying that 'econometrics, like sausage, 
was better not seen in the making,' could equally be applied to survey research.
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4.2.3 Program Participation
The other essential ingredient needed to estimate the impacts of programs is 
information on enrolment. As noted above, the existing source, IOP codes, were 
unreliable, so a new system for tracking enrolment in the on-the-job training 
program s was devised. Employers were required to identify the participants 
and the period for which the wages were paid on the billing forms that they 
subm itted to the Ministry. Start dates were defined as the first date for which a
wage subsidy payment was made. Where these forms were improperly filled
\
out or missing, the start date would appear to be later than the true start date.
With these three sources of information, a reasonable study was possible. 
However, in the implementation of the survey, three other sources of data were 
developed to enhance the study, one from a survey of rehab officers (RO's) in the 
province, and two from the Participant Referral Form.
4.2.4 Participant Referral Form
In order to develop a sample for the survey, a participant referral form was 
developed. The forms were filled out by the rehab officer and client at the time 
that the client was referred to a program. This was then carried by the client to 
the potential employer as a letter of introduction. The employer would complete 
| the form and return it to the Ministry.
I
| The most im portant element on the form was a declaration by the client that 
h e /sh e  agreed to participate in the evaluation. Although this was completely 
voluntary more than 95% agreed to participate. In addition, the form collected 
information on education, information on contacts, identified the employer, and 
identified whether the client had been hired or rejected by the employer. This 
latter group, that had made it almost all the way through the selection process, 
was used in a test for selection bias. (See Chapter 5.)
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4.2.5 Survey of RO's
We w anted the comparison group for the survey to be as similar to the 
participants as possible in both measured and unmeasured variables. We felt 
| that the RO's would be the best source since they would be most familiar with
| the type of individual that they referred to programs, and so we enlisted their
aid. We asked each of the roughly 70 RO's to identify 7 clients that they judged 
to be similar to participants in the on-the-job training programs, but who had not 
participated. This was a very labour intensive process, both for the RO's who 
had to identify and contact the clients, and also for the support staff in the 
Research, Evaluation and Statistics Branch who had to nag each RO to make
!
h is/her contribution. Nonetheless, this initiative was a great success13 with the 
RO's identifying about 500 members for the comparison group.
We were also able to obtain or develop data with which to shed additional light 
on the issues after the survey had begun. Two sources resulted from an 
information exchange agreement between the provincial and federal 
governments. A section on exchanging information for research purposes was 
added to the existing administrative agreement specifically for the purpose of 
I enhancing our estimates of the impact of the employment and training 
programs. Although such exchanges were anticipated in the Four Corners 
Agreement, BC was the first province to sign such an agreement. It provided 
information from two sources on a one-in-ten sample.
4.2.6 ROE's
Information on pre-program earnings was provided by a one-in-ten sample of 
records of employment (ROE's). These forms m ust be submitted to the federal
13 Thanks in large part to the work of Leslie Matheson, our supervisor of Admin Services.
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Ministry of Human Resources Development whenever an individual leaves 
employment that is UI insurable. HRD reports that about 93% of the paid labour 
force is covered by UI. This includes all wage and salary employees who work 
at least 15 hours per week or who earn more than a stipulated amount, $156 per 
week in 1994. (Canada 1994 page 93) There are three main weaknesses in these 
data that apply to their use in this study. First, because these forms are only 
completed at the time of separation they cannot provide information on ongoing
employment. Second, since Unemployment Insurance claims are based on the
\
last year of employment, employers are only required to provide accurate 
information on the last 12 months of employment. For people who leave 
employment that they have held for more than a year, the level of earnings for 
prior years is not available, and the true start date may not be reported 
accurately. Third, the earnings information on each record of employment is 
only available as an average for the period reported, up to one year, and does 
not show growth. In addition, ROE's, especially those not used in support of a 
UI claim, m ust suffer data entry problems like those of any form that is 
completed manually, irregularly, and by a wide variety of individuals.
Although the ROE's are not a good source of information on ongoing 
employment, they are an excellent source of information on the history of 
employment for people in these programs. Because participants in these 
program s are drawn from people on welfare, and because the programs provide 
full time jobs, we can be confident that the participants have terminated their 
previous employment, and records of employment will have been issued for 
them. ROE's will provide a complete history. Similarly, if the comparison 
group is chosen from individuals on welfare who do not declare earnings14, the 
ROE's will provide a complete history of earnings and employment.
“except when earnings are not accurately reported
The BC Study 92
The usefulness of records of employment in examining post-program histories of 
employment is limited because ROE's are not produced until employment is 
terminated. An unknown number of participants will not have terminated 
employment at the time the data are collected and an absence of records could 
indicate either ongoing employment or ongoing unemployment. Average 
earnings based on ROE's in the post-enrolment period will understate true 
average earnings for both the treatment and comparison groups by an unknown
amount. Readers are cautioned not to interpret post-program earnings in the
\
graphs in Chapter 5 as reliable estimates of program impact on earnings.
4.2.7 Unemployment Insurance (UI)
The information exchange agreement also provided information on use of 
Unemployment Insurance (UI). The UI file records payments to the same one- 
in-ten sample as the ROE's. As well as information on UI benefits paid, it 
contains information on the age and sex of the recipient. This file records 
benefits paid by week.
4.2.8 Job Action Pilot Project
More data was generated by the Region A Job Action Pilot Project. Region A, 
which comprises the south-western part of greater Vancouver, volunteered to 
test the concept of providing job search assistance to applicants for welfare at the 
time of application. Further, the region very kindly agreed to integrate random  
assignment into their program. The Job Action Pilot Project enhanced the BC 
study in two ways. First it enabled us to broaden the range of programs for 
which estimates were produced. Second, it generated one estimate of impact 
that was, for methodological reasons, free from selection bias against which a 
non experimental estimate might be compared.
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4.2.9 Classroom Training
In 1990, results from the Urban Institute's Evaluation of ET Choices became 
available (Nightengale, 1991). That study produced dis-aggregated estimates of 
the impact of classroom training. They found that neither adult basic education 
(ABE) nor English as a second language (ESL) had a beneficial impact, but that 
vocational training did. This was one of the first optimistic findings regarding 
classroom training, and it prompted us to approach Camosun College, the local
community college and propose a joint study. They agreed, and we matched
\
tapes to identify individuals on welfare who were taking classroom training.
We developed a comparison group using administrative data on welfare 
dependence and produced estimates of program impact for four types of 
classroom training, ABE, vocational, career-technical and academic. The 
estimates of the impact of classroom training greatly enhanced the BC study 
because more welfare recipients participate in classroom training than all other 
types of training combined.
4.2.10 Clients Classified as Job Ready in an Interview
The final source of data came from a contractor who was hired to identify job-
ready clients. When the contract was finished, it became apparent that very few 
of the clients who were classified as job ready on the basis of an interview 
actually went on to participate in an on-the-job training program. Because the 
group was large (over 4,000) and the criteria for classification included variables 
that are not normally recorded15, it provided an excellent means of testing for 
selection bias.
4.2.11 Summary of Sources of Data
This section described ten sources of data used in this thesis. They were
,s e.g. Interviewers were asked to note "sloppy, careless dress"
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1. administrative data on welfare benefits paid;
2. a survey of participants and non participants;
3. participant referral forms that identified participants and rejectees;
4. monthly claim forms that identified participants in on-the-job training 
programs;
5. a survey of RCfs that identified a group of non participants who, in the 
opinion of the RCy s were similar to participants in measured and 
unm easured characteristics;
6. Records of Employment that provided histories of employment and earnings 
on a one-in-ten sample of the BC population;
7. administrative records of UI payments that provided histories of UI 
dependence both pre- and post program for a one-in-ten sample of the BC 
population;
8. the Job Action Pilot Project that identified a participant and control group of 
job club participants;
9. classroom training records from Camosun College that identified welfare 
recipients who participated in classroom training and the courses that they 
took; and
10. a group of individuals who by self identification and interview were 
identified as job ready.
Comparison groups were draw n in two distinct manners
A. comparison groups that matched participants in variables recorded in 1. 
above and
B. comparison groups that matched participants in variables recorded in 1. 6. 
and 7. above.
4.3 Three Tests_________________________________________
The BC study began in an era of scepticism regarding arcane (and even 
common) statistical techniques. As a result, the study includes m any tests for 
reliability. Most of these were related to selection bias and are reported in 
Chapter 5. But the results of three tests had a more fundam ental effect on the 
approach taken in the study. These were:
1. tests of Heckman's two stage method for dealing w ith selection bias.
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2. tests for undetected non linearity.
3. tests for non response bias.
4.3.1 A common two stage m ethod
The selection bias correction technique described in Chapter 3A, Section 3.2.2 is 
w idely used (see e.g. HRD 1993), but unfortunately, it has been shown to be very 
sensitive to assumptions regarding the distribution of the error terms. 
Goldberger (1983) showed that if the error terms deviated even slightly from 
normal substantial bias would be introduced.
This is particularly relevant in the estimation of the impacts of employm ent and 
training program s for disadvantaged individuals because our dependent 
variables are likely to be truncated. This truncation is obvious when the 
dependent variable is the percentage of time employed (which is bounded by 
zero and one) or UI dependence16 which is bounded by zero and maximum 
benefits. It is perhaps less obvious in the case of earnings which are widely 
assumed to be log normally distributed, an approximation that may w ork well at 
the m iddle of the distribution, but which is a poor approximation for 
disadvantaged workers where the distribution is truncated as a result of income 
support programs and minimum wage laws.
Table 4.1 illustrates the fragility of estimates produced using this technique 
w hen the error terms are not distributed normally.
The m odel is specified as in chapter 3A:
16 These were dependent variables in equations estimated using this technique in HRD Canada 
1993.
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1 Y = XP + T5 + Sl
2 T  = Zy +82
w here T* is a latent variable. The variable T, indicating training takes the value 1
if T* > 0 and 0 otherwise. X is specified as 2 independent variables that are
normally distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation 50. Z contains both X 
variables. All elements of p and y are 1, except the constant which is zero. 5=40. 
There are three error terms each normally distributed with m ean zero and 
standard deviation 50, referred to below as r|i, rj2, and r\3. ei = r|i + r|2> and 82 = r|3 
+ rj2. Throughout, the sample size is 10,000 and the parameters of the models are 
estimated 100 times.
In the first row of table 4.1, where the assumptions of the model hold, the results 
are encouraging. The estimate of 5 is unbiased and the variance is reasonable.
The second row reports the results when 2.5 percent of the outcome variable is 
censored at each end of the distribution. This apparently trivial deviation from 
the normal distribution increases the estimate of the coefficient, 5 by two thirds. 
Although the assumption of normal or log normal distributions of income may 
be appropriate in some populations, it clearly is not in this population where 
roughly half of program participants are dependent on welfare in any given 
m onth in the subsequent four years.
This suggests that a more realistic censoring w ould censor a higher proportion 
an only on one side of the distribution. The third row reports the result w hen 
25% of the sample is censored on one side. As expected, the bias is larger.
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The fourth row replicates the third row, except that a variable relevant to the 
selection equation, but that does not affect the outcome variable, is included. 
Even w ith an excluded relevant variable, the distribution's seemingly minor 
deviation from normal results in considerable bias.
Table 4-1 Sensitivity of two-stage method 
described is Chapter 3A, Section 3.2.2
Model Characteristics Mean 
Estimates 
of 5
Var.
Error terms normal 39.0 94
2.5% of dependent 
variable censored at 
each end of 
distribution.
67.3 94
25% of dependent 
(variable censored at 
one end of 
distribution.
90.1 64
2.5% censored as 
above, bu t equation 3 
contains a relevant 
variable, that is 
excluded from 
equation 1.
61.3 65
Two stage least 
squares
38.4 328
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The final row gives the results for two stage least squares. It is unbiased and has 
a lower mean squared error.
4 . 3 , 1 , 1  Im pact on th e  BC s tu d y
The results of this test had both a direct and an indirect effect on the study. The 
direct effect was a decision to not use that method. The indirect effect was a 
tendency to search out new data rather than new statistical methods. In 1986 
Heckman's method was still considered valid and useful16 even though 
Goldberger had published his study showing that it had severe problems three 
years earlier. Perhaps more significantly, Goldberger's study was not published 
until seven years after Heckman had proposed the method and it had become 
widely accepted. This suggests that "recent developments in econometrics" that 
Heckman and Smith (1993a p. 65) allude to may well be shown, in five or six 
years, to have some as yet undetected sensitivities17. This possibility, combined 
with existing scepticism regarding arcane statistical techniques1* dictated that the 
BC study not rely on a new statistical technique.
4.3.2 Undetected Non Linearity
Ordinary least squares regression analysis seems old fashioned to economists, but to 
many without a background in quantitative analysis it seems arcane, and for that 
reason alone should be subject to scrutiny in this study. However, there are two
u Human Resources Development Canada continued to use the method in 1989. See e.g. Goss, 
Gilroy & Associates Ltd. 1989, Appendix G.
17 In any event, they have not released the computer programs that they used in their estimation
of the impacts of the JTPA so the process of independent verification hasn't even started yet.
11 This scepticism was particularly acute in the Ministry of Social Services as a result of the
Ministry's forecasting activities. In the 1970's considerable resources were devoted to predicting
caseload growth, and an econometric model was produced. Although it was a single equation
model, it was considered state of the art when it was introduced. (It controlled for
heteroskedastidty!!) However, it under-predicted the growth of the caseload in the recession of
the early 1980's badly.
The BC Study 99
additional reasons for testing the appropriateness of using regression analysis in 
producing estimates of the impact of employment and training programs in British 
Columbia.
The first is that non linearities are common in relationships in welfare data. Rob 
Bruce (1994 and personal communication) in estimating the probability of leaving 
welfare in BC, estimated thirty separate models19 because F-tests led to rejection of
the hypothesis that pooling the data was acceptable.
\
The second is that there is a history of suspicion regarding functional form in 
employment and training programs. The main contractor for the US Department of 
Labor controlled specifically for undetected non linearity in their model and 
concluded that they had been wise to do so. (Bryant and Rupp 1987) In addition 
Dickinson, Johnson and West (1986)20 found that restricting the sample frame 
improved the regression results although within the restricted sample matching plus 
regression analysis offered no advantage over regression analysis by itself.
This section outlines the problem, and shows how it applies in the data used in this 
thesis and how matching can reduce the problem.
4 . 3 . 2 . 1  The Problem
Figures 4-1 and 4-2 show the actual (non linear) and fitted (linear) relationships 
between history of welfare dependence and subsequent welfare dependence for 
two non random samples of non participants. The first group was selected to 
have roughly even distribution of welfare histories (from zero to 12 months in
19 He had initially intended to estimate 48 models, but reduced it to thirty because the sample 
sizes were small in some of the sub groups.
30 Mahalanobis metric matching is a popular alternative to the cell matching used here, but 
Dickinson, Johnson and West found that the technique offered no improvement over cell 
matching. Its disadvantages are that it requires more comparisons, and it generates a one to one 
match. Cell matching gives one to many matches if the matches are available.
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the previous year). The second sample was selected to have a distribution of 
welfare histories like that of the individuals in data source 10. The distribution 
for the second sample was far from even with almost 70% having been 
dependent on welfare for all 12 months in the previous year, and less than 1% 
having been dependent for zero months in the previous year.
Actual6 ■■
—  —  Fitted
2 ■■
history of welfare dependence
Figure 4-1 Actual and fitted (linear) welfare dependence, even distribution of 
welfare histories.
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history of welfare dependence
Figure 4-2. Actual and fitted (linear) welfare dependence, distribution of welfare 
histories like that found in group identified by interview (data source 10).
The relationship between prior welfare dependence and subsequent welfare 
dependence is similar for the two groups, and obviously non-linear in both 
cases. But the similarity in the relationship does not prevent the OLS fitted 
estimates from being very different. The coefficient on welfare history was .29 (t 
= 43.5) for the first group and .50 (t = 13.1) for the second group.
The effect of this difference will be to bias coefficients of variables that are 
correlated with deviations from linearity. A third regression gives us an 
indication of the extent of the bias that would result from m is-spedfying the 
functional form in this way. The coefficient on a dum m y variable identifying 
members of the selected group of is .9 or 7.5 percentage points (t=10.0). Recall 
that both groups were selected from non participants, were selected only on the 
basis of observed characteristics, and differed only in the distribution of 
observed characteristics.
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Although the sample sizes in this example were large enough (20,000) to show 
the non linearities, we rarely have this luxury. Further, relationships other than 
that between welfare history and subsequent welfare benefits might also be mis- 
specified. Figure 4-3 shows the relationship between welfare history and 
subsequent welfare dependence for single men and single parents. Clearly the 
two relationships are not parallel, as would be implied by a functional form that 
included one of these family types as a dummy variable.
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Figure 4-3 Relationship between welfare history and subsequent dependence 
single men and single parents.
4 . 3 , 2 . 2  A Solu tion
Fortunately, a solution to the problem of undetected non linearity has been 
proposed. Cochran and Rubin (1973) suggest that the comparison group be selected 
such that it is as similar as possible (in the explanatory variables) to the treatment 
group. If the match is one-to-one then no weighting is necessary. However, if the 
matching is one-to-many, then the comparison group observations must be 
weighted by the inverse of the number of matches. In this case, where we have a 
discrete explanatory variable, several members of the "treatment" group are
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matched with many members of the comparison group. In those cases the weights 
equal the inverse of the ratio of the number of comparison group matches to the 
number of treatment group matches.
4 . 3 . 2 . 3  Impact on the BC Study
This section has shown that reasonable specifications of functional form can lead 
to bias. This did not lead to a rejection of regression analysis altogether, bu t did 
lead to a greater tendency to use matched comparison groups.
4.3.3 Non response bias
Non-response bias is another form of omitted variable bias. It arises if the 
individuals who respond to a survey have characteristics different from the 
sample as a whole and if these characteristics are correlated both with program  
participation and with the outcome of interest. Non-response bias can arise if, 
for example, participants are more likely to respond than non participants 
(perhaps due to gratitude for the provision of the program) and if those who are 
less successful are more likely to respond (perhaps since those still on welfare 
would be easier to find or might feel an obligation to co-operate, or those who 
are independent of welfare are disinclined to have any further contact with 
welfare).
If we estimate the impact of the program using OLS to estimate the parameters 
of an equation of the form 
y = X,Pi + A jP 2 +e
but only observe X,, the extent of the bias in b, the estimate of P, is given by:
(x^r^p,
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Heroic efforts were made to increase the response rate in the survey in order to 
minimise problems with non response bias. Standard practice in dealing with 
potential non response bias is to increase the response rate, and success of the 
contractor in achieving a high response rate in our survey was notable. 
Nonetheless, the 25% of the sample that was not contacted was dramatically 
different from the 75% who were contacted. Administrative data showed that 
only 28% of the missing respondents were dependent on welfare 18 months after 
enrolling in a program or being selected for a comparison group, compared with 
43% of the interviewed respondents.
These figures do not, by themselves, indicate that the results will be biased. If 
the omitted variables are not important or if they are not correlated w ith 
program participation ( (X(X} )_1 X[X2 « 0) then the bias will also be close to zero. 
Fortunately, Griliches(1986) has shown us a way to improve on the OLS 
estimates produced using information on the survey respondents when there is 
additional information on the full sample. In this case we have administrative 
information (program, age, sex, family type, classification and history of welfare 
dependence) on the full sample. He suggests that we estimate the parameters of 
equations in which each of the explanatory variables is on the left in turn and the 
rest of the explanatory variables are on the right hand side. Then use these 
parameters to produce predicted values for the missing variables.
Following this procedure has a dramatic impact on the estimates of impact of the 
program. A regression equation with welfare receipt 18 months after enrolment 
in the program as the dependent variable61 was estimated using the 
administrative and survey data, but sample was restricted to the survey
61 The mean of this (dummy) dependent variable is .43 for the survey sample and .39 for the full 
sample. Amemiya (1981) has shown that over the range 30% to 70% the coefficients of the linear
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respondents. The attached tables22 with the results of the regressions show that 
the all of the programs reduced dependence on welfare. The Community 
Tourism Employment Training Program (PGM1) reduced the probability of 
dependence in month 18 by 8.1 percentage points (t=2.2), the Employment 
Opportunity Program (EOP) by 13.9 percentage points (t=4.0) the Environment 
Youth Program (EYP) by 10.5 percentage points (t=l .7), job clubs by 5.0 
percentage points (t=1.3) and the Forest Worker Assistance Program (FWAP) by
21.8 percentage points (t=1.8). But when we include the observation for the non-
\
respondents, the coefficients on program participation change substantially. The 
coefficients associated with participation in EOP and FWAP fall from 13.9 and
21.8 percentage points to 9.1 (t=3.1) and 16.7 (t=1.8) respectively. Even more 
dramatic was the impact on the coefficients associated with participation in 
CTETP, EYP and job clubs, that fell to .2,1.8 and 2.6 respectively, all with f s  less 
than .6
4 . 3 . 3 . 1  Impact on the BC Study
The finding that, even with an unusually high response rate, non response bias 
could result in a qualitative change in the estimates was a major contributor to 
the decision to use survey data less and administrative data more.
4.4 Program impact________________________________________
A full discussion of the impacts of the various types of employment and training 
programs for welfare recipients in British Columbia is given in Chapters 6 and 7. 
At this point, however, it is useful to provide a preview. The initial estimates of 
program impact were made using cell matching with administrative data. Three 
hundred and fifty cells were created for each month:
” In appendix C.
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• Five sex and marital status classes: single men, single women, couples, 
two parent families, and one parent families
• Two employability classes: employable and unemployable
• Five age classes: under 23 years old, 23-30, 30-33, 33-50, over 50 years old
• Seven welfare-experience classes: out of the previous 25 months received 
benefits in no months, 1-3 months, 4-7, 8-12,13-22, 23-24, all 25 months.
Each month, participants and non participants were divided into these 350 cells. 
This generated a comparison group for each participant, the non participants in 
the same cell as the participant This group was unchanged over the observation 
period. The post program welfare dependence of EOP participants could then 
be compared w ith the comparison group, and a weighted23 average dependence 
calculated. Results are given in Figure 4-1. It shows a dramatic reduction in the 
welfare dependence of the participants in the initial months together w ith a 10 to 
15 percentage points difference in welfare dependence that lasts throughout the 
48 month observation period. As with all of the graphs that follow, the X axis 
measures the num ber of months since the event in question, in this case 
enrolm ent in EOP. We were able to follow the welfare dependence of early 
enrolees in EOP and their comparison group for 48 months. The full sample is 
tracked for 24 months. The difference in welfare dependence between the 
participants and the comparison group is shown on the lower graph. The 
confidence interval is very narrow  because (for this study of this program) the 
sample size is very large. There were 8,940 participants and more24 (probably 
m any more) comparison group members. The difference in the sample size is 
reflected in the confidence intervals.
23 The average dependence of the non participants in the cell weighted by the number of 
participants in that cell.
24 In the early studies I created generic comparison groups in order to reduce computing costs. 
All non-partidpants (in excess of 100,000) were grouped into cells and then comparison groups 
were generated for each program using the cells that matched the partidpants for that program. 
I did not have the computer print out the final comparison group size, but the match is at least 
one-to-one in each case since no blank cells were used.
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Figure 4-4 Percent dependent on welfare, EOP participants and com parison 
group
There are several interesting features of this result. Perhaps the first to catch the 
eye is the finding that two m onths after enrolm ent only half of the participants 
are independent of welfare. This result is due to tw o factors, d rop  outs and  top 
ups. Recall that individuals are defined as participants if they receive any wages
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from an employer, even if they dropout of the program on the first day. Records 
of Employment indicate that almost 40% of participants in this program end 
employment within three months of starting. Second, individuals who receive 
income from employment that is less than the escape level for welfare m ay 
continue to receive (top up) benefits. Although a wage of $7 per h o u r24 at 35 
hours per week generates an income above the escape level for a single, this 
income is below the escape level for families with children. Almost 40% of
participants in EOP were from cases with children.
\
Second, the rates of dependency for both the participants and the comparison 
group are strikingly high. Roughly half of participants, and people like the 
participants (the comparison group) were dependent on welfare four years later. 
This indicates that selection into this program is not characterised by extreme 
"creaming." In addition, this graph paints an interesting picture of welfare 
dependence that differs from the standard description based on spells of 
dependence. For example, Cragg (1994) reports that of his 18 subgroups, only 
female single parents over 35 years of age have more than 10% (at 10.1%) of 
spells with duration longer than 48 months. There are two differences between 
this graph and the graphs by Cragg (1994) or Cragg and Barrett (1995). First, the 
program participants are less likely to leave since they typically are well into a 
spell of dependence at the time that they enter the program, and state 
dependence has been clearly established for this group (See Cragg, 1994; Barrett, 
1994; or Bruce, 1994). Second, this graph includes returns to dependence which 
is excluded from the analysis of spells.
Another interesting feature is the hint regarding the interaction between welfare 
and Unemployment Insurance. The increase in welfare dependence at around
24 This is not to say that none of the cases with children became independent as a result of the 
program. Although many of the placements were at $7 per hour some were at higher wages.
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six months coincides with the end of the subsidy and the achievement of UI 
eligibility in many cases. This could result in a job separation, followed by a 
short spell of welfare dependence while the Unemployment Insurance claim is 
processed. Roughly 12 months later, the UI eligibility would expire, and there is 
an associated return to welfare. (This relationship is more pronounced in 
program s with a specific duration of six months. See Chapter 7.)
Finally, the graph shows impacts that last throughout the observation period.
\
Although this program is described as on-the-job training, it consisted almost 
entirely in placing an individual in a job. This, it was felt, would result in some 
on-the-job training, though not necessarily more than the participant would have 
received in a different job. If the program is interpreted in this light, then the 
difference in the subsequent welfare dependence can be interpreted as scarring, 
the deleterious effects of a bout of welfare dependence on the non participants.
It is appropriate at this point to wonder if the participant's success following this 
program should be attributed to some unmeasured variables that are correlated 
with program participation (selection bias) or to the program itself. That 
question is addressed in the next chapter.
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4.5 Appendix 4-A: Chronology______________________________
Table 4-1: Chronology:__________________________________________________
Septem ber 1985: Four Corners Agreement announced by federal and provincial
ministers responsible for social services.
February 1986: Bill Warburton hired by the Research, Evaluation and Statistics 
Branch of the Ministry of Social Services.
A pril 1986: Letter pf understanding implementing the Four Corners Agreement 
in BC comes into force, and funding for new programs begins.
A pril 1987: Begin identification of job-ready clients by interview by contractor. 
June 1987: Estimate of the impact of the existing training programs is produced. 
Septem ber 1987: Canada/BC agreement on exchange of information signed. 
December 1987: Early estimates of impact of wage subsidy programs.
February 1988: Funding for enhancements to evaluations of employment and 
training programs approved.
January 1989: Contract with survey research firm signed and survey begins. 
January 1989: Region A Job Action Pilot Project begins.
February 1989: Survey of RCKs (for comparison g ro u p ) begins.
April 1989: Minister reports estimates of impacts of programs to colleagues at 
meeting of federal/provincial ministers responsible for social services.
October 1989: Agreement for joint study with Camosun College.
April 1991: Wave 3 of the survey completed.
October 1992: Report on effectiveness of employment and training programs 
released by Ministry of Social Services.
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4.6 Appendix 4-B: The relationship between the results from 
matching and the results from regression analysis_______________
Suppose that we have a data set with N observations. N, observations have had 
a treatm ent (participants) and N2 have not had the treatment (the comparison 
group). (N, + N2 = N)
Y is the outcome of interest and X is a (kxl) vector of explanatory variables.
\
The relationship among the variables is
1. Y = xp + T5 + e
T is a dum m y variable indicating training, and 8 is the average training effect. 
We sort the observations so thatT  is an (Nxl) vector with N, Ts followed by N2 
0's.
Using the standard result for a partitioned regression (See e.g. Greene, 1990, 
page 182) gives
2. d  = (T T )1 T'(Y - Xb)
where d and b are the OLS estimates of 5 and p.
As a result of the simple nature of T the following relationships hold.
(TT)*1 = 1 /N
rr = w,^
T ' X ^ N ^
Where Yx and X, are the means of Y and X across the first N, observations. 
Substituting, these relationships into 2 gives
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W e also know that
4. Y = X b + T d  since with OLS the mean of the estimated error is zero
w hen a constant is included among the regressors. Decomposing these means 
into the means for participants and comparison group gives:
7. &=(F2x 2)''x2y,
Substituting this into 3 gives
8. d = -  X i (F 2 X2 Y'Xi Y^
Premultiplying both sides by X'i  gives
9. F 2d = F 2yI - F 2x 1( r 2x 2)- ,F 2)7-
If the means of the explanatory variables are the same for the treatment and 
comparison groups then any of the k equations can be solved to get
10. d = Y] -T1
That is to say, if the means of the explanatory variables are the same for the 
treatment and comparison groups then the difference in means of the 
explanatory variables (the matching result) is equal to the coefficient on the 
dum m y variable for treatment in an OLS (best linear unbiased estimator) 
regression.
5.
then using 3 gives
6. Y2 = X2b
or
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4.7 Appendix 4-C: Regression Results, survey respondents and full
sample
Table 4-2 Coefficients on models of 
welfare dependence for survey 
respondents and full sample.
Survey
Respondents
Only
Full Sample
N 1424 1974
Variable Coefficient
(t-statistic)
1. Constant .476 .252
V (6.9) (5.0)
2. A dum m y variable that takes the 0.032 0.057
value 1 if the individual is a single (0.9) (1.9)
female
3. A dum m y variable that takes the -0.0755 -.092
value 1 if the individual is in a case (-1.1) (-1.6)
with two adults and no children
4. A dum m y variable that takes the -0.031 -.0088
value 1 if the individual is in a case (-0.6) (-0.2)
with two adults and children
5. A dum m y variable that takes the 0.044 .076
value 1 if the individual is a single (1.3) (2.6)
parent
6. A dum m y variable that takes the -0.0458 .048
value 1 if the individual is classified (-1.3) (1.6)
as unemployable.
7. The num ber of months in which 0.016 .018
welfare benefits were paid during the (8.2) (11.2)
period 1 to 25 months before selection
8. Years of elementary and secondary -.018 -.0054
schooling (4.0) (-1.9)
9. A dum my variable that takes the -.054 -.061
value 1 if the individual declared any (-2.1) (-2.8)
post secondary training.
10. A dum m y variable that takes the .0014 .018
value 1 if the individual declared any (0.04) (.6)
university training.
11. Employment history (in months) -.000359
(-0.7)
-.000148
(-.3)
12. Age (in months) .579E-04
(0.5)
.134E-04
(.1)
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13. A dum m y variable that takes the 
value 1 if the individual participated 
in CTETP.
-0.081
(-2.2)
.0023
(.1)
14. A dum m y variable that takes the -0.139 -.10
value 1 if the individual participated (-4.0) (-3.1)
in EOP.
15. A dum m y variable that takes the -0.104 -.026
value 1 if the individual participated (-1.7) (-.5)
in EYC.
16. A dum m y variable that takes the -0.050 -.018
value 1 if the individual participated (1.3) (-.6)
in Job Action. v
17. A dum m y variable that takes the -0.218 -.17
value 1 if the individual participated (-1.8) (-1.8)
in FEP.
5. Is Selection Bias the Bogeyman?
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One legacy of CETA is a fear of selection bias and a hearty scepticism of 
estimates of the impact of employment and training programs that are not based 
on random  assignment. For the most part, the estimates of the impact of 
employment and training programs reported in Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis 
are not based on random assignment, and, as a result of the CETA experience, 
some people may view them with scepticism.
This chapter examines the issue of selection bias to determine whether this 
scepticism would be well founded. In addition, it provides insight into the 
nature of selection bias, and provides answers to the four questions identified at 
the end of Chapter 3:
• Can we conduct post-program tests for selection bias without random  
assignment?
• Are pre-program tests for selection bias reliable? and as a subsidiary 
question,
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• Does robustness to choice of base year mean that differences in 
differences estimators are unbiased?
• Are unmeasurable variables the primary source of selection bias?
• Why did different researchers come up with such different estimates of the 
impacts of the CETA programs?
The chapter has five sections. The remainder of the introduction provides some 
background on the selection process. The second section gives the results of five 
tests for selection bias. The analysis in it leads to the conclusion that scepticism 
regarding the results of this study would not be well founded. Taken together, 
the results of the tests lead to the conclusion that the estimates reported in 
Chapters 6 and 7 are reliable and that selection bias amounts to less than five 
percentage points. In addition, the tests illustrate the principle that it is possible 
to test observational studies for bias in the absence of random  assignment.
In the third section evidence is presented that shows that pre-program tests are 
not reliable in the data, estimation techniques and selection mechanisms 
investigated here. This result holds even when many years of pre-program data 
are available. Further, robustness to choice of base year does not mean that 
differences in differences estimators are unbiased.
The fourth section shows that unmeasurables are not the primary source of 
selection bias. Rather, failure to control adequately for changes in major 
explanatory variables is a much more important source of variation in estimates, 
even in this relatively sparse data set and with this relatively vigorous selection 
mechanism.
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The fifth section finds that the large differences in the estimates of the CETA 
programs produced by Westat (See, e.g., Bryant and Rupp, 1987) and those 
produced by Dickinson Johnson and West (1986) could have resulted from the 
fact that annual earnings data is inadequate to detect many pre-program dips in 
earnings. CETA participants experienced a dip in their earnings before enrolling 
in the program. Evidence presented in this chapter shows that if the dips 
experienced by CETA participants1 were similar to the dips experienced by 
participants in programs in British Columbia, then it would not be possible to 
detect and control for the pre-program dip in earnings adequately with annual 
data.
5.1.1 Selection
Bias in estimates occurs when omitted variables are correlated both with 
program participation and with the outcome of interest. This bias is referred to 
as selection bias when it is the selection process that causes the former 
correlation. One approach to dealing with selection bias is to examine and 
model the selection process explicitly. If, for example, researchers can identify 
factors that affect program participation but that do not affect the outcome of 
interest, then it becomes possible to estimate the impact of programs using a two 
stage estimator.2
An alternative, followed in this thesis, is to investigate the circumstances under 
which selection bias occurs and the extent to which selection bias is a problem. 
Careful modelling of the selection process is not an integral part of this approach
’For a detailed discussion of the 'dip' in the American context, see, e.g. Devine and Heckman, 
1994 or Heckman and Smith, 1994
This approach is being followed by Devine and Heckman (1994). Diagram 1 suggests that 
modelling the various paths into the programs is a daunting task indeed.
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and so a detailed description of the selection process is not included in this 
thesis.
Posslbla screening ra: 8 
mo, Job readiness, 
realistic employability
R.O.
Special
needs
Other
programs
Employable and 
show up
Direct F.A.W job 
referral
R.O, job  referral
Unemployable, no 
shows
Job  Action
Employable 
w.r.t. 1.102
FAW
Direct R.O. job 
referral
moiviouaiH.u. or 
F.A.W. 
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Employable and 
show up
R.O Information 
session
No-shows or 
judged 
unem ployable a t 
Info, session
IA At m erit
O ther Program s or 
nothing
R.O. Job referral
Self Market
Diagram 5-1 Model of selection mechanism
Nonetheless, the extent to which selection occurs has implications for the 
usefulness of the findings. If the selection process into the programs 
investigated here were innocuous, then a finding that selection bias was not 
much of a problem in estimates of the impact of these programs would be of less 
interest than if the selection were more vigorous.
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Selection into the programs analysed in this thesis occurred in m any steps and 
involved many individuals. A schematic of the selection process prepared by 
the DPA Group (Diagram 5-1) shows that selection was a complex and varied 
process3. A brief summary of their conclusions follows. Selection into the 
program  occurred in four steps. First there was an element of self-selection. 
Second, Financial Assistance Workers referred a subset of their clients to Rehab 
Officers. Third, Rehab Officers referred roughly three clients to prospective 
employers for each vacancy, and fourth, the employer would select the most 
suitable candidate. This process tended to result in program participation by 
welfare recipients who were neither the most employable (the most employable 
become independent on their own before they can complete this multi-staged 
process) nor the least employable (who would not be selected). Nonetheless the 
DPA Report concluded that it tended to select clients who were "more 
employable" than average [page 7-2].
5.2 Post Program Tests for Selection Bias______________________
This section reports the results of five tests for selection bias. Four of the five 
tests indicate that selection bias will result in an overestimate of program  impact. 
The fifth, a comparison between a cell matched comparison group and a 
random ly assigned control group suggests an underestimate in the short term 
and no bias in the long term. The results of the tests taken together suggest that 
the bias is not sufficiently large to overturn the qualitative results that are 
reported in the next two chapters.
Briefly, the tests were as follows:
3 The study of the selection process was completed by a private contractor, the DPA group. 
More information on the selection process is available in their report (DPA Group, 1988).
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• Tests 1, 2, and 3: Persons selected to participate in a program who 
nevertheless did not participate were identified and compared with the 
comparison group.
• Test 4: A control group, generated by randomly assigning individuals 
referred to a job club program, is compared w ith a comparison group.
• Test 5: Programs in which both program impact and selection bias are 
believed to be positive are examined for long-term im pact
These tests are not general because the extent of selection bias depends on the 
selection mechanism and the data that is available. For example, Test 1 interviews 
the rehab officers, the programs' gatekeepers, and asks them to identify other 
individuals who would be suitable candidates for a program. The test consists of 
comparing the subsequent welfare dependence of these non participants with the 
subsequent welfare dependence of other non participants. Differences indicate 
selection bias. As with applying any empirical results from one jurisdiction in 
another, care must be taken in using this estimate of selection bias in other 
jurisdictions. A number of factors could affect the results: the attitudes of the 
program gatekeepers; the nature of the programs; the perception of the programs, 
characteristics of participants or non participants, and of course availability and 
quality of data. Nonetheless, the principle of testing for selection bias is quite 
generalizable. A person with any method of estimating the impact of programs, in 
almost any jurisdiction could interview program gatekeepers and ask them to 
identify comparable non participants. The impact of the "program" produced by 
the estimation method would be an indication of selection bias in that method and 
data.
5.2.1 Test 1: Non-participants identified by Ministry staff
Rehab Officers were asked to attempt to mimic the selection process by 
identifying recipients they would have referred to programs had there been 
space available. The weaknesses of this test are:
• We can never be sure that the Rehab Officers did identify clients which 
are truly comparable to program participants.
• About 3% of the group identified in this way eventually did participate in 
a wage subsidy program.
Nonetheless there are three reasons why this test m ight be valid.
• There were lots of potential candidates. About 230,000 different cases 
received welfare in British Columbia in 1989, and only a few thousand 
participated in on-the-job training.
• The Rehab Officers as a group support evaluation.
• By the time clients had made it into the Rehab Officers caseloads, the 
clients had been through two of the three selection hurdles, self selection 
and referral by the financial assistance worker.
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Figure 5-1 Percent dependent on welfare, Rehab Officer selected group  and 
com parison group 1)ata source 5; comparison group A
Four hundred  and forty individuals were identified in this way. Their 
subsequent welfare dependence together w ith that of a com parison g roup4 is 
show n in Figure 5-1. The results show  an upper lim it of about five percentage 
points in selection bias, with the selected group being less likely to be dependent 
on welfare.
* Drawn in the manner described in the last section of Chapter 4.
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5.2.2 Test 2: N on-partic ipan ts iden tified  by an in terv iew
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Figure 5-2. Percent dependent on welfare, clients identified in interview  and 
com parison group Data source 10; comparison group A
A num ber of years ago and for purposes totally unrelated to program  
evaluation, a process was im plem ented that approxim ated the results of the 
norm al selection process undergone by recipients who enter em ploym ent and 
training program s. A contractor was given the nam es and addresses of 48,000 
Income Assistance recipients. Most were rejected: because their cases had 
closed, because they had m oved from the area, by M inistry staff, and  for other 
unspecified reasons. The rem aining 12,800 recipients were sent letters inviting 
them  to be interviewed by the contractor for possible entry into em ploym ent or 
training program s. Of these, 8,000 show ed up  to be in terview ed, and, of these, 
4,283 were classified as job-ready employables. At that poin t the am ount of 
selection and self-selection that had occurred appeared com parable to w hat 
w ould be needed to get into such program s in the norm al course of events.
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Differences between the subsequent dependence of these 4,283 persons and the 
dependence of a comparison group developed to mirror them would be due to 
the latter's inability to account for the influences of the selection process. No 
difference would be strong evidence of no such unknown and uncontrolled 
influences, that is, no selection bias.
The results showed a difference of about five percentage points (Figure 5-2), 
with the selected non-participants less welfare-dependent than the comparison 
group. The reversal in the direction of the bias after two years is not an effect of 
time. It disappears when recipients interviewed in the first six m onths are 
excluded. (The reason is unknown.) With this qualification, the test indicates 
about five percentage points of selection bias.
5.23 Test 3: Non-participants identified by employer rejection 
Under the Employment Opportunity Program more clients are referred to
employers than are hired. A group of 325 recipients selected for on-the-job
training and referred to employers, but not hired, was identified. If selection
bias tends to favour greater independence, "rejection bias" by employers would
tend to indicate greater dependence. The results should reflect the sum  of the
selection bias from the self-selection, selection by the Rehab Officers and
Financial Assistance Workers, and the "rejection bias" by employers. The net
effect is negative between months five and twelve and zero thereafter (Figure
5-3).
Since selection bias appeared to be positive between months four and ten in the 
fcesis reported above, this test suggests that selection by employers does increase 
selection bias in estimates of short term impacts, but has no effect on estimates of 
long term impacts.
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Figure 5-3. Percent dependent on welfare, clients rejected by em ployer and 
com parison group Data source 3; comparison group A
5.2.4 Test 4: A gainst R andom  A ssignm ent
Because random  assignm ent will produce unbiased estim ates of program  
im pacts, it is popular to assess the adequacy of com parison groups by com paring 
the estim ates of program s produced using com parison groups w ith those 
produced  using control groups, (e.g. Lalonde 1986, Fraker and M aynard 1987, 
Cain et al. 1993, Friedlander and Robins 1994) A lthough the inability of a 
com parison group to replicate the results of a control group is sufficient reason
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to reject the com parison group, its ability to replicate the results of a control 
g roup  m ay not be a strong test, since random  assignm ent m ay elim inate m uch of 
the selection that occurs in a norm ally operating program .
The im pact of British Colum bia's job search program , Job Action, was estim ated 
using random  assignm ent Figure 5-4 reports the subsequent welfare 
dependence of the control group and a comparison group. The com parison 
group  underestim ates the program 's impact, com pared to the control group, by 
as m uch as 15 percentage points in the first few m onths. There is no
underestim ate in the long run.
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Figure 5-4. Percent dependent on welfare, pilot project control g roup and 
Comparison group Data source 8; comparison group A
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It is interesting to note that the comparison group underestimates program 
im pact because selection bias in training programs is normally expected to result 
in an  overestimate of the impact of a program. (See discussion in Test 5 
following.) The reason for the direction of the bias lies with the mechanics of the 
paym ent system.
In British Columbia, welfare cheques are dated for a W ednesday, normally the
\
last W ednesday of the month. Welfare is paid in advance. Attached to each 
cheque is a Request for Continued Assistance form. Recipients are required to 
complete this form and return it to the district office by the fifth of the following 
m onth, and the information on it is used to calculate entitlement for the 
subsequent month. If the Request for Continued Assistance is not returned to 
the office, the welfare cheque is sent to the district office instead of the home 
address, and if the recipient does not go to the office and submit a Request for 
Continued Assistance the cheque is reversed and the case is closed.
For example, cheques dated April 27,1995 provide benefits for the m onth of 
May. Recipients must complete the Request for Continued Assistance and return 
it to the office by May fifth and the information on it will be used to calculate 
entitlement for June. As a result, a recipient may legally submit their Request for 
Continued Assistance at the end of April, get a job on May first, and yet receive 
benefits for May (through the April 27th cheque) and June by virtue of the 
Request for Continued Assistance submitted at the end of April.
As a result most people get at least one month of benefits after they get a job. 
Since from five to ten percent of the caseload becomes independent each month, 
five to ten percent already have a job and are receiving their last m onth's 
benefits. These individuals, according to systems information, are receiving
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welfare benefits and so appear to be suitable participants for training programs, 
bu t because they already have a job, would not participate. If we select a 
comparison group from those on welfare, a number of the individuals who 
already have a job, and who will become independent in the next m onth, will be 
included.
This will bias the results. There is an unmeasured difference between the 
participants and the comparison group (some of the comparison group members 
already have a job) and this unmeasured characteristic is correlated both with 
program  participation (those who have a job are less likely to participate) and 
with the outcome (those who have a job are more likely to become independent). 
This source of bias will cause an underestimate of the impact of the program on 
subsequent welfare dependence.
This bias will be greatest where the caseload turnover is highest and, as a 
consequence, the proportion of recipients who already have a job is highest, that 
is among new applicants for welfare, and among young single employables.5
In summary, the comparison group, like the participant group, is draw n from 
welfare recipients. Because welfare is paid in advance, recipients who get jobs 
will receive benefits in that month, and may (legitimately) receive benefits in the 
subsequent month as well. Therefore, every comparison group will unavoidably 
contain recipients who have just become employed and who will leave welfare 
almost immediately. That would not be true of the participants, because the 
very fact of participating in a job search program is a sign that one does not have 
a job. Test 4 found evidence of substantial bias in estimates of short run impact 
but no evidence of bias in estimates of long-run impact from this source.
5For a discussion of rates of turnover, see Bruce 1994 or Barrett and Cragg 1995.
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5.2.5 Test 5: Where Analysis Shows No Long-term Impact
Notwithstanding the results of Test 4, selection bias is normally expected to
result in an overestimate of program impact6. A process evaluation of the on- 
the-job training programs for welfare recipients in British Columbia found that 
"overall, it appears that the vast bulk of referrals by staff to job openings is of
recipients with the best chance of succeeding". [DPA Group, 1989] If
\
participants are more employable in both measured and unmeasured variables, 
then the correlation between the unmeasured variables and program 
participation and between the unmeasured variables and the outcome of interest 
is expected to result in an overestimate of program impact.
In addition, training programs are generally believed to either help or have no 
impact on participants. In this case this will be true if, on average, providing an 
individual with six months of paid employment does not hurt their subsequent 
employment prospects.
'As was found in Tests 1 and 2.
Is Selection Bias the Bogeyman? 129
to 0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
Morths since startirg progam
□ffererce
95% confiderre interval
0.4 T
0 . 2 -
- 0.2
Figure 5-5. Percent dependent on welfare, CTETP participants and com parison 
g roup  Data source 4; comparison group A
If both of these beliefs are true, that is, both selection bias and program  im pact 
are positive, then any observed long-term im pact which is the sum  of selection 
bias and program  impact, sets an upper limit on selection bias.
Two program s present themselves as candidates for indicating this u p per lim it 
on selection bias, the Com m unity Tourism Em ploym ent T raining Program  
(CTETP, Figure 5-5) and the Environm ent Youth Corps Program  (EYC, Figure 5- 
6). In both cases the significant short term program  im pacts (0-18 m onths) are 
associated first with em ploym ent under the program  and then w ith dependence
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on U nem ploym ent Insurance. The long term im pact, the upper lim it of selection 
bias in these cases is about three percentage points.
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Figure 5-6. Percent dependent on welfare, EYP participants and com parison 
group  ^ ata source 4; comparison group A
A caveat: the results of this test are not directly applicable to the estim ates of the 
im pact of EOP. Although the selection process for the public sector em ploym ent 
program s (CTETP and EYC) is theoretically the same as for the private sector 
EOP, we m ight suspect that the selection by em ployers who are not required  to 
bear any of the costs of em ploym ent, and who are not expected to retain the 
em ployees beyond the subsidy period (CTETP and EYC) w ould be less stringent 
than the selection by private sector em ployers (EOP).
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Pre-program Tests for Selection_______________________________
Selection bias occurs when omitted variables are correlated both with program  
participation and with the outcome of interest When random assignment is 
used, the correlation between values of all characteristics of the participants and 
controls, measured prior to program participation, is close to zero by design. 
Indeed, comparison of pre-program characteristics is often used to ensure that 
assignm ent has in fact been random. This suggests a comparison of pre-program 
differences between participants and the comparison group as a test for selection 
bias.
Strictly speaking, similarity between participants and comparison group in pre­
program  variables is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the 
comparison group to provide unbiased estimates of program impact. If an event 
w hich causes participants to differ from comparison group members is 
coincident w ith program participation then pre-program similarity will not 
ensure unbiased estimates (not sufficient)71. If the variable which differs in the 
pre-program  period is not correlated with the outcome of interest, then the 
estimates will not be biased, despite the pre-program differences (not necessary).
The usefulness of these tests is an empirical question. If we find that studies in 
w hich the pre-program characteristics of participants and comparison groups are 
sim ilar tend to be unbiased, we may begin to use pre-program similarity as an 
indication of unbiasedness in the study. Consequently this section has two 
objectives:
^For example, if two individuals were laid off from the same plant, the one who knew that 
he would not be recalled would be more likely to take training.
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• to use additional pre-program  inform ation to test for selection bias; and
• to test the usefulness of pre-program  inform ation in testing for selection 
bias.
The additional information is only available for a one-in-ten sam ple that differs 
from  the full sam ple in two respects. First, the sam ple is not a random  sam ple, it 
excludes those on ancillary welfare program s, it is restricted to those w ith valid 
SIN 's, and  it is restricted to those who received welfare in the m onth in which 
they enrolled in the program . Second, there is inform ation on all participants for 
the full 36 m onth follow up  period, so the mix of participants in the last year 
differs from the mix for the full sample.
5.3.1 T esting  for bias
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Comparison groups (EOP) Data source comparison group A
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Figure 5-7 reproduces Figure 4-4 using the one-in-ten sam ple. The im pact of the 
different participant mix in the final year is evident, bu t the differences in the 
estim ates of the im pact are not significant in any m onth.
0.9 --
0.8 - -
0 .7 -
60
0 .6 -
0 .5 -
0 .4 -
0.3
0 .2 -
0.1 -
VCrotMCM 00(N
Months Sure Enrolment in Program
0.05 T
-0.05 ^  
- 0.1 -  
-0.15- 
-0.2 -  
-0.25- 
-0 .3- 
-0.35 -
Cbnficfcnce Interval 
Difference
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Figure 5-8 gives a five year pre-program  history of welfare dependence for 
p rogram  participants and a comparison group. Recall that the com parison 
group  m atches participants on age (five groups), gender/m arita l sta tus (five 
groups), em ployability (two groups), history of welfare dependence over the 
past 25 m onths (seven groups) and welfare dependence at the time the 
participan t enrolled in the program . The two groups track rem arkably well, 
w ith the com parison group slightly more inclined to receive welfare. This p re­
program  test indicates that selection bias is perhaps a percentage poin t or two.
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Figures 5-9 and 5-10 report the results of pre-program  tests on earnings and UI, 
variables that were not used to select the com parison group. They pain t a m uch 
less optim istic picture. The pre-program  earnings of the com parison g roup  do 
no t d ip  in the same m anner as the participants', although they do m atch 
reasonably well over the prior five years. The pre-program  UI experience of 
participants is about four percentage points (about 25%) lower than the 
participants '.
v
The pre-program  test for selection bias indicates that the estim ates of the im pact 
of the program  on subsequent welfare dependence are relatively free from  bias, 
b u t the estim ates of program  im pact on UI dependence and earnings are biased.
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Figure 5-10 Pre- and post program  UI dependence of participants and
com parison group (EOP) Data sources 4, 7; comparison group A
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5.3.2 Assessing the usefulness of pre-program tests 
A second comparison group is selected to assess the reliability of this finding.
The second group is selected to match the participants on all available pre­
program characteristics including UI dependence employment and earnings, 
information that was not available in the selection of the original comparison 
group. Because the second group matches the participants in the new variables 
as well as in all the variables used to produce the first comparison group there 
are fewer unmeasured variables and (maintaining the assumption that selection 
will induce a correlation between program participation and factors reflecting 
employability) the selection bias will be no greater*. Difference between the 
estimates produced by the two comparison groups is an estimate of the selection 
bias in the simpler estimate.
' Recall that the matched results are identical to the regression results if the means of the 
explanatory variables are the same in the treatment and comparison groups. Matching on an 
additional variable on the bias has the same effect as including another variable in a regression
equation. Omitted variable bias is ^  p, p f , where p, is the coefficient in a regression of the
induded variable of interest on excluded variable i and f), is the coeffident on the excluded 
variable in the true model. If selection results in more "employable" people participating in the 
program then p, and p, will have the same sign if the dependent variable is correlated with 
employment or opposite signs if the dependent variable is inversely correlated with 
employment (e.g. if the dependent variable is welfare dependence as above.). Increasing the 
number of variables in the equation will decrease the bias.
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Figure 5-11. Pre- and post program  earnings of participants and two com parison 
groups (EOP) Data sources 4, 6; comparison groups A and B
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Figure 5-1 la . Pre- and post program  UI dependence of participants and two 
com parison groups (EOP) Data sources 4, 7; comparison groups A and B
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Intuitively, we expect prior earnings and UI experience to be correlated with our 
outcome of interest, post program welfare dependence, so we expect that 
matching on these variables will reduce bias and affect our estimates of program 
impact. Figures 5-11 and 5-1 la  superimpose the pre-program earnings and UI 
experience of the new comparison group on Figures 5-9 and 5-10. The earnings 
of the new comparison group dip in a manner similar to the earnings of the 
participants, and the UI history is much more similar to the UI history of 
participants, although the differences are statistically significant in some months 
more than 24 months before the enrolment date.
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Figure 5-12. Pre- and post program  welfare dependence of participants and two 
com parison groups (EOP) Data sources 1,4; comparison groups A and B
Interestingly, the new  comparison group, although quite different from the old 
com parison group  in terms of earnings and UI use, is very sim ilar in term s of 
welfare use before the program . A com parison of the welfare dependence of the 
participants and the comparison group, used as a pre-program  test for selection 
bias, w ould give the estim ate based on only the welfare m atch a clean bill of
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health. The post program experience of the two comparison groups paints a 
different picture. The estimate of the extent of selection bias, the difference in 
estimate of impact between the two comparison groups, spikes at twelve and 
nine percentage points in months two and three, before falling below six 
percentage points and averaging 5.2 percentage points throughout the rem ainder 
of the follow up period (Figure 5-13). Clearly, pre-program similarity is not a 
reliable indicator of an absence of selection bias.
Table 5-1 Estimates of impact using different base years and comparison groups
Base
Year
Comparison group 
matched on all 
variables
Comparison group 
matched on welfare 
variables only
-5 0.6898 1.0446
-4 0.5544 0.9388
-3 0.6933 1.1153
-2 0.7697 1.2049
-1 0.7411 1.2457
Robustness of differences in differences estimators to choice of base year is a 
popular test for selection bias that is based on pre-program data9. The 
illustration of the general finding that tests based on pre-program data are not 
reliable using the specific test of robustness of differences in differences 
estimators to choice of base year is straightforward. Table 5-1 reports 
differences in differences estimates of the impact of EOP on welfare dependence 
in the third year after program enrolment. The columns correspond to the 
different comparison groups, the first matches participants on all variables, the 
second matches participants on welfare variables only. Although the two sets of
’See e.g. Ashenfelter and Card(1985), Bassi (1984) or Park et al. (1994).
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estimates of impact of the same program differ substantially, each set is robust 
to choice of base year. Clearly robustness to choice of base year is not a reliable 
indicator of an absence of selection bias.
5.4 Is Selection Bias Due to Unmeasurable Variables?___________
Thus far the discussion of selection bias has focused on unmeasured but 
measurable variables: earnings, UI use, etc. However, the rhetoric used by 
proponents of random assignment tends to focus on unmeasurable variables.
For example Bloom et al. (1993 page 8) cite motivation as an unmeasurable 
characteristic that is likely to cause selection bias. And Judith Gueron, then 
Executive Vice President of MDRC, in her April 11,1986 letter to the Deputy 
Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare advocating 
the use of random assignment to estimate the impact of the ET Choices program, 
said, "Because clients end up in activities as a result of choice (not a random  
process), it is clear that they would differ in very definite (if not always 
measurable) ways."
One reason that the proponents of random assignment may emphasise the 
unmeasurable variables is that if the differences between participants and non­
participants that cause bias are not measurable, then our choice of techniques 
becomes limited. We must either model the selection process separately or use 
random assignment. But, if as Greenberg and Wiseman suggest (1992, p. 136), 
the appeal of random assignment to policy makers is that it reduces controversy, 
then modelling the selection process may not be a viable alternative.
Uncertainty will remain, with the debate turning on whether the omitted 
relevant variables can legitimately be omitted, or, if identification depends on 
assumptions regarding the distribution of error terms, whether these 
assumptions are valid.
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Conversely, if the impact of unmeasured variables is small, then, as long as all 
researchers include all measured variables then differences would not be due to 
selection bias. We could not expect that controversy would be eliminated10, but 
only that it would not be related to selection bias, the source of controversy that 
random  assignment eliminates. If the bias due to unmeasurables is small, there 
will be little benefit from random assignment.
This section produces an indication of the upper bound of the bias resulting 
from unmeasurable variables by redoing one of the post program tests. Recall 
from Test 2, the group of interviewed individuals who were classified as job- 
ready, but who did not participate in training. There, the interviewers 
attempted to identify job-ready individuals, that is they attempted to select 
individuals who had characteristics (whether measured or unmeasured) that 
were correlated with the probability of becoming independent of welfare. For 
this reason the bias from each omitted variable should be negative11, and none 
will offset any of the others. Any residual bias that we find will be the sum of 
bias due to measurable but omitted variables and unmeasurable variables. That 
is, it will put an upper limit on selection bias due to unmeasurables.
Test 2 showed that the interviewed group did indeed differ from the (welfare- 
variables12-matched) comparison group in unmeasured variables that were
10 We could turn our efforts to entiy effects or impacts on individuals who are outside the 
experimental framework. See e.g. discussions by Moffitt and by Garfinkel et. al. in Manski and 
Garfinkel (1992)
11 In practice the sample had been selected from those who remained dependent on welfare 
for the two to three months between the mailing of the letter and the interview. Those who 
received the letter but became independent before the interview were less likely to show up and 
be classified. Omitting this variable introduces an offsetting bias. This is described in more 
detail below.
12 As described in Chapter 4 Section 4.
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correlated both with selection and with subsequent welfare dependence. These 
correlations resulted in selection bias of about five percentage points. But m any 
of the unm easured variables are m easurable (i.e. em ploym ent, earnings, UI 
dependence), and are available for the one-in-ten sam ple13 and so we can re-do 
Test 2 using the additional information.
Interviewees 
Comparison group
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Figure 5-13. Percent dependent on welfare, clients identified in interview  and 
Comparison group Data source 10; comparison group A
,3There are 386 individuals in this one-in-ten sample. Nine were excluded because they 
received benefits through an ancillary program.
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The right-hand side of Figure 5-14 reproduces Figure 5-2. A lthough the sm aller 
sample naturally  exhibits greater variability, the average difference betw een 
those w ho had been interviewed and determ ined to be "job ready" and the 
comparison group is com parable for the two groups. In the first 19 m onths, the 
p e rb d  for which observations on the full sam ple were available in test 2, the 
differences are 5.7 percentage points for the full sam ple and 6.1 percentage 
poiits for the one-in-ten sample.
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Looking at the last 12 months, in the one-in-ten sample with the comparison 
group matched on welfare variables only, the difference, our estimate of the 
am ount of selection bias, is 4.3 (t=2.1) percentage points. As we anticipated, 
including formerly omitted variables decreased the level of selection bias. When 
we match on all available variables (Figure 5-14) the estimate of residual bias 
falls to 2.3 (t=l .4).
Figure 5-14 suggests that further analysis would be profitable. The interviewed 
and comparison groups are statistically significantly different in welfare 
dependence in the first few pre-interview months14, and the potential exists to 
control for five years of welfare dependence and earnings. Unfortunately it is 
expensive and time consuming to draw matched comparison groups. In 
addition, as the matching criteria become finer and finer, the probability of 
having no matches for some participants increases. Regression analysis 
overcomes both of these problems, so further analysis was done by estimating 
the parameters of an equation using the interviewed individuals and the 
matched (and weighted) comparison group.
5.4.1 Digression on Regression
The dependent variable in these regressions is the sum of benefits received 13 to 
24 months following selection and so takes 13 discrete values from 0 to 12. Tobit 
analysis is appropriate since the distribution is censored at both ends, but 
coefficients from tobit regressions are not as easy to interpret. For this reason the 
coefficients from the OLS regression are reported below. In any event, the 
significance and sign for all the coefficients were very similar for the tobit and 
OLS regressions. For single parents the coefficient on welfare history between
14 See footnote 11.
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months 4 and 12 between months 1 and 12 squared and on UI history between 
months 1 and 12 became significant, and the dummies on very recent work 
experience fell to insignificance in the tobit equation. All other 
signs/significance remained unchanged. For single men the changes were even 
smaller. The t for the coefficient on the dummy for having received no m onths 
and three months of welfare in the previous three months fell to .125 and 1.7 
respectively and the t for DUI315 changed from .5 to -.6. All other 
signs/significance remained unchanged.
Table 5-2 Coefficients on models of 
welfare dependence for interviewed 
group and comparison group.
Combined Single
Men
Single
Parents
Number of participants 34016 114 77
N 2391 861 961
Variable Coefficient
(t-statistic)
1. A dum my variable that takes the 
value 1 if the observation is for a 
selected individual.
-0.25742
(-1.343)
-.31116
(-1.047)
-.70134 1 
(-2.503)
2. Constant 4.214
(3.144)
6.846
(3.466)
5.463
(2.049)
3. A dum m y variable that takes the 
value 1 if the individual is a single 
female
-0.12958
(-0.400)
4. A dum m y variable that takes the 
value 1 if the individual is in a case 
with two adults and no children
0.77876
(1.524)
5. A dum m y variable that takes the 
value 1 if the individual is in a case 
with two adults and children
-0.20529
(-0.724)
6. A dum m y variable that takes the 
value 1 if the individual is a single
-0.02274
(-0.086)
15 variable 21 defined in Table 5-2 below.
M 46 interviewed individuals were dropped from the sample because they did not receive 
welfare benefits in the month in which they were interviewed.
Is Selection Bias the Bogeyman? 147
parent
7. A dum my variable that takes the 
value 1 if the individual is classified 
as employable.
-0.48623
(-1.601)
-.81636
(-1.495)
-.35308
(-.976)
8. The number of months in which 
welfare benefits were paid during the 
period 13 to 25 months before 
selection
0.19269
(5.021)
.19978
(3.376)
.30482
(4.412)
9. The number of months in which 
welfare benefits were paid during the 
period 4 to 12 months before selection
-0.66562
(-2.841)
-.76299
(-2.208)
.3588
(2.688)
10. The number of months in which 
welfare benefits were paid during the 
period 1 to 3 months before selection
-0.99942
(-1.454)
-2.8837
(-2.9)
.01519
(.01)
11. The number of months in which 
welfare benefits were paid during the 
period 13 to 24 months before 
selection
4.58E-03
(0.137)
.01807
(0.332)
-.32601
(-5.989)
12. The num ber of months in which 
welfare benefits were paid during the 
period 38 to 49 months before 
selection
6.56E-03
(0.232)
.01314
(0.274)
.05242
(1.246)
13. The square of the number of months 
in which welfare benefits were paid 
during the period 1 to 12 months 
before selection
4.94E-02
(3.344)
.06658
(3.07)
-.0153
(1-.474)
14. A dum m y variable that takes the 
value 1 if the individual received no 
benefits in the three months prior to 
the interview/selection date.
-0.35438
(-0.161)
-5.2606
(-1.833)
.84158
(.376)
15. A dum my variable that takes the 
value 1 if the individual received 
benefits in all three months prior to 
the interview/selection date.
2.6214
(2.502)
3.3245
(2.171)
16. Age (in months) 2.80E-03
(3.201)
.00461
(3.419)
.00131
(.875)
17. The num ber of months in which UI 
benefits were paid during the period 1 
to 12 months before selection
0.21546
(2.739)
.20756
(1.423)
-.09976
(-.544)
18. The num ber of months in which UI 
benefits were paid during the period 
13 to 24 months before selection
-0.14438
(-2.999)
-.04392
(-0.533)
-.11689
(-1.441)
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19. A dummy variable indicating
employment in the three months prior 
to selection according to a record of 
employment. It takes the value 1 if 
reported earnings would generate UI 
entitlement greater than welfare 
entitlement, but fewer than 10 
insurable weeks (the minimum 
number needed for UI eligibility) 
were reported.
-0.66844
(-1.363)
-2.0348
(-3.152)
20. As above, except that earnings are 
between the level of welfare 
entitlement and the level of earnings 
that would generate UI entitlement 
greater than welfare entitlement.
-3.1453
(-4.829)
-2.4621
(-2.552)
-4.258
(-4.386)
21. As above, except that 10 or more 
insurable weeks are reported.(DUI3)
-3.8378
(-5.678)
-5.0846
(-4.903)
-3.4419
(-2.354)
22. A dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 if UI benefits greater than 
welfare entitlement were paid in the 
month before selection.
-0.67202
(-1.04)
.7323
(0.517)
-3.39
(-3.326)
23. Sum of earnings (as reported on ROE) 
in 12 months preceding selection.
7.57E-04
(2.86)
.0021
(4.942)
.00121
(2.56)
24. Sum of earnings (as reported on ROE) 
in 12 months ending 13 months 
preceding selection.
-1.57E-03
(-5.464)
-.0015
(-3.367)
-.00194
(-4.27)
25. Sum of earnings (as reported on ROE) 
in 12 months ending 25 months 
preceding selection.
1.16E-03
(4.415)
.00139
(3.333)
-.00046
(-1.005)
26. Sum of earnings (as reported on ROE) 
in 12 months ending 37 months 
preceding selection.
-6.20E-04
(-2.724)
-.00118
(-3.498)
-.00146
(-3.426)
27. Sum of earnings (as reported on ROE) 
in 12 months ending 49 months 
preceding selection.
-4.01 E-04 
(-2.335)
-.00057
(-2.321)
.00105
(2.57)
In the combined regression, the estimate of selection bias is .26 m onths of 
benefits over 12 months, or 2.2 percentage points (compared with 2.3 percentage
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points for the matched result). This suggests that little was gained through the 
use of the additional information.
The results for single men17 lead us to a substantially different conclusion. The 
dis-aggregated result from the matched comparison group is +2.4 percentage 
points for single men, compared with -2.6 percentage points from the regression 
analysis. One explanation for the change is the new information available to the 
regression analysis. As seen above, (Figure 5-14) the selected group was 
significantly different from the comparison group in recent welfare dependence. 
The selected group was more dependent in the three months immediately 
preceding the interview. Three variables (Variables numbered 10,14,15) are 
included in the regression equation to capture the recent dependence and, for 
single men, all three are statistically significant.
The results are that the selection bias due to omitted variables, measurable and 
unmeasurable is 5.8 percentage points for single parents, 2.6 percentage points 
for single men, and 0 ("wrong" sign and t=.3) for the remainder. Many 
im portant measurable variables such as education, labour force participation 
and age of youngest child have not been included. Because two of these are 
particularly important for predicting the subsequent dependence of single 
parents, the results for single men and "others" are probably more relevant for 
assessing the importance of unmeasurables. They both indicate that the bias due 
to unmeasurables such as motivation or intelligence is small18, that is, that very 
little is gained by the use of random assignment.
17 The results for the "all others" group, not reported in Table 5-2, also changed, but from -.46 
to +.14 (t=.3).
,*This is not to say that motivation and intelligence are unimportant, but rather that their 
influence on subsequent welfare dependence is adequately reflected in their welfare 
dependence, employment and earnings history.
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A subsidiary finding from this analysis relates to the number of variables that 
belong in the equation that describe the conditions immediately prior to 
selection. For single men the welfare dependence in the three m onths prior to 
selection19 were important in predicting welfare dependence between one and 
two years later. Earnings, Unemployment Insurance benefits and employment 
in the three months prior to selection were also important predictors of 
subsequent welfare dependence. But none of these variables could be measured 
using annual data, and so we could expect omitted variable bias (selection bias) 
to be much more severe with annual data. This suggests an explanation for the 
problems with the CETA evaluations described in Chapter 2.
5.5 What Went Wrong in the CETA Evaluations?________________
The results presented in this chapter are at odds with the literature relating to 
the CETA evaluations. Our results suggest that the differences due to the 
treatment of unmeasurables should only have a moderate effect on estimates. 
Certainly there is nothing to suggest that the treatment of unmeasurables would 
change, qualitatively, estimates of impact of programs such as these, and yet that 
did happen in the CETA studies. The key to resolving the difference between 
those findings and these lies with the implications of trying to control for the 
"pre-program dip" in earnings using annual data.
5.5.1 Why care about Pre-Program Dip?
It has long been recognised that participants in employment and training 
programs experience a dip in their earnings before enrolment.20 This has
19 For single parents this variable was 2.96 (maximum value 3), and so had little variation.
“See, e.g. Ashenfelter (1978)
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profound implications for estimating the impact of a training program without 
using random assignment. When we estimate the impact of a program on 
earnings using a comparison group design, we want the comparison group to be 
as similar to the participants in expected earnings as possible. We expect that 
people who suffer a dip in earnings will have lower earnings after the dip than 
people who do not suffer a dip in earnings. So researchers m ust select 
comparison group members who have earnings dips similar to those 
experienced by the program participants. For example, Westat, the main 
contractor the US Department of Labor for estimating the impact of the CETA 
programs21 reports that three of its four highest priority variables for matching 
relate to pre-program earnings or changes in pre-program earnings.
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Figure 5-15. Average earnings of high-earner EOP participants
I Data sources 4,6
Participants in CETA had much higher incomes than participants in EOP.22 To 
make the studies more comparable, this analysis is restricted to the 82 EOP
“see e.g. Bryant and Rupp, 1987.
“Recall that EOP participants had been welfare recipients and as such:
a) had earnings that were less than their welfare entitlement; and
b) either were not qualified for UI because they had exhausted their benefits or did not 
have sufficient employment experience to qualify, or did qualify for UI but had benefits lower 
than their welfare entitlement.
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participants with the highest annual pre-program earnings. This group had 
average earnings of $7,500 in the immediate pre-program year (late '80's), which 
is roughly comparable to the pre-program earnings of CETA participants (early 
70 's) in real dollars.
Figure 5-15 shows the average earnings of the high-earner EOP participants 60 
m onths leading up to participation and 36 months after. The pre-program dip in 
earnings is a prominent feature of these data. From peak to trough, the dip in 
earnings is 62%, much larger than the dip experienced by CETA participants as 
reported by Bloom (1987) or Bryant and Rupp (1987). Figure 5-16 reports the 
same information, except that earnings are expressed as annual averages. The 
dip now appears to be 32%, which is between the dips reported by Bloom (1987) 
and Bryant and Rupp (1987). Clearly, many important features of the data, 
including the pre-program dip are obscured simply by using annual averages.
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Figure 5-16. Average annual earnings of high-earner EOP participants
; Data sources 4,6
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5.5.2 Which year contains the dip?
The problem of a dip obscured using annual data, is exacerbated by the problem 
of defining the year in which the dip is said to occur. Participants enter 
programs throughout the year, and so their earnings dips are also spread 
throughout the year. If a participant enrols late in a calendar year, then a 
considerable amount of the dip will occur in the year in which enrolment occurs. 
In that case it would be important to compare that participant's subsequent 
earnings with earnings of non participants who had similar earnings in the 
enrolment year. Conversely, if a participant enrols early in a calendar year, a 
considerable amount of post program earnings would be included in the 
enrolment year's earnings, and it would be important that enrolment year 
earnings not be used to select comparison group members. The seriousness of 
this problem depends to a large measure on the duration of the dip in earnings. 
If the dip spans several calendar years, then only a small amount of the dip will 
be missed using annual data.
5.5.3 Duration of the dip
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Figure 5-17. Duration of pre-program dip
Data sources 1,4,6,7
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We have found that the duration of the dip varies across participants but that 
many dips were short. Two definitions were used to describe the duration of the 
dip. In the first instance a participant was defined as experiencing a pre­
program dip in earnings if he/she were receiving benefits through either 
Unemployment Insurance or welfare. In the second, a participant was defined 
as experiencing a pre-program dip in earnings if h is/her earnings were less than 
25% below the average earnings in the pre-program year. Figure 5-17 shows the 
cumulative distribution of the duration of pre-program dips. Using the 
U l/w elfare definition, more than 40 percent of the dips are of six months 
duration or less.
5.5.4 Implications for CETA
This has profound implications for the estimation of the impact of CETA 
programs. If data are annual, like the CETA data are, and enrolment in the 
program and the distribution of the duration of pre-program dip is evenly 
distributed across time, then for 38% of participants the pre-program dips will 
occur entirely within the year in which program participation began.23 With the 
dips being so short, researchers find themselves on the horns of a dilemma. If, 
like Westat, they define pre-program earnings as earnings in 1976 for 
participants who enrolled in the program between July 1,1976 and June 30,1977, 
they will pick up most of the dip, but they will be matching on some within and 
post program earnings. If, like Dickinson, Johnson and West, they define pre­
program earnings as earnings in 1975 for participants who enrolled in the 
program in the calendar year 1976, they will match only on pre-program
^This is calculated as follows. People who enrol in the program in December (1 /12  of the 
total) will have their pre-program dip entirely within the year if their dip is of duration 11 
months or less (63% from Figure 4-19). For December the percentage is 1/12 * .63. For 
November, 1/12 * .58, etc.
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earnings, but they will miss the pre-program dip in almost 40% of the cases. 
Given the shortness of the pre-program dip, we should not be surprised that the 
Dickinson, Johnson and West studies produced estimates that were markedly 
lower than the estimates based on comparison groups drawn by Westat.
The analysis of Dickinson, Johnson and West supports this interpretation of the 
difference. They generated separate estimates for participants who enrolled in 
the first and second half of the year. Because more participants in the first half 
of the year would have dips in earnings in the pre-program year, and as a result 
w ould be more likely to be compared with others who also experienced a dip in 
earnings, we would expect these estimates to be higher, and indeed they were. 
The Dickinson, Johnson and West estimates of the impact on men's earnings 
were: $-458 for the early enrolees, and $-971 for the late enrolees. For women, 
the estimate for early enrolees was $+246 and $-220 for the late enrolees. 
However, even when participation is restricted to the first half of the year, the 
pre-program dip will be missed in 17% of cases, so even these estimates will be 
lower than the true impact.
This is not to say that the Westat estimates were correct. If within-program 
earnings are zero, and people stay in the program more than six months, then 
pre-program earnings by their definition will understate true pre-program 
earnings, and for those who enrolled in 1975 their estimates will overstate the 
true estimates. On the other hand, if within program earnings are positive (as 
they are in wage subsidy programs with the private sector) or program 
participation is short, then the Westat estimates will understate true program 
impacts. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that purely annual data are
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not adequate for the purposes of estimating the impact of employment and 
training programs24.
5.5.5 An Illustration
To illustrate the effect of using annual data, the impact of the program is 
estimated using two different methods. First, a comparison group is draw n that 
is comparable to the participants as described above. Figures 5-18,5-19 and 5-20 
show the earnings, UI dependence, and welfare dependence of program 
participants and a comparison group for five years before program participation 
and three years after. The comparison group tracks the participants well in the 
pre-program period and indicates that the program has a modest impact in the 
short run (four months) and no impact after that.
5 . 5 . 5 . 1  A n e w  c o m p a r i s o n  g r o u p
We now convert our data from monthly to annual and draw  a comparison group 
in a manner similar to that used by Westat and Dickinson, Johnson and West. 
The criteria used in this match are:
• The comparison group members were selected from those who had 
received welfare in at least one month in the calendar year in which the 
participant enrolled in the program.
• If the participant received UI or welfare in the calendar year before the 
year in which the participant enrolled in the program then members of 
the comparison group for that participant did too.
“Some data that are apparently annual, in fact contains intra-annual information that may 
make monthly data unnecessary. For example, a comparison group drawn from individuals 
who are receiving UI at the same time as and for as long as program participants, will be 
experiencing the same pre-program dip as participants since a) they must have been working 
before they began receiving UI and b) they must not be working while they are receiving UI.
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Figure 5-18 Earnings of high-income participants and comparison group
Data sources 4, 6; new comparison group
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Figure 5-19 Welfare dependence of high-income participants and comparison 
group  Data sources 1,4; new companson group
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Figure 5-20. UI dependence of high-income participants and comparison group
Data sources 4, 7; new comparison group
• The comparison group members had to match participants on category 
(single men, single women, couples, two parent family or one parent 
family) and age using the five age categories described above (page 87).
• The comparison group members had to match participants' earnings as 
follows:
• if participants' earnings were zero then the comparison group 
members had to have zero earnings as well, otherwise
• if the participants' earnings were less than $2,000 per year, then the 
comparison group members had to have earnings less than $2,000 per 
year. Otherwise
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• comparison group members had to have earnings between 80% and 
125% of the earnings of the participants.
The comparison group members had to match on earnings in this way in each of 
the two calendar years before the enrolment date.
• The changes in earnings between one and two years before enrolment had 
to be negative for both participants and comparison group members, or, if 
positive, both be less than $2000, or if above $2000 the change for the 
comparison group member had to be between 80% and 125% of the 
change in earnings of the participant.
This match is inferior to the matches of Westat and of Dickinson, Johnson and 
West. For example, it does not contain education variables among the matching 
criteria.
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5.5.6 R esu lts
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Figure 5-21. Annual earnings, EOP participants and comparison group matched 
using annual data (in manner of Westat or Dickinson Johnson and West).
Data sources 4, 6; new comparison group
The effect of moving to annual data and not controlling for the UI and welfare 
dependence is dramatic. The comparison group selected on the basis of annual 
data gives the result (Figures 5-21,5-22,5-23) that the program  reduces earnings 
by over $1,000 in the year of enrolment (t=2.9) and that the deleterious effects 
persist. Even in year three, earnings are apparently reduced by almost $700 
(t=1.4).
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Sim ilarly, the analysis based on annual data indicates that welfare dependence is 
increased by statistically significant am ounts in each year. U nem ploym ent 
Insurance dependence is also apparently  increased by statistically significant 
am ounts.
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Figure 5-22. Welfare dependence, EOP participants and com parison group  
m atched using annual data (in m anner of W estat or Dickinson Johnson and
Wes t) Data sources 1,4; new comparison group
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Figure 5-23. UI dependence, EOP participants and comparison group matched 
using annual data (in manner of Westat or Dickinson Johnson and West)
j uata sources 4,7; new comparison group
5.6 Conclusions___________________________________________
This chapter examined the issue of selection bias and found that with monthly 
data on welfare dependence together with a few demographic variables 
selection bias in long-term estimates of welfare dependence was of the order of 
magnitude of five percentage points. When data on UI dependence, 
employment and earnings are added selection bias fell to about two percentage 
points. The estimates of bias varied across programs, characteristics of 
participants and time since the program. Nonetheless, the analysis leads to the 
conclusion that selection bias is not enough to overturn the conclusions reported 
in the next two chapters.
This chapter also provided insight into the nature of selection bias by providing 
answers to four questions.
• Can we test for selection bias without random assignment?
• Are pre-program tests for selection bias reliable? and as a subsidiary 
question,
• Does robustness to choice of base year mean that differences in 
differences estimators are unbiased?
• Are unmeasurable variables the primary source of selection bias?
• Why did different researchers come up with such different estimates of 
the impacts of the CETA programs?
The findings were:
1) It is possible to test observational studies for bias resulting from specific 
selection mechanisms. Five such tests were presented.
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2) Pre-program tests for selection bias are not reliable. Further, robustness 
to choice of base year does not mean that differences in differences estimators 
are unbiased.
3) Unmeasurables are not the primary source of selection bias.
4) The large differences in the estimates of the CETA programs could have 
resulted from the inadequacy of annual data to detect and control for the pre­
program dip in earnings.
The answers to these questions, taken as a whole suggest that the apparent 
wholesale condemnation of the use of observational studies to estimate the 
impacts of employment and training programs is unwarranted. Chapter 2 
showed that the condemnation was based two factors. First, observational 
techniques applied to the same sources for comparison groups as were used to 
estimate the impacts of the CETA programs could not replicate the results of the 
Supported Work demonstration. Second, different techniques applied to the 
same data generated qualitatively different results. This chapter shows that 
annual data (like that used in the studies cited in Chapter 2 that discredited 
observational studies) are too coarse to permit reliable estimates of program 
impact, and that both of these results might be expected when annual data is 
used. Further, it shows that the residual bias due to unmeasurables is small and 
therefore, if we can avoid other serious problems such as non-response bias or 
improperly specified functional form, observational studies in general and the 
results in the chapters that follow in particular, can provide a useful guide to the 
effectiveness of programs.
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6. Impact of On-the-job Training with 
Wage Subsidies____________________
This chapter presents the estimates of the impact of a wage subsidy program  on 
the subsequent welfare dependence, UI dependence and employm ent of 
participants. The estimates have been produced using administrative data and 
survey data, and by the use of cell matching as well as regression analysis.
Chapter 5 found that selection bias in estimates of the impact of programs in BC on 
subsequent welfare dependence amounted to roughly five percentage points when 
estimates of impact were made by comparing subsequent welfare dependence of 
participants with non participants who were similar in age, sex, marital status, 
history of dependence classification and who were receiving welfare at the same 
time as the participants. The analysis was done explicitly so that the reader could 
assess the results presented in this and the following chapters. Where the impacts 
are less than five percentage points (e.g. the long term impacts of CTETP) they 
should be viewed with suspicion. However, where they are greater than five 
percentage points, (e.g. for EOP and vocational training) we can be fairly confident 
that there is a real long term impact
Recall from Chapter 1 that British Columbia's Employment Opportunity 
Program (EOP) subsidised the wages of persons who were receiving welfare 
benefits and who were hired by employers on certain conditions. The conditions 
w ere that the job offered m ust be full-time, be of two to six months duration, and 
not result in the dismissal of any existing employee; moreover, the employer had 
to agree to provide on-the-job training. The subsidy was for half the wage up to 
a maximum of $3.50 an hour. Eligible welfare recipients included both welfare 
applicants and any dependants.
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The Employment Opportunity Program had the largest budget of British 
Columbia's eleven programs aimed at helping recipients become independent of 
welfare. With a total expenditure in 1991/92 of nearly $12 million, the program 
accounted for 30 percent of total expenditures in the eleven programs of nearly 
$40 million. That year, about 6000 people participated in the program, for an 
average cost per participant of more than $1900.
Despite the large size of the program, its participants represented only two 
percent of the 270,000 applicants who received welfare in all or part of 1991/92. 
Similarly, its cost of $12 million was only one percent of the $1.2 billion in 
welfare distributed to employable persons and their dependants in 1991/92.
6.1.1 Conclusions
British Columbia’s Employment Opportunity Program successfully helped 
recipients become independent of welfare. Additional survey results reinforce 
this inference, indicating that the program clearly helped recipients find 
employment in the long term. Program impact varied significantly with the 
category, welfare history, and age of the participants.
The program increased Unemployment Insurance eligibility in the short term 
and appears also to have encouraged greater UI dependence, especially during 
the 12-month eligibility period following the end of the program, and to a lesser 
extent in the long term as well.
Most employers clearly benefit from the program, though a few do not. The 
program 's impact was only slightly affected by the unemployment rate.
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For the provincial government, the reduction in welfare caused by the program  
was greater than the program expenditure. However, the program resulted in 
increased Unemployment Insurance payments by the federal government. 
Nevertheless, over 65 months the cumulative savings in welfare expenditure 
exceeded the combined cumulative expenditures on the program and on 
Unemployment Insurance by a significant amount.
6.2 Impact On Participants__________________________________
6.2.1 Reducing welfare
6 . 2 . 1 . 1  Conclusion:
Participants moved off welfare more quickly than non-participants.
6 . 2 . 1 . 2  Discussion:
The program's effect on welfare dependence as shown by a cell-matched 
comparison group was dramatic (Figure 6-1). Three months after beginning the 
program, half the participants no longer received welfare, whereas only one-fifth 
of the comparison group had moved off it. Interestingly, at this point, though all 
participants still had work through the program except those who had dropped 
out, half the participants were still on welfare. Program employment thus did 
not put an end to welfare dependence for those whose income was low or whose 
need was high.
By month seven, when all program participation had ended and some 
participants had returned to welfare, the participant group had a lower 
dependence on welfare than the non-participant group of 10 to 15 percentage 
points, and this relative advantage was maintained more or less steadily up  to 
and beyond two years as both groups gradually declined in welfare dependence.
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This result is based 
on a sample that 
varied in size from 
8,940 in m onth zero 
to 2,097 in m onth 40 
and 82 in m onth 48. 
The num ber of 
individuals in the 
comparison group 
also varied, but 
always exceeded the 
num ber of 
participants. The 
confidence interval 
for the difference 
between the welfare 
dependence of the 
participants and the 
comparison group is 
reported at the 
bottom of Figure 6-1.
4 230 4 8
Figure 6-1 Percent dependent on welfare, EOP
participants and comparison group
Data source 4; comparison group A
6.2.2 M oving to U nem ploym ent Insurance
6 . 2 . 2 . 1  Conclusion:
The program  resulted in increased dependence on Unemployment Insurance. 
Participants were more likely than non-participants to draw  Unem ploym ent 
Insurance, a difference that was most pronounced during the 12 m onths after the
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end of the program  but which was still in evidence up  to the end of observations 
three years after the program began.
6 . 2 . 2 . 2  D i s c u s s i o n :
Estimates of the impact on
UI dependence were made
using regression analysis
and a matched comparison
group. In the first method,
36 separate regressions
were used to estimate the
impact of EOP on
subsequent UI dependence.
(Regression equations and
results are reported in
Appendix B.) They showed
that on average participants were more dependent on Unemployment Insurance
than the comparison group from month three after the beginning of the program
(Figure 6-2). This greater propensity amounted to 15 to 20 percentage points
during  the 12-month period of their eligibility for Unemployment Insurance due
to their program  participation. After month 18, the difference declined to five to
10 percentage points but remained visible for as long as observations continued.
The second method used a matched comparison group described in Chapter 5 
(See Figure 5-12). The matched comparison group produced estimates that were 
som ew hat lower (about half) than the results produced using regression 
analysis, but the qualitative results are the same, EOP increased UI dependence 
in both the short and long run, but the effects were larger in the short run.
4236 4*O 12
Figure 6-2 Percent dependent on UI, EOP 
participants and comparison group
Data sources 4, 7; regression analysis
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6.2.3 Finding employment
6 . 2 . 3 . 1  Conclusion:
Survey results showed that the program clearly helped participants find 
employment.
6. 2. 3. 2 Discussion:
Data from the interview survey were used. The interviewees were asked 
simply: "Are you currently working?" The data were analysed using maximum 
likelihood (probit) analysis. The response rate was about 75%, but since the 
survey was the source of the dependent variable, it was not possible to estimate 
the impact of non-response bias on this question. With that caveat, the analysis 
found that the Employment Opportunity Program, increased employment by a 
statistically significant 11 percentage points. This finding is consistent with the 
results of the estimates of the impact on welfare dependence that are not subject 
to non-response bias.
6.2.4 Impacts on different types of recipients
6 . 2 . 4 . 1  Conclusion:
The program helped those with longer welfare histories more than those with 
shorter welfare histories. Single parents were less likely to be helped than other 
types of recipients, but the single parents who were helped, because of their 
dependants, brought a much greater reduction in benefits paid than others. 
Program impact also tends to rise with the age of participants.
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6 . 2 . 4 . 2  D isc u ss io n :
Cell matching produced estimates of the impact of EOP on the am ount of 
welfare received for each participant. These estimates were used as the 
dependen t variable in a 
regression in which the 
characteristics of the 
participants were the 
explanatory variables.
By history of benefits, 
program  impact increased 
with num ber of months of 
benefits received in the 
previous 25 months up  to 
a m axim um  of 23 to 24 
months, then showed a 
decline for the group that had received benefits in each of the previous 25 
m onths (Figure 6.3). This 
suggests, first, that 
program  impact is least for 
those least dependent on
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welfare, increases to a
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those with very lengthy 
dependence.
By categories of applicants,
p rogram  impacts increase Figure 6-4 Welfare savings by category
Data source 4; comparison group A
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Figure 6-3 Welfare savings by welfare history
Data source 4; comparison group A
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successively for single men, 
single women, couples, 
two-parent families, and 
single-parent families (Figure 6-
4). Detailed results show that, 
in  caseload num bers, the 
program  did less to reduce the 
welfare dependence of single 
parents than of the others.
However, because the average 
num ber of dependants was 
higher for single parent cases 
than for other cases, the effect 
on num ber of recipients, and thus on welfare costs, was greater for single 
parents than for others.
By age, program impacts do not vary much up  to age 40, but from then on 
increase markedly, and are greatest for participants over 50 (Figure 6-5).
Figure 6-5 Welfare savings by age g roup
Data source 4; comparison group A
6.3 The Broader Context
6.3.1 Benefits to em ployers
6. 3 . 1 . 1  Conclusion:
Most employers clearly benefited from the program, while a few clearly d id  not.
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6 . 3 . 1 . 2  Discussion:
Employers participating in the
program  were asked to
compare the productivity of
program employees and
unsubsidised employees.
Nearly two-thirds stated that
program employees were as
productive as regular employees or more productive (see table). They were then
asked how much they paid unsubsidised new employees. The answers
averaged $6.04. Program data meanwhile show that employers paid an average
of $3.06 for program employees.
Thus the nearly two-thirds of employers who received equal or better 
productivity from their program employees saved on average nearly $3.00 an 
hour on each of them. On the other hand, one employer in five paid $3.06 an 
hour for employees of poor productivity. In fact, one employer in ten rated 
program employees’ productivity as zero, and so saw themselves as getting 
nothing at all in return.
6.3.2 Effect of unemployment rate on program impact
6 . 3 . 2 . 1  Conclusion
The unemployment rate had no clear effect on the program’s impact.
6 . 3 . 2 . 2  Discuss ion
Program impact was estimated for three calendar years, 1988-90, whose 
employment rates differed. The average reduction in welfare benefits 
attributable to the program was 1.6,1.8, and 1.9 months respectively, while the 
unemployment rate in the same three years was 10.3,9.1, and 8.3 percent.
Table 6-1: Client Productivity 
(% of employers stating)
Much Better 4
Somewhat better 22
About Same 37
Somewhat worse 19
Much Worse 18
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Interestingly, the largest program impact was in 1990, the year with the lowest 
unemployment. Moreover, the program impact remained substantial despite a 
large variation in unemployment.
6.3.3 Program expenditures and savings
6. 3 , 3 . 1  Conclusion
For the provincial government, the expenditures on the program were lower 
than the savings that resulted from the reduction in welfare payments. 
Unemployment Insurance payments increased federal government costs.
6 . 3 . 3 . 2  Discussion
The dramatic effect of the program on reducing welfare dependence has already 
been shown (Figure 6-1). The area between the participants' curve and the 
comparison group curve represents1 the difference in welfare dependence
attributable to the program and thus the 
saving to the provincial government 
accumulates to a much higher level 
than the program expenditures, 
which consist mainly of the wage 
subsidies.
The program causes a substantial 
increase in federal Unemployment 
Insurance payments, indicated by 
the area between the curves in Figure 6-1
overall saving in welfare. In time this
Table 6-2 :Employment 
Opportunity Program: Selected 
Costs and Savings
Program Cost 2129
Welfare Savings 5182
UI Costs 2162
Note: Discounting at 10% j
!, this time with participants higher than
1 This diagram only shows percentage receiving any benefits. Estimates of levels of savings are 
made by comparing benefits paid to participants and the comparison group.
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the comparison group. But after 65 months, the reduction in welfare 
expenditures is greater than the combined increase in expenditures on the 
program  and on Unemployment Insurance by $890 per participant in 1989 
dollars (assuming a discount rate of 10 percent annually).
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7. Impacts of other Programs
This chapter presents estimates of the impact of three additional employment and 
training programs: on-the-job training in public projects, classroom training and 
job clubs (job search skills training). These estimates were produced using a 
variety of techniques. Estimates of the impacts of the on-the-job training in 
public projects were produced using cell matching on administrative data and 
regression analysis on survey data. Estimates of the impacts of classroom 
training were made by combining administrative data from a community college 
w ith administrative data from the Ministry of Social Services. The comparison 
group was selected from welfare recipients who were not participating in 
Ministry on-the-job training programs. Estimates of the impact of the job club 
were m ade using random assignm ent Both administrative and survey data 
were used in the analysis.
Recall that Chapter 5 found that selection bias in estimates of the impact of programs 
in BC on subsequent welfare dependence amounted to roughly five percentage 
points when estimates of impact were made by comparing subsequent welfare 
dependence of participants with non participants who were similar in age, sex, 
marital status, history of dependence classification and who were receiving welfare 
at the same time as the participants. The analysis was done explicitly so that the 
reader could assess the results presented in this and the following chapters. Where 
the impacts are less than five percentage points they should be viewed with 
suspicion. However, where they are greater than five percentage points, we can be 
fairly confident that there is a real long term impact
7.1 On-the-job Training in Public Projects______________________
7.1.1 The Programs
British Columbia has three programs that offer welfare recipients employment with 
on-the-job training on government projects. The Ministry of Social Services supplies 
the wages (up to $7 an hour for labourers and up to $10 an hour for supervisors), the
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employers' contributions to employee benefits, and an additional amount for 
administrative overhead. The positions are normally for six months but are 
sometimes extended to 12 months.
The three programs are as follows:
• The Community Tourism 
Employment Training 
Program (CTETP) funds work 
with non-profit organisations 
on community tourism 
development. Projects include 
heritage site restorations, 
parks development, and festival
• The Forest Worker Assistance Program (FWAP) funds work on silviculture 
projects throughout the province. The FWAP is administered by the Ministry 
of Forests.
• The Environment Youth Program funds work for welfare recipients aged 
17-24 on such outdoor projects as trail improvement and salmon 
enhancement. The EYP is operated in conjunction with the Ministry of 
Environment, Lands and Parks.
These three public-sector programs taken together are comparable in budget to the 
Employment Opportunity Program. However, they assist only about one-quarter 
the number of people. Fewer than one percent of all welfare recipients participated 
in the public-sector programs, and the average cost per participant was about $6800.
Table 7-1 Relative size of public sector 
programs (1991/1992)
Clients Budget
CTETP 961 5.3
FWAP 508 4.1
EYP 350 3.0
Total 1819 12.4
start-ups.
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7.1.2 C onclusions
British Columbia's three public employment programs reduced welfare dependence 
in the short term but had little long-term impact. The survey results also indicated 
that the program  did not help participants find jobs in the long term.
Like the private sector wage subsidy program, the public employm ent program s all 
increased UI eligibility, especially in the 12 months following the end of each 
program , when participants were 25 to 30 percentage points more likely than 
non-participants to be on UI. This effect was much greater than with the wage 
subsidy program , and in two of three instances lasted at a lower level throughout 
the observation period.
The program s created a value in 
public benefits estimated to range 
from 50 to 94 percent of the program 
expenditures. The combination of 
value created and the short term 
reduction in welfare benefits paid out 
approached program expenditures 
bu t was m arkedly less than program 
expenditures and increased 
Unem ploym ent Insurance combined.
7.1.3 Im pact O n Participants
7.1.4 R educing  w elfare
7 . 1 . 4 . 1  Conclusion  
The public programs helped reduce
welfare dependence while they were Figure 7-1 Im pact of CTETP on
subsequent welfare dependence
Data source 4; comparison group A
Months Since Starting Program
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under w ay and during the following 12 months of Unemployment Insurance 
eligibility for participants. Beyond that they had little or no positive effect.
7 . 1 . 4 . 2  D isc u ss io n  
Using a cell-matched
comparison group of
non-participants, it was found
that the welfare dependence
of program  participants
dropped much more quickly
than for comparable
non-participants, and stayed
lower for about 18 months
(Figures 7-1 - 7-3). In the first
six m onths, the employment
in the program s themselves
accounts for the lower welfare
dependence of the
participants. The next 12
m onths corresponds to the
period of participants'
eligibility for Unemployment
Insurance as a consequence of
program  employment.
(Participants showed greater
reliance on UI during this period; see below.)
After 18 m onths, the impact of the programs diminishes dramatically. Between 
m onths 19 and 36 the average impact of the Community Tourism Program  averaged
Figure 7-2 Im pact of EYP on subsequent
welfare dependence
Data source 4; comparison group A
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3.5 percentage points, and the Environment Youth Program averaged 3.3 percentage 
points (Figures 7-1 and 7-2). Although these differences are statistically significant, 
they are not necessarily due to the initial program.
Of the participants in the CTETP in 1988/89,8.3 percent participated in a subsequent 
on-the-job training program. Since the subsequent program  had an impact of 15 to 
20 percentage points in the early months, roughly half of the long-term impact can
be attributed to the impact of subsequent programs. About 4.5 percent of
\
participants in EYP participated in other programs in subsequent years so roughly 
one-quarter of the long term impact of EYP can be attributed to the impact of 
subsequent programs.
The pattern of welfare 
dependence of participants is 
strikingly different in the Forest 
W orker Assistance Program than 
in the other programs (Figure 7- 
3). The dependence of the 
participants is higher than that of 
the comparison group at about 
two years following entrance to 
the program , but subsequently 
became lower than the 
comparison group. This may be 
due to the high degree of 
seasonality in the forestry 
programs. Two-thirds of
participants entered the program between July and October; virtually none entered 
between March and July. If the forestry programs cause people to join a seasonal
Figure 7-3 Im pact of FWAP on subsequent
welfare dependence
Data source 4; comparison group A
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industry, then the level of their dependence might be expected to oscillate around 
the level of dependence of the 
comparison group. The impact of 
repeat users of the program may 
have exacerbated this. Roughly 
seven percent of participants in the 
1988/89 forestry program
participated in a subsequent
\
program. If those programs started 
in the same months, the cyclers 
w ould leave welfare faster than the 
comparison group in a few specific 
months.
7.1.5 M oving to unem ploym ent insurance
7 . 1 . 5 . 1  Conclusion
All three program s enabled their participants to rely on Unemployment Insurance to 
a much greater extent than non-participants (25 to 30 percentage points more) for the 
12-month UI eligibility period after the end of the program  and then somewhat 
m ore for at least another year after that. Beginning about m onth 30 from program  
start, FWAP participants became less reliant on UI than non-participants. But 
greater long-term reliance on UI than non-participants persisted for CTETP 
participants and even more so for EYP participants.
Figure 7-4 Im pact of CTETP on 
subsequent UI dependence
Data sources 4, 7; regression analysis
7 . 1 . 5 . 2  D isc u ss io n
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Regression analyses showed that participants were more dependent on average than 
the comparison group on 
Unem ploym ent Insurance from 
about m onth four after the 
beginning of each program 
(Figures 7-4 - 7-6). Participant 
dependence remained 25 to 30
percentage points higher than
\
non-participant dependence over 
the 12 m onth period of their 
program -derived eligibility for 
Unem ploym ent Insurance. After 
m onth 18, participants remained 
more dependent on 
Unem ploym ent Insurance than the 
comparison group, but only by perhaps 10 percentage points. With the Forest 
W orker Assistance Program this greater dependence on UI came to an end about 30 
m onths from the beginning of the 
program. W ith the Community 
Tourism Employment Training 
Program  and the Environment Youth 
Program, the greater dependence of 
participants on UI persisted 
throughout the observation period of 
36 months.
Details of the regression analyses are 
provided in Appendix B.
Figure 7-5 Im pact of FWAP on
subsequent UI dependence
Data sources 4, 7; regression analysis
Comparison Group 
Participants
Month* since Starting Program
Figure 7-6 Im pact of EYP on subsequent UI 
dependence
Data sources 4, 7; regression analysis
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7.1.6 Finding employment
7 . 1 . 6 . 1  Conclusion
There is no dear survey evidence that the programs helped people get work once 
the programs themselves were completed.
7 . 1 . 6 . 2  Discussion
Table 7-2 Percent employed by program
Partidpants ! Non-Partidpants
CTETP 46 I 46
FWAP 23 ! 43
EYP 46 1 41 |
The survey 
interviewees were N 
asked simply: "Are you 
currently working?"
The survey responses, when controlled for partitipant characteristics, showed no 
long-term impact for CTETP and EYP: there was no statistically significant 
difference in rate of current employment at the 17-month mark between the 
partidpants and the non-partidpants in the comparison group.
By contrast, FWAP respondents exhibited a large negative impact. However, this is 
probably due to the seasonal nature of forestry work and the timing of the interview. 
With the vast majority of FWAP projects starting in the late summer, the survey at 
the 17 month mark would be in the winter. Additional evidence in support of this 
explanation is that in response to the question, "Have you been employed since the 
last interview?" five percent more of the FWAP partidpants than the comparison 
group answered "yes."
7.1.7 Public value of work performed
7 . 1 . 7 . 1  Conclusion
The public employment programs produced value ranging from 50 percent to 94 
percent of the value that would have been produced using private contractors for 
the same tasks.
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7 . 1 . 7 . 2  Discussion
This question required that estimates be made by the employing agencies and 
supervisors. The value of the program products, mainly in the form of work 
completed, was taken to be the estimated cost of having the same product produced 
by other means, such as by contractors. The managers for whom the program 
participants worked were asked to estimate that alternative cost for equivalent work 
completed, which was then compared to the cost of the full wage subsidies for the
participants. The three public programs had varying results:
\
• CTETP: This estimate had the lowest reliability. Because of the decentralised 
nature of the projects, only a small sample of managers and projects could be 
examined. The interview question, "What is the value of output per 
month?", may have been interpreted as an intrinsic value of the product 
rather than as the cost of an alternative supply. Comparisons could not easily 
be made with other projects where costs were known, and the managers 
interviewed were in any case not experts in the field, as they were for the 
other two programs. The sample surveyed found that $16,000 in work was 
completed for a total cost of $32,000. Thus each CTETP dollar generated 50 
cents in product value.
• FWAP: The estimate here was judged the most reliable of the three, because 
the Ministry of Forests measured the work completed and was able to 
compare it directly to similar work completed by their contractors. In fiscal 
year 1986/87 (when the FWAP was much larger than in subsequent years), 
the total value of work completed was $9.7 million, for a cost of $12.5 million. 
Thus each FWAP dollar generated 78 cents in product value.
• EYP: This estimate was less reliable because the projects for the Ministry of 
Environment were not always quantifiable or comparable to other projects 
for which costs were available. Nevertheless, the judgement of experts in the 
field was that in fiscal 1987/88, $1.6 million in work was completed for a total
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cost of $1.7 million. Thus each EYP dollar generated 94 cents in product 
value.
7.1.8 Program expenditures and savings
7 . 1 . 8 . 1  Conclusion
The programs reduced welfare expenditures by the provincial government, though 
not enough to equal program expenditures. But when the value to society of the 
work performed by the participants is added to the welfare savings, the combination 
approaches program
expenditures in each 
case. At the same
1 .......  T...nrmi'iii ii... ■■
Table 7-3: Public sector employment programs, 
selected costs and savings ($/participant)
time, increased CTETP FWAP EYP
Unemployment Program Cost 5155 8971 8571
Insurance
Public Value Created 2758 6295 8057
expenditures were
imposed on the Welfare Savings 2127 1057 2335
federal government. UI Costs 3519 3194 3344
Note: Discounting at 10%
Discussion
The accompanying table shows how the welfare savings compared to program 
expenditures, the value of the work performed, and the increased Unemployment 
Insurance payments that resulted. For CTETP and FWAP, welfare savings were 
calculated by subtracting the welfare benefits paid to the participants from those 
paid to the comparison group. For EYP this difference was estimated by 
multiplying the difference in dependence (shown in Figure 7-2) by the average 
benefits per case.
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7.2 Classroom Training Programs____________________________
7.2.1 The Programs
The Ministry refers welfare recipients to classroom training programs as 
employment preparation. Funding is provided by a number of agencies, the 
provincial Ministries of Social Services and of Skills Training and Labour, and the 
federal Human Resources Development Canada. The training programs are 
provided mainly by community colleges and institutes. In 1991/92, more than 
20,000 recipients registered for these courses, and the cost to the Ministry (but not 
the total cost) of providing the courses was about $3 million, for an average cost per 
participant of $150.
Detail on these programs can be gained from the example of Camosun College in 
Victoria, where the programs are placed in four categories:
• Vocational training: 6-12 months in duration, e.g. plumbing, welding, 
secretarial, dental hygienist;
• Career Technical Training: 24 months in duration, e.g. criminal justice, 
visual arts, electronic technology;
• Adult Basic Education: from basic literacy and numeracy to high school 
equivalence, including Employment Opportunities for Women;
• Academic: university transfer courses.
7.2.2 Conclusions
An earlier (1987) province-wide estimate of the impact of Classroom Training 
programs on welfare dependence showed no positive impact and a probable small 
negative impact (i.e., causing additional dependence). A new (1992) province-wide 
analysis is only slightly more optimistic, showing a modest positive overall impact 
in the form of a net reduction of dependence by nearly two months of benefits per 
participant over a five-year period.
Impacts of Other Programs 186
Another new analysis focuses on courses provided by one institution, Camosun 
College in Victoria, to compare the effects of different types of courses. The results 
show that Career Technical and Vocational courses have the most impact, Adult 
Basic Education has the least positive impact (if any), and Academic courses have a 
modest positive impact. For all courses together, the result for Camosun was 
consistent with the province-wide finding: a small positive impact of nearly two 
months in reduced welfare benefits paid.
v
7. 2 . 2 . 1  S e le c t io n  b ia s  in  the d isaggrega ted  s tu d y
Of all the estimates presented in this thesis, the disaggregated results from the joint
study with Camosun College are the most likely to suffer from selection bias. In this
case an important relevant variable, education, is correlated both with the program
(whether upgrading or post-secondary) and with the outcome, subsequent welfare
dependence. Individuals must have completed their secondary education in order
to enrol in vocational, career-technical or academic courses at a community college.
Otherwise they must enrol in upgrading (ABE). The results of the survey indicate
that individuals who declare any post secondary training are six percentage points
less likely to receive welfare1. To the extent that secondary schooling completion is
not perfectly correlated with the variables used to select the comparison group, the
comparison group will have more education than the participants in ABE and less
education than participants in the other courses. In the survey sample 52% of
respondents reported some post secondary training. This suggests that bias from
this source would be less than three percentage points, not enough to overturn the
results.
1 See Regression Results, Full Sample, the last table in the appendix to Chapter 5, coefficient on 
variable APS.
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7.2.3 Background
Gassroom Training programs for welfare recipients have been criticised for 
ineffectiveness. In British Columbia, a study in 1987 took a province-wide sample of 
participants in all courses in 1983 and traced their experience through 1986. The 
results showed a probable negative impact on participants, that is, their welfare 
dependence was modestly increased rather than reduced.
Evaluations of Classroom Training programs conducted elsewhere show much the 
same results. The federal government's evaluation of the National Institutional 
Training Programs concluded that there was "no significant benefit from 
participating in the training relative to a comparison group." [Abt 1985] American 
studies have generated similar findings2.
However, a Massachusetts study of state programs which was the first to break 
down classroom training by type produced a new and interesting result: though 
there was no impact from adult basic education or from English as a second 
language courses, there was a positive impact from vocational training courses. 
[Nightengale 1991] This finding encouraged us to approach Camosun College to 
conduct a similar disaggregated study, allowing an examination of the differences in 
impact between the courses, differences that turn out to be significant. The 
Camosun study was accompanied by a second province-wide analysis.
This report therefore discusses three estimates of the impact of Gassroom Training 
programs for welfare recipients in British Columbia. The first is the province-wide 
1987 study of participants from 1983 through 1986. The second study (1992) mirrors 
the first at a later period, following a province-wide sample of participants in all 
programs from 1986 through 1991. The third is limited to courses offered by
2 See e.g. Lalondel992.
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Camosun College in Victoria with a sample of partidpants whose experience was 
followed from 1986 through 1991.
The analysis of Classroom Training programs is limited to the impact on welfare 
dependence using provindal welfare program  data. The federal Unem ploym ent 
Insurance data were available for too few of the partidpants to be statistically useful. 
No interview survey was done to gather information on employment and earnings.
\
The m ethod used was cell matching, with a separate matched comparison group for 
each partiripant group. Partidpants in all four courses totalled 1388 people 
distributed as follows: Adult Basic Education 760, Vocational 339, Career Technical 
169, and Academic 120.
7.2.4 Im pact On Participants
7.2.5 R educing  w elfare
Conclusion
Classroom Training as such (all 
courses considered together) had 
a m odest positive impact on 
welfare dependence, redudng  it 
by nearly two months on average 
per partidpant. Career Technical 
had the largest impact, redudng  
dependence about 15 to 20 
percentage points in the long 
term. Vocational training came 
next, redudng  dependence about
10 to 15 percentage points. Figure 7-7 Classroom  training, province-w ide,
aggregate im pact, 1983 cohort
Data source 9; comparison group A
C o m p a r i s o n  G r o u p  
P a r t ic ip a n ts
18 24  30
M o n th s  S in c e  S ta r r in g  P ro g ra m
36 4212
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Academic training had a more modest positive impact. However, A dult Basic 
Education had no overall positive effect, and in earlier months a negative impact, 
actually increasing dependence on welfare.
0 . 9 -  -  Comparison group 
"■“ Participants0.8
0 . 7
0.6
0 . 5
0 . 4
0 . 3
0.2
M onths since starting program
0 . 1 5 Difference 
Confidence interval
0 . 0 5
- 0 . 0 5
- 0.1
3 6
Figure 7-8 Classroom  training, Cam osun College, aggregate im pact, 1986 cohort
Data source 9; comparison group A
7 . 2 . 5 . 1  D isc u ss io n
The province-wide results from the first study (1987, an analysis of recipients whose 
participation began in 1983) showed an aggregate impact that was not positive and 
possibly negative (Figure 7-7). The second study (1992, an analysis of recipients 
whose participation began in 1986) differed, showing a m odest positive aggregate 
impact (Figure 7-8). However, this finding was consistent with the aggregate results 
of the study of Camosun students (1992) who received welfare in the m onth in 
which they enrolled (Figure 7-9).
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Figure 7-9 Classroom training, province-wide, aggregate im pact, 1986 cohort
Data source 9; comparison group A
The difference between the negative overall result in 1987 and the positive result in 
1992 is noteworthy. One reason may have been that the provincial welfare caseload 
increased dramatically during the years between the 1983 sample and the 1986 
sample, w ith most of the increase consisting of recipients classed as "employable". 
Such recipients would be more likely to attend the more directly 
employment-oriented courses (Vocational and Career Technical), that also have the 
highest im pact If a larger proportion of recipients participated in the courses with 
the highest impact, the overall impact of the courses w ould rise even if the course 
im pact per participant remained the same. (The overall results for the 1983 sample
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are strikingly similar to the results for Adult Basic Education for the 1986 sample.) 
Furthermore, unemployment remained high in the years following the first study, 
perhaps reducing the number of graduates who could find jobs.
0.9 - - Comparison group
—  Partidpants0.8
0.6
0.3
0.2
0.1
Months since starting program
difference 
Confidence interval
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
8ca
Q
- 0.1
- 0.2
605448423612 18 300 6 24
Figure 7-10 Percent dependent on welfare, career-technical training participants 
and  com parison group Data source 9; comparison group A
The course-by-course impacts found in the Camosun study were more pronounced 
than the aggregate impacts, with interesting month-by-month changes in welfare 
dependence. Career Technical courses (Figure 7-10) usually last two years. The 
figure shows the onset of a training effect about month 24 and sustained from then 
on. Vocational training (Figure 7-11) lasts six to twelve m onths, averaging about
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nine months. This figure also shows the onset of a training effect at about nine 
m onths, which is sustained as well.
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Q
•0.1
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Figure 7-11 Percent dependent on welfare, vocational training participants and 
com parison group Data source 9; comparison group A
Academic training (Figure 7-12) usually lasts about eight m onths (during which the 
student has income from loans and grants, explaining the abrupt decline in welfare 
dependence in this early period and the return to dependence after the academic 
year is completed). The sustained but cyclical reduction in welfare dependence 
from then on may reflect conditions in further academic training rather than the 
finding of employment and the existence on other non-welfare costs for the 
provincial government.
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Figure 7-12 Percent dependent on welfare, academ ic participants and 
com parison group Data source 9; comparison group A
Quite a different picture is conveyed by Adult Basic Education (Figure 7-13). The 
absence of a positive impact and the probability of some increased welfare 
dependence are clear. The continued dependence of recipients on welfare while 
enrolled is understandable: job search is displaced by study. The sim ilarity 
betw een participants and com parison group suggests that the participants did  
not receive any training that gave them  an advantage in the job m arket. A
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subsidiary  finding, that 46% of courses taken by ABE students in our sam ple 
resulted  in failure or incomplete, suggests that an exam ination of the d rop  out 
rate, and the reasons for dropping out w ould be fruitful areas of research. In 
any event, because most recipients participating in classroom training take the 
A dult Basic Education courses, the disappointing im pact of those courses
dom inates the overall impact of classroom training.
0.9
-  -  Comparison group
—  Partidpants0.7bO
0.3
02
Months Since Starting Program
0.4
0.3 Difference 
Confidence interval0.2
-0.1
- 0.2
Figure 7-13 Percent dependent on welfare, ABE participants and com parison 
g roup  Data source 9; comparison group A
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7.3 Job Search_____________________________________________
7.3.1 The Program
The Ministry of Social Services has given the name Job Action to its job search 
assistance initiatives. Job Action encompasses a range of short programs of the kind 
called "job clubs" found widely across Canada and the United States. Their purpose 
is to help job-ready welfare recipients improve their ability to find work. The Job 
Action programs, which run up to five weeks in length, combine classroom learning 
with supervised job search. Participants learn to assess their skills, obtain job 
interviews, and present themselves effectively in interviews. They also receive an 
allowance of up to $150 for program-related expenses such as transportation, 
clothing, and personal grooming. Job Action is brief, inexpensive, and targeted at 
recipients with no apparent barriers to immediate employment.
The Job Action programs in 1991/92 had total expenditures of $3 million, a total 
enrolment of 6,233 recipients, and a cost per participant of about $480.
7.3.2 Conclusions
British Columbia's Job Action programs are successful in helping recipients find 
employment and reduce their dependence on welfare.
Although program participation had no effect on wage levels, Job Action reduced 
welfare dependence significantly for about eight months. Participants left welfare 
more quickly than non-partidpants in early months, but without returning to 
dependence more quickly. Savings in welfare payments exceed program 
expenditures by a wide margin (unless attendance at dasses falls substantially 
below minimum levels guaranteed to the contractors, which is a function of 
program planning).
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These conclusions are in agreement with the results of evaluations of similar 
programs in the United States.
7.3.3 Background
The estimate of the impact of Job Action was the most detailed and thorough of 
those described in this report. Whereas the other analyses used comparison groups 
with participant matching, the Job Action analysis was based on random 
assignment. The special project was undertaken to test a proposed change in 
program delivery.
7 . 3 . 3 . 1  The c a l l  f o r  an eva luat ion
In British Columbia, Job Action traditionally has been offered only to people who 
have been on welfare for several months; for example, two-thirds of participants in 
Job Action in British Columbia have been on welfare for more than six months. This 
practice was based on studies that showed that employment and training programs 
are most helpful to "less-employable" recipients (i.e. longer-term welfare 
beneficiaries).3 Because the "more-employable" recipients are more likely to leave 
welfare within the first few months, the policy of reserving Job Action to 
longer-term recipients was believed to direct it to those whom it would benefit most.
However, Ministry workers in Region A (parts of Vancouver and neighbouring 
Richmond) thought this policy might diminish the impact of Job Action for those 
recipients who, after several months on welfare, lose contact with employers and 
become discouraged. They urged that Job Action be made available to people from 
the time they applied for welfare.
Several possible contradictory effects of this policy change could be foreseen:
3 See e.g. Friedlander 1988.
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•  If the Region A workers were right, the new "e a r l/ ' participants would be 
more responsive to Job Action and thus more successful, increasing its 
impact.
• But the new "early" participants would not be allocated as the result of a 
rehab officer's assessment and recommendation, and thus might on average 
be less responsive than those who were, thereby reducing the program's 
impact.
•  With the "early" participants there would be little or none of the usual
\
preparation for the program, that tells recipients how the program works and 
what is expected of them, so that, again, the "early" participants might be less 
responsive than those who were so prepared, also reducing the program's 
impact.
These questions led to the Region A Job Action Pilot Project, designed to assess the 
impact of Job Action when offered at the time of application for welfare.
7 . 3 . 3 . 2  A random assignment p r o j e c t
A random assignment test was chosen for several reasons. Because the change in 
service would extend it to recipients who would not have qualified for it under 
existing policy, a project whose program participants were randomly selected would 
not deprive any recipients of services they might have received otherwise.
Moreover, provided the demonstration population was large enough, the statistical 
uncertainties of the results would be smaller than with a comparison group method. 
Finally, the Region A staff, as advocates of the policy change, were willing to help 
implement the project.
Applicants for welfare in February, March, and April 1989 who volunteered to 
participate in the pilot project were referred to interviewers who collected 
information on their education, work experience, and attitudes. The interviewers 
then randomly selected participants by sending every second recipient for
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enrolment in a Job Action course scheduled to begin within a week. Information on 
subsequent welfare dependence was obtained from Ministry program data. 
Information on subsequent employment and income was gathered from interviews 
held six months and 15 months after enrolment.
In all, 236 recipient interviews were completed, from which random assignment led 
to 125 being referred to Job Action and 118 to the control group. Two participants 
and five controls refused the interview, so the analysis applied to 123 participants4 
and 113 controls. A comparison of the average of its characteristics with that of the 
control group revealed no statistically significant differences, thus confirming the 
random selection (see Appendix C).
7 . 3 . 3 . 3  Estimate o f  impact
Though only 51 of those randomly selected actually participated and generated the 
impacts, the data gathered on the impacts of Job Action on those 51 true participants 
had to be averaged across the entire randomly selected group of 123, as though the 
impacts on 51 had applied to the whole group. This was done to avoid "selection 
bias", that might have m ade— probably did make— the 51 not representative of 
the whole participant group. Then, using program data, the welfare dependence of 
participants and controls was followed on a monthly basis. A monthly average 
dependence was derived for both groups, as were monthly average benefits 
received. The differences between participants and controls in these basic averages 
are attributable to the effects of Job Action.
These basic averages were then refined using regression analyses, as detailed in 
Appendix B. Afterwards, the results were compared with the results of similar 
evaluations of job club programs in the United States.
4 Although 123 individuals were referred to Job Action only 51 actually received any service.
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7.3.4 Im pact On Participants
7.3.5 Reducing welfare
7 . 3 . 5 . 1  Conclusion
Job Action reduced welfare dependence for about eight months. There was no 
evidence of a longer-term effect
\
7 . 3 . 5 . 2  Discussion
The participants and controls were compared for welfare dependence. In Figure 7- 
14, the two lines show the average welfare dependence for both groups, and the 
lower dependence of the participant group is clear. Fewer participants than
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Figure 7-14 Percent dependent on welfare, Job Action participants and control 
g roup Data sources 1,8
controls received benefits in the early months, but the difference petered out after 
about eight months.
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Figure 7-15 Percent leaving welfare, Job Action participants and control group
Data sources 1, 8
The same effect is shown in a different way by looking at the percentage of 
participants and controls who became independent in each m onth (Figure 7-15). 
The two lines show the num ber of months after the program began w hen 
participants and controls stopped receiving benefits. In the first three months 
participants become independent more quickly than controls, but in subsequent 
m onths the opposite happened.
Because Job Action participants get jobs more quickly, there is some concern that 
these jobs m ay be unsuitable, causing them to quit prematurely and return to 
welfare. Examination of the num ber of recipients returning to welfare every month 
did indeed show that more participants than controls returned in the early months 
(Figure 7-16).
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Figure 7-16 N um ber returning to welfare by m onth, Job Action participants and 
control g roup Data sources 1, 8
But in those months more participants had left and thus were available to return. If 
the return rate were the same for participants and controls, more participants would 
return in early months. To control for the different rates of leaving welfare, we 
looked at the proportion of recipients who returned to welfare by the num ber of 
m onths since they left welfare (Figure 7-17). This measure reversed the preliminary 
finding that more participants than controls returned to welfare; it showed that, on 
the contrary, members of the control group were more likely to return.
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7.3.6 F ind ing  Em ploym ent
7 . 3 . 6 . 1  Conclusion
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Figure 7-17 Percent returning to welfare by num ber of m onths since leaving
Data sources 1, 8
The survey gave no evidence that Job Action increased employm ent among 
partidpants six months after they enrolled in the program. Reduced welfare 
dependence, described below, suggests indirectly that there m ay have been a 
positive effect.
7 . 3 . 6 . 2  D isc u ss io n
The survey, which occurred six months after the program  began, did not show a 
statistically significant difference between percentage of partidpants and the 
percentage of controls employed. At the six-month mark, 72 percent of partidpants 
and 70 percent of the control group had been employed at some point in the 
previous six months. After 15 months, 84 percent of partidpants and 83 percent of 
controls were employed.
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There has been speculation that partidpants in the Job Action programs may accept 
lower wages than non-partidpants. The survey results did not support this 
conjecture. The average starting wage among the 38 partidpants responding was 
$8.04, while among the 28 controls responding it was $7.94. This difference too was 
not statistically significant.
7.3.7 Program expenditures and savings
7 . 3 . 7 . 1  Conclusion
Provided Job Action dasses are well attended, the welfare savings exceed program 
expenditures by a wide margin.
7 . 3 . 7 . 2  Discuss ion
The savings and expenditures assessed were limited to those with dear, direct 
effects on the Ministry budget. The savings were reductions in welfare; indirect 
savings such as increased tax revenues were not considered. Similarly, the 
expenditures considered were program contract costs and redpient expenses, both 
borne by the Ministry; other costs, such as the other activities forgone to divert staff 
resources to refer redpients to Job Action, were not considered.
Welfare savings have been estimated at $367 per partidpant. A major appeal of 
random assignment studies is that estimates of the impact can be made simply by 
comparing the average values of the partidpants and the control group. It is 
possible to refine these estimates by the use of regression analysis, although the 
refinement carries a price in complexity and concomitant sceptidsm.
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In the present case, the participants received on average $227 less than controls in the 
year following application. Regression analysis increases this estimate to $367. This 
difference demands an explanation.
Random assignment will result in similar average values of all characteristics of 
participants and controls, the averages being more alike the larger the sample size.
In this study a few more recipients with children were assigned to the participant 
group than to the control group. Although the difference is not statistically 
significant, it has a substantial impact on the estimate. In general, recipients with 
children receive higher benefits. This means that if Job Action had no impact we 
would expect the participants to have higher benefits on average than the control 
group. Second, single parents leave welfare more slowly than any other group.
Turning to program costs, Job Action is delivered by contractors. Contract costs for 
the pilot project were set at $500 per attendee, with a guarantee of 15 attendees per 
class. Reimbursements for recipient expenses were set at $150 per recipient.
As noted earlier, in the pilot project only 51 of 125 referred participants actually took 
part in Job Action. This under-participation meant that in the pilot project 
classrooms the 15 seats were never full, so the true pilot project cost per attending 
participant was much higher than the minimum guaranteed, in fact about three 
times as high. In this respect the pilot project could be misleading. A more accurate 
picture of Job Action costs in actual practice would be given by assuming that classes 
were at least as large as the minimum guaranteed. Consequently the analysis 
assumed that the program costs would be at the contract level of $500 plus $150 in 
expenses, or $650, per participant.
In order to avoid selection bias, program participation was defined as being referred 
to the program, rather than attending classes. Costs, in contrast, will normally be
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determined by attendance, as the Ministry refers more people than there are spaces. 
Using the cost per participant of $650, total costs would have been $650 x 51 = 
$33,150. Thus the average cost per participant would have been $33,150 +125 = 
$265.20. This was well below the similarly averaged saving per participant of $367.
Obviously, if Job Action classes are full, the welfare savings exceed program 
expenditures by a wide margin. However, if class size falls more than about 20 
percent below the guaranteed minimum level, expenditures begin to exceed welfare 
savings.
7.3.8 Comparison with other job club evaluations
7 . 3 . 8 . 1  Conclusion
Other studies indicate that job club programs at least have positive short-term 
effects. Some studies show persistent impacts.
1.3.  8. 2 Discussion
The results were compared with the results of random assignment evaluations of job 
club programs in three American jurisdictions: Louisville (Kentucky), San Diego 
(California), and Arkansas. There were differences among these programs in 
program content, recipient types and employability, economic climate, 
administrative procedures, and so forth. Even so, there was a broad consistency in 
the findings that such programs have a significant, if short-term, effect in increasing 
employment and reducing welfare dependence.
The Louisville study of 286 participants and 287 controls found in the first three 
months a large difference in employment (39 percent of participants and 25 percent 
of controls) though no difference in the percentage receiving welfare. [Wolfhagen 
1983] The San Diego study of single-parent recipients (856 participants and 873 
controls) and two-parent recipients (831 participants and 813 controls) found
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significant impacts on employment for three months and on welfare dependence for 
more than a year. [Goldman 1986] The Arkansas study of 554 participants and 565 
controls found significant impacts on both employment and welfare over nine 
months. [Friedlander 1985]
7.4 Summary_____________________________________________
This chapter reported estimates of the impact of three types of training program.
On-the-job training in public projects had no measurable impact on the subsequent 
welfare dependence, or employment of participants. Classroom training had very 
different impacts by type of training. Adult basic education had no impact on the 
subsequent welfare dependence of participants. Vocational training had large 
impacts on subsequent welfare dependence. Academic training appeared to have a 
smaller, but still positive impact, but the sample was small, so the differences were 
not generally statistically significant. These findings are consistent with the 
disaggregated results produced in the evaluation of the Massachusetts ET Choices 
program, but provide more information than the existing work in Canada, which 
has not produced disaggregated estimates, and which generally concludes that 
classroom training is not effective. This chapter also reports the results of one of the 
first, if not the first, random assignment studies of an employment and training 
program in Canada. It found that participants left welfare faster, and contrary to 
expectations, did not return faster. The program had neither a wage effect, nor a 
long-term effect on welfare dependence.
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8. Summary
This chapter provides a brief summary of the thesis, and describes the nature of 
the original contribution made by this thesis.
8.1 Summary of thesis______________________________________
8.1.1 Chapter 1
Chapter 1 provided an introduction to the thesis and background information on 
the programs and the income support system in BC.
8.1.2 Chapter 2
Chapter 2 reviewed the experience in estimating the impacts of the American 
CETA programs. It reported two studies (LaLonde, 1986 and Fraker and 
Maynard, 1987) that found that methods used to estimate the CETA programs 
could produce the wrong answer when used to re-estimate the impacts of pilot 
projects that had true control groups. It reported a study (Bryant and Rupp 
1987) that found generally positive and statistically significant impacts and a 
study (Dickinson, Johnson and West, 1986) that found generally negative and 
some statistically significant impacts from CETA programs, even though they 
made the estimates using the same data set. It reported the conclusion of the Job 
Training Longitudinal Survey Research Advisory Panel that labelled the source 
of the problem selection bias, and recommended that the US Department of Labor
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use random  assignment to estimate the impacts of its employment and training 
programs.
8.1.3 C hapter 3
Chapter 3 reviewed recent developments in the estimation of the impacts of 
employment and training programs in the United States and Canada. It 
reported the fragility of random assignment estimates, and the problems of 
generalizability that have surfaced as a result of the greater use of random  
assignment over the past decade. It also reported the success of attempts to 
replicate the results of random assignment experiments using non-experimental 
methods. Friedlander and Robins found that non-experimental studies could 
not reliably replicate the results of experimental studies. In the best case, 87% of 
cross-site, within-state estimates produced the same statistical inference as the 
control group. Cain et al. drew a comparison group from screen-outs and drop­
outs from a random  assignment experiment and found estimates of selection 
bias of from 4.3% to 7.7% compared with a program impact of 13.9%. They 
conclude that the approach holds promise. Park et al. find that two stage 
methods do not remove selection bias as well as difference-in-difference 
estimators. They also find that a difference-in-difference estimator of the impact 
of training program s for UI recipients is robust to choice of base year when the 
comparison group is selected from individuals who are also receiving UI.
8.1.4 C hapter 4
Chapter 4 provided an overview of the BC Study. First it provided a conceptual 
framework. It was not possible to identify all participation in all alternatives to 
the programs under review, so some members of the comparison group will 
have received training through a different agency. As a result, the estimates of 
impact will be lower than if the counterfactual were "no activity".
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Chapter 4 also described the ten sources of data used in the thesis:
1. administrative data on welfare benefits paid;
2. a survey of participants and non participants;
3. participant referral forms that identified participants and rejectees;
4. m onthly claim forms that identified participants in on-the-job training 
j programs;
_ 5. a survey of RO's that identified a group of non participants who, in the 
I opinion of the RO's were similar to participants in m easured and
unm easured characteristics;\
. 6. Records of Employment that provided histories of employment and earnings 
on a one-in-ten sample of the BC population;
7. administrative records of UI payments that provided histories of UI 
dependence both pre- and post program for a one-in-ten sample of the BC 
population;
8. the Job Action Pilot Project that identified a participant and control group of 
job club participants; and
9. classroom training records from Camosun College that identified welfare 
recipients who participated in classroom training and the courses that they 
took;
10. a group of individuals who by self identification and interview were 
identified as job ready.
Chapter 4 gave the results of three tests that affected the approach taken in the 
study. It reported that Heckman's two stage method for dealing with selection 
bias was very sensitive to distributional assumptions, and that this finding led 
the study away from arcane statistical techniques. It reported tests for 
undetected non linearities that led the study to rely more on matched 
comparison groups than on regression analysis. And third, it reported non 
response bias in the survey that changed the results qualitatively. This led the 
study to rely more on administrative data than on survey data.
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| Finally, Chapter 4 gave a preview of the estimates of the impact of a private 
I sector wages subsidy program on subsequent welfare dependence.
8.1.5 C h ap te rs
Chapter 5 addresses the issue of selection bias. The first section identifies and 
reports the results of five tests for selection bias, four of which do not require the 
use of random  assignment. These tests illustrate the general principle that it is 
possible to test for selection bias in observational studies.
A num ber of results emerged from these tests. Pre-program tests for selection 
bias are not reliable. Absence of bias in one variable does not imply that 
estimates of the impact on different variables will be similarly unbiased. W ith 
regard to the specific programs and selection mechanism operating in BC, 
selection bias was less than 5 percentage points.
Chapter 5 also illustrated the danger of using annual data to estimate the 
impacts of employment and training programs for disadvantaged workers. It 
found that annual data would obscure the pre-program dip in earnings in almost 
40% of the cases. A comparison group that matched the participants on all pre­
program  variables would not necessarily have experienced a dip in earnings in 
40% of the cases, so their subsequent earnings are expected to be higher than the 
earnings of the participants. This is a clear source of selection bias that could 
easily have resulted in the variation in the estimates of the CETA programs.
Taken together, the results of the tests for selection bias in Chapter 5 indicate that 
selection bias in the estimates based on welfare data only amounts to less than 
five percentage points. Adding information on earnings and UI dependence, 
cuts this rem aining bias in half.
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8.1.6 Chapter 6
Chapter 6 reports the estimates of the impact of a wage subsidy program on 
subsequent welfare dependence, UI dependence, and employment. It finds that 
welfare dependence is decreased in both the short and long run, that UI 
dependence is increased, and that employment is increased 18 months following 
enrolment. The impacts of the program on subsequent welfare dependence are 
estimated for various subgroups. Chapter 6 reports higher savings for those 
with longer histories of welfare dependence, for categories with more dependent
(one and two parent families) and for older applicants rather than younger ones.
\
The impacts of the program did not vary dramatically with the unemployment 
rate.
8.1.7 Chapter 7
Chapter 7 reports the estimates of the impacts of three other types of program. 
The first type, on-the-job training in subsidised jobs that had a fixed term, had 
no impact on long term welfare dependence or employment. Chapter 7 reported 
the only disaggregated estimates of the impact of classroom training in Canada.
It found no impact from upgrading courses (ABE) but significant impacts from 
vocational training. Chapter 7 also reported the results of the first random 
assignment study of an employment and training program in Canada. It found 
significant, bu t short-term impacts from a job club. It also found that it worked 
by speeding the departure of clients from welfare without speeding their return 
or inducing them to take lower paying jobs. Welfare savings exceeded program  
costs.
8.2 Nature of original contribution____________________________
The work reported in this thesis advances the study of employment and training 
programs in three areas: findings, data development, and methodology. Details 
follow under these three headings.
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8.2.1 Findings
The work presented in this thesis advances our understanding of employment and 
training programs by generating estimates of the impact of programs for which no 
other estimate exists. In addition, three aspects of the findings advance our 
understanding of employment and training programs in general.
i) Disaggregated estimates: This study is the only one in Canada, and one of a very 
few in North America that presents disaggregated estimates of the impact of
classroom training for disadvantaged workers. These results are extremely
\
interesting and useful. Because different types of classroom training have very 
different impacts, estimates of the impact of classroom training, taken as a single 
treatment, can be misleading. The findings for the wage subsidy program with the 
private sector are disaggregated by age and marital status. This too is rare, and 
produces interesting findings. It is common to disaggregate by gender, but this 
study shows that the difference in impacts between single men and single women is 
small compared with the difference between single women and (93% female) single 
parents.
ii) Long-term impacts: In this thesis, impacts of programs are estimated for much 
longer periods than in other studies. For example, estimates of the 'long- term" 
impact of the New Jersey on-the-job training program only went out two years 
(Freeman et al. 1988), and the cost benefit analysis required assumptions regarding 
the decay rate of the impacts of the programs. The results reported in this thesis 
extend beyond three years for the public sector on-the-job training programs, four 
years for the private sector on-the-job training programs and five years for the 
classroom training programs.
Hi) Description of impacts: The findings also provide a much clearer exposition of the 
impact of programs than is found elsewhere. For example, Chapter 6 shows that 
only half of the participants in the wage subsidy program were independent of
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welfare in the first six months, suggesting that managers of this type of program 
should be concerned about drop out rates. Findings on all programs show that a 
high percentage of program participants would have become independent of 
welfare, even in the absence of the programs, dramatically illustrating the need for 
comparison groups in the study of employment and training programs for 
disadvantaged workers. In addition, in each case the extent of the impact varies 
dramatically from month to month. The results reported in this thesis extend our 
understanding of employment and training programs by revealing these variations.
\
8.2.2 Data development
i) Administrative data: This thesis reports work that is part of the exploration of the 
uses of administrative data on welfare receipt for research in Canada. Human 
Resources Development Canada (HRD) has a long history of linking administrative 
data on Unemployment Insurance, (UI) with tax data in order to estimate the impact 
of its employment and training programs, but it only gained access to welfare data 
in the late eighties1. Statistics Canada, in conjunction with the Economic Council of 
Canada, linked tax, welfare and UI data in order to complete a longitudinal study of 
low income individuals. The province of Ontario linked its welfare records in order 
to estimate impacts of employment and training programs in that province in the 
late eighties. This thesis reports the use of longitudinal data on welfare dependence 
to estimate the impact of employment and training programs. The work reported in 
this thesis was done concurrently with the work described above and information 
and results were shared among the groups.
ii) Random assignment: This thesis reports the results of the first use of random 
assignment to estimate the impact of an employment and training program in 
Canada, the Job Action Pilot Project of January 1989.
1 BC was the first province to enter into an agreement to exchange welfare information for UI 
information for research purposes in September 1987.
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iii) Other: This thesis also reports the use of other data. Ministry staff were contacted 
in order to get the names of individuals whom staff felt were suitable for 
participation in programs, but who had not participated. A sample of participants 
in programs was interviewed, and information on employment and earnings was 
collected.
8.2.3 Methodology
i) Selection bias: In my view the most important contribution of this thesis is in the 
development and illustration of tests for selection bias, and through them the 
exploration of the nature and causes of selection bias. Observational studies must 
grapple with the possibility of bias resulting from unknown (and possibly 
unknowable) characteristics that are correlated with program participation and the 
outcome of interest. The work reported in this thesis illustrates the types of 
additional data that can be used in order to shed additional light on the problem.
Some specific new findings that result from the application of these techniques are:
• tests for selection bias that are based on comparisons of pre-program 
characteristics are not reliable.
• estimates of the impact of programs that are based on annual data are not 
reliable.
• bias due to the presence of unmeasurable variables is small.
In summary, the work reported in this thesis advances the study of estimating the 
impacts of employment and training programs through the development of data, 
through the development of new methods of analysing the data, and through the 
production of new and more detailed information on the effectiveness of 
employment and training programs.
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8.3 Conclusions
This thesis has shown that the num ber of things that can introduce bias into the 
estimates of employment and training programs is striking. It shows the importance of 
questions like, "W hat was the response rate in the survey used?" "W hat relevant 
variables have been omitted?" "How accurately have the variables been measured?" 
and "W hat are the small sample properties of the estimator used?" Answers to these 
questions are seldom published with studies, but even if studies did report the answers 
to these questions, there are no guidelines for acceptable answers. The work in this 
thesis provides a starting place for the development of guidelines. It suggests that 
observational studies that are based on one stage techniques (OLS or matching) may 
not be reliable if any of the following three conditions are not m e t
1) Participants in a program should be compared to non participants who were eligible for the 
program. The fact that estimates of the impact of the CETA programs did not do this could 
account for much of the variability in those estimates.
2) Estimates should not be based on surveys that do not have an 80% response rate.2
3) When regression techniques are used, functional forms should be explicitly tested for non 
linearities.
2 The response rate should be measured as the number responding divided by the number given to the 
survey research firm.
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In m ost cases, these data, by themselves would not be adequate to address specific 
questions, and additional survey w ork would have to be done. However, these data 
w ould provide characteristics on the non respondents that would make it easier to test 
for non response bias. Overlap in information on some variables would give indication 
of the errors in measurement of variables in both data sets. Further, the administrative 
data could reduce the length of the survey instrument, thereby saving money.
In addition there is a need to conduct occasional random assignment studies. Where 
random  assignment is used, the estimates of impact have a sound mathematical 
foundation. A  valid test of observational techniques w ould be to produce estimates of 
the impact of random  assignment studies in advance of those produced using the 
control group. This external validation of techniques is im portant to reassure policy 
makers.
As an interim and much less expensive step, estimates of the extent of selection bias 
should be m ade in the manner illustrated in chapter 5. Non participants who have 
been through the selection process should be identified and the impact of selection 
estimated for them. Where these impacts show up different from zero, researchers 
have an indication of omitted variables.
8.3.2 Potential directions for further research.
There is a trem endous need for research in estimating impacts of programs. I discuss a 
num ber of them below, proceeding from the specific to the general. First, extensions of
Summary A4
the work presented in this thesis, second, research needed on the development of 
standards, third other research that is possible using administrative data and finally, 
the development of new techniques for estimating the impacts of programs.
There are many extensions to the work reported in this thesis. First, the impacts 
reported in this thesis are the first estimates of the impacts of most of these programs. 
Disappointing impacts may result from years of neglect rather than inherent 
weaknesses in programs. In addition, the work of MDRC shows that impacts can vary 
dramatically across sites. For these reasons, it is im portant to produce disaggregated 
estimates of impact, in order to identify areas of success and then work to ensure that 
the approaches used in the successful sites are communicated to other sites.
There is also a need to broaden the scope of these studies. This thesis has estimated the 
impact of training on the trained. However, training can also have impacts on others. 
For example, individuals placed in employment through a training program may 
displace others. Garfinkel et al. (1992) also suggest that programs could have impacts 
on community standards. Also, this study has treated prior welfare dependence as a 
pre-determined variable. However, the existence of training may make the welfare 
package as a whole more attractive, and induce individuals to apply. A complete 
accounting of the costs and benefits of a program m ust include these factors.
Second, more work is needed in the development of standards. It is im portant to 
document the effects of controlling for various variables in different types of studies.
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For example, it seems likely that controlling for prior academic achievement would be 
im portant in estimating the impact of classroom training programs. I have recently 
matched high school leaving records with post secondary training records for welfare 
recipients in BC (for whom I already have records of welfare dependence). The impact 
of including high school leaving grades on the estimates of the impact will give an 
indication of the importance of this variable.
In addition, w e often conduct surveys of our clients, a comparison of the accuracy of 
predicted rates of leaving welfare using survey data and administrative data will give 
an indication of the relative advantages of using both over either separately.
Third, administrative data can be used to answer many more questions than those 
relating to the impact of employment and training programs. The large sample sizes 
and the accuracy of the audited data make it suitable for application to a w ide range of 
questions. For example, administrative data can be used to estimate the impacts of 
granting welfare itself. Many thousands of individuals apply for welfare and are 
turned down. The application of the rules involves some judgement, and the rate at 
which applications are granted varies from office to office. This suggests that an 
office's rate of granting welfare could be used to form an instrument for receipt of 
welfare that is independent of unm easured personal characteristics. This instrum ent 
could then be used to measure the impact of granting welfare on subsequent welfare 
dependence, health, income or criminality.
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Finally, more work is needed on general methods for estimating the impact of 
programs. The monte carlo studies in chapter 3a suggest that very large samples are 
needed to use these new estimators, but administrative data can provide these very 
large samples. Nonetheless, there is a need to understand the finite sample properties 
of these estimators before they are used as a basis for policy.
Despite the very large num ber of studies, we have very little guidance to offer those 
who wish to make estimates of the impact of training programs or to those who wish to 
make policy decisions regarding them. The work in this thesis suggests that much 
progress can be m ade through a more basic approach with an emphasis on data 
collection.
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Appendix A: Details Of Matching
% i ? 4
Comparison group A was produced in the following manner. Records for each individual 
in the Province were linked to produce longitudinal records of welfare dependence. These 
records were divided into those of participants and those of non participants. The 
characteristics of each non participant was analysed in each month to determine age, sex 
marital status, employability, whether they received welfare in that month and history of 
welfare dependence to that point. These characteristics determined which of the 350 cells 
they belonged to in that month. If we were looking at program participants who enrolled 
over a two year period, we would have a total of 350 * 24 = 8,400 cells. If the non 
participant had received welfare in that month, then their subsequent welfare dependence 
was recorded for each subsequent month. Finally, the subsequent welfare dependence was 
divided by the number of non participants in that cell.
Estimates of impact were made by comparing the subsequent welfare dependence of 
participants with the average subsequent welfare dependence of the non participants in the 
same cell. Where n participants were in the same cell, the average for that cell would be 
multiplied by n. The result of this is that the subsequent welfare dependence of each non 
participant was weighted by the ratio of participants to non participants in that cell.
Comparison group A generated comparison groups for EOP, CTETP, FEP and classroom 
training with one pass through the non participant data set.
Comparison group B was produced only for the participants in EOP and the interview (data 
source 10) whose SIN's ended in ’5'. Non participants in this comparison group matched 
participants on a number of variables reflecting UI dependence and earnings (criteria 
specified on page 222 and following) as well as the welfare dependence and demographic 
characteristics in comparison group A. This made the number of potential cells much 
larger, and so the computer programming had to change although the concept remained the 
same.
In a similar fashion, the welfare records, UI records and earnings records were linked to 
produce longitudinal records for each individual, and participants were separated from non 
participants. This time the characteristics of each non participant was examined for each 
month to see if it belonged to the same cell as a participant. If so, the average welfare 
dependence, UI dependence and earnings were retained and averaged. Again, the welfare 
dependence, UI dependence and earnings of the comparison group were weighted by the 
ratio of participants to non participants in that cell.
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Introduction
This appendix describes the steps which were taken in order to develop the matched 
comparison group used in the paper. It contains five sections. The first describes the graphing 
of the matching variables. The second presents the results of a regression used to refine the 
matching criteria. The third describes the restrictions which resulted in the sample used, and 
the final section describes the computer programs which matched the participants with 
:omparison group members.
The matching criteria were determined in three steps which are described in detail below. 
First the probability of receiving Income Assistance 6 months later is graphed against the 
variables which are available for the match. Second, the graphs are inspected in order to find 
groups which have roughly constant probabilities. Third, an equation is estimated using 
regression analysis in order to estimate the importance of each variable, given the values of 
the other variable for that individual.
A2. Graphing the variables.
Hie following seven graphs show the percentage of welfare recipients who are still receiving 
velfare 6 months later. The graphs were produced by data from the computer program 
^RONIA, attached.
The ROE, UI and welfare records of all individuals who were comparable to the 
participants in terms of their welfare records were stripped to get a file which was of 
manageable size and which was comparable to the participants. This generated a file 
of 23,500 records.
Then the relationship between welfare dependence and the variables available in the 
ROE and UI files was examined by calculating the percentage still receiving welfare six 
months later by each variable. The results are shown in the seven following graphs.
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[he graph on page 268 shows welfare dependence by annual earnings for those with very low 
tamings, less than $2,000 per year. The difference between the percentage and 50% together 
»ith twice the standard deviation is reported on this graph. The difference only exceeds twice 
k standard deviation at two points, zero earnings and $600 per year. The difference at $600 
per year is ignored since it is not part of a trend ( the difference at $500 and $700 is in the other 
lirection) and no such difference exists for earnings of $600 in the prior year.
[his graph suggests that the data should be split into those with no earnings, and those with 
msitive earnings.
[he graph on page 269 shows welfare dependence by annual earnings in $1,000 increments, 
nthis case the graphs do suggest a division based on annual earnings:
1) those with no earnings;
' 2) those with incomes below $4,000;
3) those with incomes below $9,000;
I) those with incomes below $13,000;
5) those with incomes above $13,000.
he observations with incomes between $13,000 and $14,000 and between $17,000 and $18,000 
renot given their own groups because the sample sizes are small. A Chi-squared statistic for 
he groups from $12,001 to $13,000 per year to $20,000 and above is 7.99. The probability of 
staining a statistic at least that big is .33.
le graph on page 266 shows welfare dependence by the largest number of insurable weeks 
sported on any ROE issued within the four months before the reference month. This variable 
as created in order to separate those who may have had an Unemployment Insurance claim 
ending while receiving welfare.
le graph on page 267 reproduces the previous graph for four income groups:
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1) any income level,
2) income at least $50 per week,
3) income greater than welfare entitlement and
1) income greater than 1.6 times welfare entitlement
Those with earnings lower than $50 per week were no more likely to leave than those without 
recent records of employment Those with earnings in the higher categories were 
correspondingly more likely to leave. (Income more than 1.6 times their entitlement implies 
that their UI benefits would be greater than their welfare entitlement)
The divisions selected are:
1) those with no insurable weeks;
2) those with 1 to 9 insurable weeks and earnings greater than 1.6 times welfare 
entitlement;
3) those with 1 to 9 insurable weeks and earnings greater than their welfare entitlement 
but less than 1.6 times welfare entitlement
4) those with more than 9 insurable weeks and earnings greater than 1.6 times welfare 
entitlement
5) those with more than 9 insurable weeks and earnings greater than their welfare 
entitlement but less than 1.6 times welfare entitlement
6) those with earnings less than their welfare entitlement
n  calculating insurable weeks, those with maximum earnings less than $50 per week were 
gnored.
Ten weeks is the smallest number which entitles an individual to Unemployment Insurance. 
\gain  sample sizes are small for most groups, more than 60% of the sample falls into the first 
jroup.
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The graph of welfare dependence by number of months of UI dependence again shows a 
m arked difference between those with no history of Unemployment Insurance dependence 
and those with any. In addition, those with one, two and three months of UI benefits in the 
previous twelve months appear to have a lower probability of being dependent on welfare six 
months later. The divisions selected are:
1) those with no UI dependence;
2) those with 1 month of UI dependence;
3) those with 2 or 3 months of UI dependence;
4) those with more than 3 months of UI dependence.
The graph of welfare dependence by number of months since last UI dependence (page 263) 
again shows a marked difference between those with no history of Unemployment Insurance 
dependence and those with any. It also shows that those who had been dependent on 
Unemployment Insurance one, two or three months prior to the reference month had a lower 
probability of being dependent on welfare six months later. The divisions selected are:
1) those with no UI dependence;
2) those who had been dependent on UI in the previous month and whose UI benefits 
were higher than their welfare entitlement;
3) those who had been dependent on UI either 2 or 3 months before the reference month 
and whose UI benefits were higher than their welfare entitlement;
4) those who had been dependent on UI more than 3 months before the reference month.
Hie graph onpage 264 shows welfare dependence by difference in annual earnings. Clearly, 
hose whose earnings did not change in the two previous years are different from the rest As 
veil, those whose earnings grew are different from those whose earnings fell. The divisions 
(elected are:
1) those whose earnings declined or did not change;
2) those whose earnings grew;
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A3. Regression analysis
These graphs cannot reveal inter-relationships among the variables. For example, the number 
of months since last dependent on U and the number of month of UI dependence in the 
previous year might be highly correlated, and so it might not be appropriate to divide the 
sample across both variables.
Variables in the regression are defined as follows:
EARN1 Earnings in the year preceding the 
reference month.
DEARN A dummy variable taking the value 1 if 
EARN1 = 0.
DEARN1 A dummy variable taking the value 1 if 
EARN1 > 0 but <5000.
EARN2 Earnings in the year 13 to 24 months 
preceding the reference month.
DEARN2 A dummy variable taking the value 1 if 
EARN2= 0.
UI Number of months since the individual 
received UI benefits. Takes the value 0 if 
UI benefits never received.
UIMISS A dummy variable taking the value 1 if UI 
= 0.
DUI A dummy variable taking the value 1 if UI
DUI A dummy variable taking the value 1 if 
U I=  1.
DUI2 A dum my variable taking the value 1 if 
U I=  2 or 3.
cu n Number of months in which UI benefits 
were received in the year preceding the 
reference month.
DCUI A dum my variable taking the value 1 if 
CIJI1 = 1.
CUI2 Number of months in which UI benefits 
were received in the year 13 to 24 
months preceding the reference month.
DCUI2 A dum my variable taking the value 1 if 
CUI1 = 2 or 3.
WEEKS The number of UI insurable weeks 
reported on a Record of Employment 
issued up to four months prior to the 
reference month.
WKMISS A dummy variable taking the value 1 if 
WEEKS = 0.
WKLOW A dum my variable taking the value 1 if 
WEEKS > 0 but < 9.
DDIFF Takes the value EARN1 - EARN2 if 
EARN1 - EARN2 > 0; zero otherwise.
0
The additional information which we get from the regression results are:
C
D
0 0 0 2 2 2
Earnings in the year 13 to 24 months preceding the reference month are an 
important predictor of subsequent welfare dependence, even when several 
variables reflecting prior year earnings are included.
Growth in earnings is an important predictor.
UI dependence in the year 13 to 24 months preceding the reference m onth is not 
an important predictor of subsequent welfare dependence when more recent UI 
experience is included.
As a result, the final criteria for matching are:
Earnings, both for months 1 to 12 before reference month and for months 13 to 24 before 
the m onth in which the participant entered program:
if participant's earnings are zero then comparison group member's earnings m ust 
also be zero; otherwise
if participant's earnings are less than $4,000 then comparison group member's 
earnings m ust also be less than $4,000; or
comparison group members earnings m ust be within 40% of the participant's 
earnings.
Num ber of weeks of insurable earnings reported up to four months prior to the m onth 
in which the participant entered program:
if the participant has no weeks of insurable earnings then the comparison group 
member m ust not have any weeks of insurable eamings;otherwise 
if the participant has fewer than 10 weeks of insurable earnings and earnings 
greater than 1.6 times welfare entitlement, then so too m ust the member of the 
comparison group;otherwise
if the participant has fewer than 10 weeks of insurable earnings and earnings
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greater than h is/her welfare entitlement, then so too m ust the member of the 
comparison group;otherwise
if the participant has more than 10 weeks of insurable earnings and earnings 
greater than 1.6 times welfare entitlement, then so too m ust the member of the 
comparison group;otherwise
if the participant has more than 10 weeks of insurable earnings and earnings 
greater than his welfare entitlement, then so too m ust the member of the 
comparison group.
If none of these conditions are met, but the participant has insurable earnings 
then so too m ust the member of the comparison group.
History of UI dependence
If the participant had received no UI benefits in the 12 months prior to enrolment 
in the program, then the comparison group member must not have received any 
UI either; otherwise
If the participant had received UI benefits in one of the 12 months prior to 
enrolment in the program, then the comparison group member m ust have 
received UI in exactly one month too; otherwise
the number of months in which the comparison group member received UI 
benefits m ust be within 3 of the number of months in which the participant 
received UI benefits.
Time since receiving UI benefits
If the participant had UI benefits in the month prior to enrolment in the program, 
then so too m ust a comparison group member; otherwise 
If the participant had UI benefits in the two or three months prior to enrolment 
in the program, then so too m ust a comparison group member.
0 0 0 2 2 * *
Change in earnings
If the participant's earnings had grown in the year over the year before that, then 
so too m ust the comparison group members. Further the extent of the growth 
m ust be within 40% of the growth experienced by the comparison group member.
A4. The Sample
This paper uses information on the Employment Opportunity Program in its analysis of 
selection bias. Enrolment data was taken from copy 3 of the Monthly Claim form (copy 
attached). The Social Insurance Number (field 8) is used for identification. The 
enrolment date is defined as the first from date (field 6) for that individual. No other 
fields were used in this analysis.
Participants in the program need not have been receiving Basic Income Assistance. They 
m ight have been receiving Supplementary benefits (for the handicapped and the aged), 
or services relating to child protection. Entry and editing errors undoubtedly occurred. 
This analysis is restricted to those participants who had valid Social Insurance Numbers 
(SIN's) and who received Basic Income Assistance benefits within one m onth of the 
enrolment date, defined as above.
Where the participant did not receive benefits in the month of enrolment, the enrolment 
date was adjusted by up to one month. Bad data is thought to be the main reason that 
an individual would not receive benefits in the month containing the enrolment date. 
A Monthly Claim form, on which the SIN or from date is missing or illegible, or which 
is missing altogether could make the enrolment date appear later than the true 
enrolment date.
This left 521 individuals in the sample, 56 (slightly more than 10%) of whom had had 
their enrolment date adjusted. 24 had been excluded because they were not on Basic 
Income Assistance, and another 111 had been excluded because they were not on any 
type of Income Assistance within 1 month of the enrolment date. Although the 111 were
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excluded from the participant group in this analysis, they were also excluded from the 
comparison group since they may have been participants from welfare, but some of their 
Claim forms didn't make it from the Accounting Department to research branch. 
(Another 29 would have been included if we had adjusted enrolment dates by 2 
months.)
For efficiency, the welfare records, Records of Employment and Unemployment 
Insurance records are stripped into smaller files. Because this process is very 
straightforward, the programs which do this are not reproduced here.
A5. Identifying the comparison group
From a computer programming perspective, the challenge in identifying and stripping 
the records of comparison group members is to avoid making the same calculation twice. 
The straightforward approach, going through the file of participants, comparing each 
to each potential comparison group member, writing out the records of the comparison 
group members when they were sufficiently similar to the participant can result in many 
unnecessary calculations.
The alternative, used here, has the disadvantage of being somewhat more difficult to 
follow, but eliminates many unnecessary calculations. Duplicate calculations are reduced 
by:
a) calculating the characteristics of the participants in advance;
b) sorting the participant file by start date;
c) only checking comparability of subsequent variables if the potential comparison 
group member were similar on variables already checked.
The first matching criterion checked is that comparison group members must be on Basic 
Income Assistance in the month that contains the participant's enrolment date.
The program which calculates the characteristics of the participants, PPDPART6 is 
attached.
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The program PPDCOMP6 (attached):
calculates the characteristics of the comparison group members 
checks to see if they match any of the participants
calculates and writes out average values of the variables of interest for 97 months,
60 months prior to the participants enrolment date and 36 months after. The 
variables of interest are UI dependence, IA dependence and earnings, 
writes out the SIN's of the comparison group members and a record of the 
participants they matched.
The criteria listed above generated matches for all but 7 of the 521 participants. All had 
exact matches on all demographic, welfare and UI variables but had inexact matches 
with earnings variables.
The program found 5,004 distinct matches for the 521 participants.
The output of this program is combined with information on the participants in the 
program PPD6. We are now in a position to look at four outcomes of interest:
• the percentage dependent on welfare;
• the percentage dependent on Unemployment Insurance;
• the percentage dependent on either welfare or Unemployment Insurance; and
• average earnings.
PPD6, attached, calculates the values of each of these variables for both the participants 
and the comparison group, together with the variance of the difference. In addition it 
calculates the variance of the sum of the difference for the first and last twelve months.
The results from PPD6 are imported into a spreadsheet and graphed.
PL1 Program 
PPDPART6
0 G0 2 2 8
MAIN:
DCL
p r o c
EOF
SYSPRINT
PG M (169)
P N U L L (169 )
D N U L L (97)
COUNT( 0 : 9 )
COUNT1
COUNT2
COUNT3
COUNT4
COUNT5
COUNT6
SUM
AGE
I
TMPWKS
WEEKS
MAXEARN
ENT
DP
OPTIONS (MAIN) ;
B IT  I N I T ( ' O ' B )  
FIL E  OUTPUT, 
FLOAT( 6 )  I N I T ( ( 1 6 9 ) 0 ) ,
FIXED DEC( 9 )  I N I T ( ( 1 6 9 ) 0 ) ,  
FIXED DEC( 9 )  I N I T ( ( 9 7 ) 0 ) ,  
FIXED DEC( 9 )  I N I T ( ( 1 0 ) 0 ) ,  
FIXED DEC( 9 )  I N I T (O )
DEC( 9 )  IN I T (O )
DEC( 9 )  I N I T (O )
DEC( 9 )  IN I T (O )
DEC( 9 )  I N I T (O )
DEC( 9 )  I N I T (O )
DEC( 9 )  I N I T (O )
DEC( 9 )  IN I T (O )
DEC( 9 )  I N I T (O )
DEC( 9 )  I N I T (O )
DEC( 9 )  I N I T (O )
FIXED  
FIXED  
FIXED  
FIXED  
FIXED  
FIXED  
FIXED  
FIXED  
FIXED  
FIXED  
FLOAT(6 )  
FLOAT( 6 )  
FLOAT( 6 )
COMPIN
ROEIN
U I I N
PARTIN
I A I N
OUTFILE
OUTCNT
FIL E
FILE
F IL E
FIL E
FIL E
FILE
FILE
RECORD
RECORD
RECORD
RECORD
RECORD
RECORD
RECORD
INPUT,
INPUT,
INPUT,
INPUT,
INPUT,
OUTPUT,
OUTPUT,
1 PART,
3 S I N CHAR( 8 ) ,
3 S IN 2 C H A R ( l ) ,
3 BRDATE P I C ' 9 9 9 9 ' ,
3 SEX C H A R ( l ) ,
3 CAT P I C ' 9 9 ' ,
3 CLASS CHAR( 2 ) ,
3 IA H IS T P I C ' 9 9 ' ,
3 FYY P I C ' 9 9 ' ,
3 FMM P I C ' 9 9 ' ,
3 PGM C H A R ( l ) ,
1 OUT,
2 S I N CHAR( 8 ) ,
2 CAT P I C ' 9 ' ,
2 CLASS P I C ' 9 ' ,
2 A P I C ' 9 ' ,
2 P P I C ' 9 ' ,
2 U I 1 P I C ' 9 9 ' ,
2 U I 2 P I C ' 9 9 ' ,
2 START P I C ' 9 9 9 ' ,
2 NUM P I C ' 9 9 9 '  I
2 U I 3 P I C ' 9 ' ,
2 WKS P I C ' 9 ' ,
2 EARN1 FLOAT( 6 )  ,
2 EARN2 FLOAT( 6 ) ,
1 ROE,
2 S IN
2 SIN 2
2 MONTH( 1 6 8 )
3 ROESTAT
3 INWKl
3 INEARN1
3 PC O D Ell
3 PCODE12
3 EMPL1
3 S IC 1
3 REASON1
3 INWK2
3 INEARN2
3 PCODE21
3 PCODE22
3 EMPL2
3 S I C 2 ’
3 REASON2
CHAR( 8 ) ,  
P I C ' ( 1 ) 9 '
C H A R ( l ) , 
CHAR( 2 ) ,  
CHAR(5),  
C H A R ( l ) , 
CHAR(5),  
CHAR( 9 ) ,  
CHAR( 4 ) ,  
C H A R ( l ) , 
CHAR(2),  
CHAR(5),  
C H A R ( l ) , 
CHAR(5),  
C H A R (9 ) , 
CHAR( 4 ) ,  
C H A R ( l ) ,
1  U I ,
S I N CHAR( 8 ) ,
S IN 2 P I C ' ( 1 ) 9 '
AGE CHAR( 2 ) ,
SEX C H A R ( l ) f
MONTH ( 1 6 8 )  ,
3 BEN P I C ' 9 ' ,
3 D IS T CHAR( 4 ) ,
3 PROV CHAR( 2 ) ,
3 REG CHAR( 2 ) ,
3 DPND CHAR( 1 ) ,
3 BRATE CHAR( 4 ) ,
3 STUD CHAR( 1 ) ,
3 INWK CHAR( 2 ) ,
3 OCC CHAR( 7 ) ,
3 S IC CHAR( 4 ) ,
3 WKPD CHAR( 3 ) ,
1 I A ,
2  F I D 1  
2  F ID 2  
2  S I N  
2 S I N 2  
2 BYR 
2 BMO 
2 SEX 
2 T M P (1 6 9 )  
2 CAT( 1 6 9 )
CHAR( 2 ) ,
P I C ' 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 ' ,  
CHAR( 8 ) ,
P I C ' ( 1 ) 9 ' ,  
P I C ' 9 9 ' ,
P I C ' 9 9 ' ,
C H A R ( l ) ,
P I C ' 9 ' ,
P I C ' 9 ' ,
2 C L A S S ( 1 6 9 )  P I C ' 9 ' ,  
2 D P N O (1 6 9 )  P I C ' 9 ' ;
0 C 0 2 3 0
ON E N D FIL E ( IA IN ) I A . S I N  = ' 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 ' ;
ON ENDFILE(PARTIN) EOF = ' l ' B ;
ON ENDFILE(ROEIN) BEGIN; ROE. S I N  = ' 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 ' ;
PUT SK IP  E D IT ( 'E N D  OF ROE F I L E ' ) ( A ) ; E N D ;
ON E N D F IL E (U IIN )  B E G I N ;U I .S I N  = ' 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 ' ;
PUT SK IP E D IT ( 'E N D  OF U I F I L E ' ) ( A ) ; E N D ;
READ FIL E (R O E IN ) IN T O (R O E );
READ F I L E ( I A I N )  IN T O (IA ) ;
READ F I L E ( U I I N )  I N T O ( U I ) ;
DO I  = 1 TO 8 ;  / *  BYPASS THOSE WITH INVALID S IN S  * /
READ F IL E  (PARTIN) INTO (PAR T);
END;
NUM = 1 ;
DO W HILE(i E O F );
I F  R O E .S IN  < P A R T .S IN  THEN 
READ FIL E (R O E IN ) IN T O (R O E );
ELSE I F  I A . S I N  < P A R T .S IN  THEN 
READ F I L E ( I A I N )  I N T O ( I A ) ;
ELSE I F  U I . S I N  < P A R T .S IN  THEN 
READ F I L E ( U I I N )  I N T O ( U I ) ;
ELSE I F  PART.PGM = ' 2 '  | PART.PGM = ' 3 '
| PART.PGM = 'A '  THEN BEGIN;
/ *  PUT IA  RECORDS INTO SAME 
ORDER AS RO E'S AND U I  * /
I F  I A . S I N  = P A R T .S IN  THEN 
DO I  = 1 TO 1 6 9 ;
PGM( 1 7 0 - 1 )  = I A .T M P ( I ) ;
END;
ELSE PGM = PNULL;
START = ( P A R T .F Y Y -8 0 )* 1 2  + PART. FMM;
/ *  ADJUST START DATES
AND COUNT THOSE ADJUSTED
/
I F  PGM(START) = 0 THEN
COUNTl = COUNT1 + 1 ;  ELSE
I F  PGM(START) = 3 THEN
COUNT2 = COUNT2 + 1 ;  ELSE
COUNT3 = COUNT3 + 1 ;
I F  PGM(START) = 0 THEN START =
I F  PGM(START) = 0 THEN START =
I F  PGM(START) = 0 THEN
COUNT4 = COUNT4 + 1 ;  ELSE
I F  PGM(START) = 3 THEN
COUNT5 = COUNT5 + 1 ;  ELSE
COUNT6 = COUNT6 + 1 ;
I F  START < 60  | START > 1 3 3  THEN BEGIN;  
PUT SK IP  EDIT(START) ( F ( l l ) ) ;
t: C 0 2 31
PUT SK IP  E D I T ( P A R T .F Y Y )(A );
PGM(START) = 0 ;
END;
I F  PGM(START) = 3 THEN BEGIN;
OUT. S I N  = P A R T .S IN ;
/ *  CALCULATE VALUES OF WELFARE
MATCHING VARIABLES FOR PARTICIPANTS
* /
OUT.CAT = I A .C A T ( 1 7 0 -S T A R T );
DP = I A .D P N O (1 7 0 - S T A R T ) ;
OUT.CLASS = I A .C L A S S ( 1 7 0 - S T A R T ) ;
I F  OUT.CAT < 3 THEN ENT = 4 0 0 ;  ELSE 
ENT = 5 0 0 +  1 0 0 *  DP;
AGE = (PA R T .FY Y -B Y R )* 1 2  + PART.FMM-BMO;
I F  AGE < 2 7 6  THEN A = 1 ;
ELSE I F  AGE <= 3 6 0  THEN A = 2 ;
ELSE I F  AGE <= 4 0 0  THEN A = 3 ;
ELSE I F  AGE <= 6 0 0  THEN A = 4 ;
ELSE A = 5 ;
SUM = 0 ;
DO I  = START -  2 5  TO START -  1 ;
I F  PGM ( I ) > 0 THEN SUM = SUM + 1 ;
END;
I F  SUM < 1  THEN P = 1 ;
ELSE I F SUM < 3 THEN P = 2 ;
ELSE I F SUM < 8 THEN P 3 ;
ELSE I F SUM < 13 THEN P 4 ;
ELSE I F SUM < 23 THEN P = 5 ;
ELSE
ELSE
I F  
P =
SUM 
= 7 ;
< 2 5 THEN P = 6 ;
/ *  CALCULATE VALUES OF UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE
MATCHING VARIABLES FOR
! PARTICIPANTS * /
U I 1 , U I 2 , U I 3  = 0;
I F  U I . S I N  = P A R T .S IN  THEN BEGIN;
DO I  = START-12 TO START -  1 ;
I F  U I . BRATE( I ) > ENT THEN U I 1  = U I 1 + 1 ;
I F  U I . BRATE( I ) > 0 THEN U I 2  = 1 ;
END;
I F  U I .B R A T E ( START-1)  > ENT THEN U I 3  = 1 ;  ELSE 
I F  (U I .B R A T E (S T A R T -2)  > ENT
| U I .B R A T E (S T A R T -3 )  > ENT) THEN U I 3  = 2 ;  ELSE 
I F  U I .B R A T E ( START-1)  > 0  |
(U I .B R A T E (S T A R T -2)  > 0 
| U I .B R A T E (S T A R T -3)  > 0) THEN U I 3  = 3 ;
END;
/ *  CALCULATE VALUES OF
MATCHING VARIABLES FROM R O E 'S  * /
TMPWKS, WEEKS, WKS = 0;
E A R N l, EARN2, MAXEARN = 0;
I F  R O E .S IN  = P A R T .S IN  THEN BEGIN;
DO I  = START-3 TO START -  1 ;
l' C 0 2 3 2
I F  INEARN1 ( I ) -,= ' * * * * * '  & I N W K l(I )  ' * * '
& IN W K l(I )  -•= ' 0 0 '  & INEARNl ( I )  /INWK1 ( I )  > MAXEARN 
THEN MAXEARN = IN E A R N l( I ) / INWK1( I )?
I F  IN W K l(I )  -.= ' * * '  THEN TMPWKS = I N W K l ( I ) ;
I F  TMPWKS > WEEKS THEN WEEKS = TMPWKS;
I F  INWK2( I ) ' * * '  THEN TMPWKS = I N W K 2 (I ) ;
I F  TMPWKS > WEEKS THEN WEEKS = TMPWKS;
I F  INEARN2 ( I ) -,= ' * * * * * '  & IN W K 2(I)  -«= ' * * '
& INWK2 ( I ) -.= ' 0 0 '  & INEARN2 ( I )  /INWK2 ( I )  > MAXEARN 
THEN MAXEARN = INEARN2( I ) / INWK2( I ) ;
END;
I F  MAXEARN < 5 0  THEN WEEKS = 0 ;
I F  WEEKS = 0 THEN WKS = 0 ;  ELSE
I F  MAXEARN > E N T / 2 .6  & WEEKS < 1 0  THEN WKS = 1 ;  ELSE
I F  MAXEARN > E N T / 4 .3  & WEEKS < 1 0  THEN WKS = 2 ;  ELSE
I F  MAXEARN > E N T / 2 .6  THEN WKS = 3 ;  ELSE
I F  MAXEARN > E N T / 4 .3  THEN WKS = 4 ;  ELSE WKS = 5 ;
DO I  = START-12 TO START -  1 ;
I F  INEARNl ( I ) -,= ' * * * * * '  Sc I N W K l(I )  -.= ' * * '
& IN W K l(I )  -.= ' 0 0 '
THEN EARN1 = EARN1 + I N E A R N l ( I ) / I N W K l ( I ) ;
ELSE I F  INEARN2 ( I ) -,= ' * * * * * '  &
INWK2 ( I ) ' * * '  Sc INWK2 ( I ) -.= ' 0 0 '
THEN EARNl = EARN1 + INEARN2 ( I ) /  INWK2 ( I ) ;
END;
DO I  = START-24 TO START -  1 3 ;
I F  INEARNl ( I ) -,= ' * * * * * '  Sc INWKl ( I ) ' * * '
Sc INWKl ( I )  -«= ' 0 0 '
THEN EARN2 = EARN2 + I N E A R N l ( I ) / I N W K l ( I ) ;
ELSE I F  INEARN2 ( I ) -,= ' * * * * * '  &
INWK2 ( I ) -.= ' * * '  Sc INWK2 ( I ) -.= ' 0 0 '
THEN EARN2 = EARN2 + INEARN2( I ) / INWK2( I ) ;
END;
END; / *  R O E .S IN  = P A R T .S IN  * /
COUNT (WKS) = COUNT (WKS) + 1 ;
START = 1 7 0  -  START;
WRITE FIL E (O U T FIL E ) FROM(OUT) ;
NUM = NUM + 1 ;
END; / *  PARTICIPANT ON BASIC IA  IN  START MONTH * /
READ F IL E (P A R T IN ) IN T O ( PART);
END; / *  ALL SIN S  >= P A R T .S IN  & WAGE SUBSIDY PROGRAM * /  
ELSE READ FIL E (P A R T IN ) IN T O ( PART) ;
END; /*N O T  E O F */
PUT S K IP  E D IT ( 'N O  BENEFITS IN  START MONTH; ' , C O U N T l ) ( A ) ;
PUT S K IP  E D I T ( 'O N  BASIC IN  START MONTH: # ,C O U N T 2 ) ( A ) ;
PUT S K IP  ED IT  ( 'B E N E F IT S , BUT NOT BA SIC : ' ,C O U N T 3) (A) ;
PUT S K IP  E D IT ('A F T E R  ADJUSTMENT,' ) ( A ) ;
PUT S K IP  E D IT ( 'N O  BENEFITS IN  START MONTH: ' ,C O U N T 4 ) ( A ) ;
PUT S K IP  E D I T ( 'O N  BASIC IN  START MONTH: ' , C O U N T 5 ) ( A ) ;
PUT S K IP  E D I T ( 'B E N E F IT S, BUT NOT BA SIC: ' , COUNT6) (A) ;
DO I  = 0 TO 0 9 ;
PUT S K IP  E D IT (C O U N T (I)  ) ( F ( l l )  ) ;
END;
END MAIN;
/ *
/ /G O .R O E I N  DD DSN=HRRSD.E1 .R O E 5.M A Y 1194 , DISP=SH R  
/ / U I I N  DD DSN=HRRSD.E1 . U I . PPDPART. JUNO 1 9 4 ,  DISP=SH R
l C 0 23 3
DD DSN=HRRSD. E l . I A .  PPDPART. JUNO 1 9 4 ,  DISP=SH R  
DD DSN=HRRSD. E l . PART5. A P R 0 8 9 2 , DISP=SHR  
DD DSN=HRRSD. E l . PPD. PERCENT. J U N 0 2 9 4 ,  DISP=SH R  
DD DSN=HRRSD. E l . PPDPART. SHORT6 .O C T 0 7 9 4 , U N IT =D ISK ,  
DISP=OLD  
D ISP =(N EW ,C A TL G ,K EE P),
DCB=(RECFM=FB,LRECL=32) ,
SP A C E = (T R K ,( 2 , 2 ) , RLSE)
/ / * G O .I N F I L E  DD DUMMY 
/ /♦ O U T F I L E  DD DUMMY
/ / I A I N
/ /P A R T I N
//* O M P I N
//O U T F I L E
/ /
/ / *
/ / *
/ / *
PL1 Program 
PPDCOMP6
i C U 2 3 5
MAIN:
DCL
PROC OPTIONS (MAIN) ; 
EOF 
F I  
F3  
OK
FOUND
MATCH
SYSPRINT
M IN SIN  P I C ' ( 9 ) 9 ' #
SMO( 5 6 0 )  FIXED  
I A I N D ( 5 2 1 , 9 7 )  
U I I N D ( 5 2 1 / 9 7 )  
N O I N D ( 5 2 1 ,9 7 )  
EARIND( 5 2 1 , 9 7 )  
TOT( 5 2 1 )  
NMRK(521)
D IN D ( 9 7 )
COUNT( 5 2 1 , 1 0 )  
COUNT2( 0 : 0 9 )  
DNULL( 9 7 )
TOTNO( 9 7 )  
T O T IA (9 7 )
TO T U I( 9 7 )
TOTEAR( 9 7 )
B I T  I N I T ( ' O ' B )  
B I T  I N I T ( ' O ' B )  
B I T  I N I T ( ' O ' B )  
B IT  I N I T ( ' O ' B )  
B IT  I N I T ( ' O ' B )  
B IT  I N I T ( ' O ' B )  
F IL E  OUTPUT,
DEC( 5 )  I N I T ( ( 5 6 0 ) 0 ) ,
FLOAT( 6 )  I N I T ( ( 5 2 1 * 9 7 ) 0 ) ,  
FLOAT( 6 )  I N I T ( ( 5 2 1 * 9 7 ) 0 ) ,  
FLOAT( 6 )  I N I T ( ( 5 2 1 * 9 7 ) 0 ) ,  
FLOAT( 6 )  I N I T ( ( 5 2 1 * 9 7 ) 0 )  
FLOAT( 6 )  I N I T ( ( 5 2 1 ) 0 ) ,
FLOAT( 6 )  I N I T ( ( 5 2 1 ) 0 ) ,
FLOAT( 6 )  I N I T ( ( 9 7 ) 0 ) ,
FLOAT( 6 )  I N I T ( ( 5 2 1 0 ) 0 ) ,  
FLOAT( 6 )  I N I T ( ( 1 0 ) 0 ) ,
FIXED DEC( 6 )  I N I T ( ( 9 7 ) 0 ) ,
FLOAT( 6 )  I N I T ( ( 9 7 ) 0 ) ,
FLOAT( 6 )  I N I T ( ( 9 7 ) 0 ) ,
FLOAT( 6 )  I N I T ( ( 9 7 ) 0 ) ,
FLOAT( 6 )  I N I T ( ( 9 7 ) 0 ) ,
TMPWKS FIXED DEC( 9 ) ,
WEEKS FIXED DEC( 9 ) ,
D IF F FLOAT( 6 ) ,
CDIFF FLOAT( 6 ) ,
ENT FLOAT( 6 ) ,
LL FLOAT( 6 ) ,
KK FLOAT( 6 ) ,
TOL FLOAT( 6 )  ,
CWKS P I C ' 9 ' ,
CEARN1 FLOAT( 6 ) ,
CEARN2 FLOAT( 6 )  ,
MAXEARN FLOAT( 6 ) ,
AGE FIXED DEC(9 ) I N I T ( 0
SUM FIXED DEC(9 ) I N I T (0
STT FIXED DEC( 9 ) I N I T (0
I FIXED DEC( 9 ) I N I T (0
I I FIXED DEC( 9 ) I N I T ( 0
J J FIXED DEC( 9 ) I N I T ( 0
A FIXED DEC( 9 ) I N I T ( 0
P FIXED DEC( 9 ) I N I T ( 0
STNO FIXED DEC( 9 ) I N I T ( 0
AG FIXED DEC( 9 ) I N I T (0
C U I1 FIXED DEC( 9 ) I N I T ( 0
CU I2 FIXED DEC( 9 ) I N I T (0
CU I3 FIXED DEC( 9 ) I N I T ( 0
J FIXED DEC( 9 ) I N I T ( 0
N FIXED DEC( 9 ) I N I T ( 0
K FIXED DEC( 9 ) I N I T ( 0
L C 0 2 3 6
S FIXED DEC( 9 )  I N I T ( O ) #
MIN B U ILTIN ,
SUBSTR B U ILTIN ,
TRUNC B U ILTIN ,
ROEIN  
U I I N  
PARTIN  
I A I N  
OUTFILE  
OUTSIN  
OUTCNT
1 MARK,
2 S I N  CHAR( 8 ) ,
2 M R K (521) P I C ' 9 ' ,
1 PART( 5 2 1 ) ,
2 S I N CHAR( 8 ) ,
2 CAT P I C ' 9 ' ,
2 CLASS P I C ' 9 ' ,
2 A P I C ' 9 ' ,
2 P P I C ' 9 ' ,
2 U I 1 P I C ' 9 9 ' ,
2 U I 2 P I C ' 9 9 ' ,
2 START P I C ' 9 9 9 ' ,
2 CNT P I C ' 9 9 9 '  I N I T
2 U I3 P I C ' 9 ' ,
2 WKS P I C ' 9 ' ,
2 EARN1 FLOAT( 6 ) ,
2 EARN2 FLOAT( 6 ) ,
F IL E  RECORD INPUT, 
F IL E  RECORD INPUT, 
FIL E  RECORD INPUT, 
FIL E  RECORD INPUT, 
FIL E  RECORD OUTPUT, 
FIL E  RECORD OUTPUT, 
FIL E  RECORD OUTPUT,
1 ROE,
2 S I N CHAR( 8 ) ,
2 S IN 2 P I C ' ( 1 ) 9 ' ,
2 MONTH( 1 6 8 )  ,
3 ROESTAT CHAR( 1 ) ,
3 INWKl CHAR( 2 ) ,
3 INEARNl CHAR( 5 ) ,
3 PCODE11 C H A R ( l ) ,
3 PCODE12 CHAR( 5 ) ,
3 EMPL1 CHAR( 9 ) ,
3 SIC 1 CHAR( 4 ) ,
3 REASONl C H A R ( l ) ,
3 INWK2 CHAR( 2 ) ,
3 INEARN2 CHAR( 5 ) ,
3 PCODE21 CHAR( 1 ) ,
3 PCODE22 CHAR( 5 ) ,
3 EMPL2 CHAR( 9 ) ,
3 SIC 2 CHAR( 4 ) ,
3 REASON2 C H A R ( l ) ,
1 U I ,
i C 0 2 3 7
S IN CHAR( 8 ) ,
SIN 2 P I C ' ( 1 ) 9 '
AGE CHAR( 2 ) ,
SEX C H A R ( l ) ,
MONTH( 1 6 8 ) ,
3 BEN P I C ' 9 ' ,
3 D IST CHAR( 4 ) ,
3 PROV CHAR( 2 ) ,
3 REG CHAR( 2 ) ,
3 DPND CHAR( 1 ) ,
3 BRATE CHAR( 4 ) ,
3 STUD C H A R ( l ) ,
3 INWK CHAR( 2 ) ,
3 OCC CHAR( 7 ) ,
3 SIC CHAR( 4 ) ,
3 WKPD CHAR( 3 ) ,
1 I A ,
2 F ID 1  
2 F ID 2  
2 S I N  
2 S IN 2  
2 BYR 
2 BMO 
2 SEX 
2 PGM( 1 6 9 )
2 CAT( 1 6 9 )
2 C L A S S ( 1 6 9 )  
2 DPNO( 1 6 9 )
CHAR(2 )  ,
P I C ' 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 ' ,  
CHAR( 8 ) ,
P I C ' ( 1 ) 9 ' ,
P I C ' 9 9 ' ,
P I C ' 9 9 ' ,  
C H A R ( l ) ,
P I C ' 9 ' ,
P I C ' 9 ' ,
P I C ' 9 ' ,
P I C ' 9 ' ;
ON ENDFILE ( IA I N )  EOF = ' l ' B ;
ON ENDFILE (ROEIN) BEGIN; ROE. S I N  = ' 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 ' ;
PUT S K IP  E D IT ('E N D  OF ROE F I L E ' ) ( A ) ; END;
ON E N D F IL E (U IIN )  B E G I N ;U I .S I N  = ' 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 ' ;
PUT SK IP  E D IT ('E N D  OF U I F I L E ' ) ( A ) ; E N D ;
READ F IL E  (ROEIN) INTO (ROE) ;
DO UNTIL ( I A .  S I N  > ' 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 ' ) ;
READ F I L E ( I A I N )  IN T O ( IA) ;
END;
READ F IL E  ( U I I N )  I N T O (U I ) ;
READ F IL E  ( PARTIN) INTO ( PART ( 1 )  ) ;
/ *  READ PARTICIPANT F IL E  INTO MEMORY 
SMO CONTAINS POSITIONS OF PARTICIPANTS
WITH
NEW START DATES. VALUES RANGING FROM
1 - 5 2 2
STNO I S  THE NUMBER OF D IST IN C T  START
DATES * /
SMO( 1 )  = 1 ; STNO = 1 ;
DO I  = 2 TO 5 2 1 ;
READ F IL E (P A R T IN ) I N T O ( P A R T ( I ) ) ;
I F  PART ( I )  .START > P A R T ( I - l )  .START THEN BEGIN;
t C 0 2 3 8
STNO = STNO + 1 ;  
SMO (STNO) = I ;  
END;
END;
SMO(STNO+1) = 5 2 2 ;
DO WHILE (-.EOF) ;
I F  R O E .S IN  < I A . S I N  THEN 
READ FIL E (R O E IN ) IN T O (R O E );
ELSE I F  U I . S I N  < I A . S I N  THEN 
READ F I L E (U I I N )  I N T O ( U I ) ;
/ *  TOO MANY NESTED LOOPS TO INDENT * /
ELSE BEGIN;
DO I I  = 1 TO STNO; / *  CHECK EACH UNIQUE START DATE * /
/ *  START (SMO ( I I )  ) I S  THE START MONTH 
FOR PARTICIPANT I N  PO SITIO N SMO ( I I )  . 
INDIVIDUALS CAN ONLY BE CONSIDERED 
FOR INCLUSION IN  THE COMPARISON GROUP 
I F  THEY RECEIVED BENEFITS THROUGH 
BASIC IA  (PGM = 3 )  I N  THAT MONTH. * /
I F  P G M (ST A R T (SM O (II)) )  = 3 THEN
/ *  I F  INDIVIDUAL RECEIVED BASIC I A  
I N  START MONTH, THEN SEE I F  THEY 
MATCH ANY PARTICIPANT WITH THAT 
START MONTH * /
DO J  J  = S M O (II )  TO S M O ( I I + l )  - 1 ;
DO KK = S T A R T ( J J ) ;
/ *  DOES INDIVIDUAL MATCH ON CLASS AND
C A T ? * /
I F  IA .C L A SS(K K ) = P A R T (J J ) .C L A S S  
& IA .C A T (K K ) = P A R T (J J ) .C A T  THEN BEGIN;
/ *  DOES INDIVIDUAL MATCH ON AGE? * /
AGE = ( 7 9 - B Y R ) * 1 2  + 1 3  -  BMO + ( 1 7 0 - K K ) ;
I F  AGE < 2 7 6  THEN A = 1 ;
ELSE I F  AGE <= 3 6 0  THEN A = 2 ;
ELSE I F  AGE <= 4 0 0  THEN A = 3 ;
ELSE I F  AGE <= 6 0 0  THEN A = 4 ;
ELSE A = 5 ;
I F  PART(J J )  .A  = A THEN BEGIN;
/ *  DOES INDIVIDUAL MATCH ON HISTORY OF IA ?  * /
t C 0 2 3 9
SUM = 0 ;
DO I  = KK+1 TO KK + 2 5 ;
I F  I A . PGM ( I ) > 0 THEN SUM = SUM + 1 ;
END;
I F  SUM < 1 THEN P = 1 ;
ELSE I F  SUM < 3 THEN P = 2 ;
ELSE I F  SUM < 8 THEN P = 3 ;
ELSE I F  SUM < 1 3  THEN P = 4 ;
ELSE I F  SUM < 2 3  THEN P = 5 ;
ELSE I F  SUM < 2 5  THEN P = 6 ;
ELSE P = 7 ;
I F  P = PART(J J ) .P  THEN BEGIN;
COUNT (CNT (J  J ) , 1 )  = COUNT (CNT (J J )  , 1 )  + 1 ;
/ *  NOW CHECK THE U I VARIABLES. * /
I F  IA .C A T (K K ) < 3 THEN ENT = 4 0 0 ;
ELSE ENT = 5 0 0  + 1 0 0  * IA .D P N O (K K );
STT = 1 7 0 -K K ;
C U I l , C U I 2 , CU I3 = 0 ;
I F  U I . S I N  = I A . S I N  THEN 
DO I  = S T T - 1 2  TO STT -  1 ;
I F  U I .B R A T E ( I )  > ENT THEN C U I l  = C U I 1 + 1 ;
I F  U I . BRATE( I ) > 0 THEN CUI2 = 1 ;
END;
I F  U I 2  ( J J )  = CUI2 THEN BEGIN;
COUNT (CNT ( J J )  , 8 )  = COUNT (CNT ( J J )  , 8 )  + 1 ;
OK = ' 0 ' B ;
I F  P A R T .U I1  (J J )  = 0 & C U I l  = 0 THEN OK =* ' l ' B ;
I F  P A R T . U I l (J J )  = 1 & C U I l  = 1 THEN OK = ' l ' B ;
I F  P A R T . U I l ( J J )  > 1 & C U I l  > 1 &
C U I l  > P A R T .U I l  ( J J )  -  3 & C U I l  < 3 + P A R T .U I l  ( J J )  THEN OK =
' l ' B ;
I F  OK THEN BEGIN;
COUNT (CNT ( J J )  , 2 )  = COUNT (CNT (J  J ) , 2 )  + 1 ;
I F  U I .  BRATE ( S T T -1 )  > ENT THEN CUI3 = 1 ;  ELSE 
I F  (U I .B R A T E (S T T -2 )  > ENT
| U I .  BRATE ( S T T - 3 )  > ENT) THEN CUI3 = 2 ;  ELSE  
I F  U I .B R A T E ( S T T -1 )  > 0 |
( U I .B R A T E (S T T -2 )  > 0 
| U I .  BRATE ( S T T - 3 )  > 0)  THEN CUI3 = 3 ;
I F  CNT(J J )  = 3 7  THEN CUI3 = U I 3 (J J ) ;
I F  U I 3 (J J )  = CUI3 THEN BEGIN;
C O U N T (C N T (J J ) , 3 )  = COUNT(CNT(J J ) , 3 )  + 1 ;
/ *  NOW THE VARIABLES FROM THE ROE. * /
/ *  F IR S T , THE NUMBER OF U I  INSURABLE
WEEKS ON RO E'S ISSU ED I N  PAST 4  M O 'S . * /
TMPWKS= 0 ;  WEEKS= 0 ;  CWKS = 0 ;  MAXEARN = 0 ;
t C 0 2
I F  R O E .S IN  = I A .S I N  THEN
DO I  = S T T -3  TO STT -  1 ;
I F  INEARNl ( I ) -,= ' * * * * * '  & INWKl ( I ) ' * * '
& INWKl ( I )  -i= ' 0 0 '  & INEARNl ( I ) / I N W K l  ( I )  > MAXEARN 
THEN MAXEARN = INEARNl ( I ) / INWKl ( I ) ;
I F  INWKl ( I )  -.= ' * * '  THEN TMPWKS = INWKl ( I ) ;
I F  TMPWKS > WEEKS THEN WEEKS = TMPWKS;
I F  INWK2 ( I ) -i= ' * * '  THEN TMPWKS = I N W K 2 (I ) ;
I F  TMPWKS > WEEKS THEN WEEKS = TMPWKS;
I F  INEARN2 ( I ) -,= ' * * * * * '  & IN W K 2(I)  ' * * '
& INWK2 ( I ) -.= ' 0 0 '  & INEARN2 ( I ) / INWK2 ( I ) > MAXEARN 
THEN MAXEARN = INEARN2 ( I ) /INWK2 ( I )  ;
END;
I F  MAXEARN < 50  THEN WEEKS = 0 ;
I F  WEEKS = 0 THEN CWKS = 0 ;  ELSE
I F  MAXEARN > E N T / 2 .6  & WEEKS < 10  THEN CWKS = 1 ;  ELSE
I F  MAXEARN > E N T / 4 .3  & WEEKS < 1 0  THEN CWKS = 2 ;  ELSE
I F  MAXEARN > E N T / 2 .6  THEN CWKS = 3 ;  ELSE
I F  MAXEARN > E N T / 4 .3  THEN CWKS = 4 ;  ELSE CWKS = 5 ;
COUNT2 (CWKS) = COUNT2(CWKS) + 1 ;
I F  CNT(J J )  = 3 7  THEN CWKS = W K S (J J ) ;
I F  CNT(J J )  = 1 5 3  THEN CWKS = W K S (J J ) ;
I F  C N T (J J )  = 3 6 8  & CWKS > 2 THEN CWKS = W K S (J J ) ;
I F  C N T (J J )  = 0 9 8  & CWKS = 2 THEN CWKS = W K S (J J ) ;
I F  CNT(J J )  = 3 7 5  & CWKS = 2 THEN CWKS = W K S (J J ) ;
I F  C N T (J J )  = 3 9 9  THEN CWKS = W K S (J J ) ;
I F  C N T (J J )  = 0 9 1  & CWKS = 4 THEN CWKS = W K S (J J ) ;
I F  CWKS = WKS (J J )  THEN BEGIN;
COUNT (CNT ( J J )  , 4 )  = COUNT(CNT( J J )  , 4 )  + 1 ;
/ *  THEN THE EARNINGS IN  EACH OF PAST 2 YEARS
/
/ *  INEARNl I S  INSURABLE EARNINGS, INWKl I S  * /  
/ *  INSURABLE WEEKS. AS A RESULT EARN AND * /
/ *  CEARN ARE ANNUAL IN S EARNINGS / 4 . 3 .  * /
CEARN1, CEARN2 = 0 ;
TOL = 1 . 6 6 ;
I F  R O E .S IN  = I A . S I N  THEN 
DO I  »  S T T - 12  TO STT -  1 ;
I F  INEARNl ( I ) -,= ' * * * * * '  Sc INWKl ( I ) -.= ' * * '  & I N W K l(I )  -i= ' 0 0  
THEN CEARNl = CEARNl + INEARNl ( I ) / INWKl ( I ) ;
ELSE I F  INEARN2 ( I ) -.= ' * * * * * '  & IN W K 2(I)  -i= ' * * '  & IN W K 2(I)  -«
0 0 '
THEN CEARNl = CEARNl + INEARN2 ( I )  /INWK2 ( I )  ;
END;
OK = ' 0 ' B ;
I F  C N T (J J )  = 37  THEN OK = ' l ' B ;
I F  C N T (J J )  = 3 6 8  THEN OK = ' l ' B ;
I F  C N T (J J )  = 3 9 9  THEN OK = ' l ' B ;
I F  PART. EARNl (J  J ) = 0 THEN I F  CEARNl = 0 THEN OK = ' l ' B ;
I F  U I 2  (J J )  = 1 & CEARNl = 0 & PART.EARNl ( J J )  < 5 0 0  THEN OK =
l ' B ;
0 C0 2 4 1
I F  P A R T .E A R N l(J J )  > 0 & P A R T .E A R N l(J J )  < 1000 
& CEARNl > 0 & CEARNl < 1000 THEN OK = ' l ' B ;
I F  CEARNl > P A R T .E A R N l(J J ) /T O L
& CEARNl < TOL * PART.EARNl ( J J )  THEN OK = ' l ' B ;  
I F  OK THEN BEGIN;
COUNT(CNT(J J ) ,  5 )  = C O U N T (C N T (JJ) , 5 )  + 1 ;
I F  R O E .S IN  = I A . S I N  THEN 
DO I  = S T T - 2 4  TO STT -  1 3 ;
I F  INEARNl ( I ) -,= ' * * * * * '  & INWKl ( I )  ' * * '  & INWKl ( I )  -i= ' 0 0 '
THEN CEARN2 = CEARN2 + INEARNl ( I ) /  INWKl ( I ) ;
ELSE I F  INEARN2 ( I ) -,= ' * * * * * '  & IN W K 2(I)  -»= ' * * '  & IN W K 2(I)  i =
' 0 0 '
THEN CEARN2 = CEARN2 + INEARN2 ( I ) /  INWK2 ( I ) ;
. END;
OK = ' 0 ' B ;
I F  CNT(J J )  = 3 7  THEN OK = ' l ' B ;
I F  C N T (J J )  = 3 6 8  THEN OK = ' l ' B ;
I F  C N T (J J )  = 1 5 3  THEN OK = ' l ' B ;
I F  C N T (J J )  = 3 9 9  THEN OK = ' l ' B ;
TOL = 1 . 6 6 ;
I F  PART. EARN2 (J  J ) = 0 & CEARN2 = 0 THEN OK = ' l ' B ;
I F  PART.EARN2 ( J J )  > 0 & PART.EARN2 (J J )  < 1 0 0 0  
& CEARN2 > 0 Sc CEARN2 < 1 0 0 0  THEN OK = ' l ' B ;
I F  U I 2  (J J )  = 1 Sc CEARNl = 0 Sc PART. EARN2 (J  J ) < 5 0 0  THEN OK = 
' l ' B ;
I F  CEARN2 > PART.EARN2 ( J J ) /T O L  
Sc CEARN2 > 0 Sc EARN2 (J J )  > 0
Sc CEARN2 < TOL * PART.EARN2 ( J J )  THEN OK = ' l ' B ;
I F  OK THEN BEGIN;
COUNT (CNT (J  J ) , 6 )  = COUNT (CNT ( J J )  , 6 )  + 1 ;
/ *  THEN CHECK DIFFERENCE IN  EARNINGS * /
OK
I F
I F
I F
I F
I F
= ' 0 ' B ;  
C N T(J J )  
C N T (J J )  
CN T(J J )  
C N T (J J )  
CN T(J J )  
D IF F  = 
CD IFF =
= 3 6 8  THEN OK = ' l ' B ;
= 3 7  THEN OK = ' l ' B ;
= 9 1  THEN OK = ' l ' B ;
= 1 5 3  THEN OK = ' l ' B ;
= 3 9 9  THEN OK = ' l ' B ;
P A R T .E A R N l(J J )  -  PART. EARN2(J J ) 
CEARNl -  CEARN2;
I F  D IF F  < 1 Sc CDIFF < 
I F  CD IFF > D IF F /T O L  Sc 
THEN OK = ' l ' B ;
I F  D IF F  > 0 Sc CDIFF > 
THEN OK = ' l ' B ;
I F  OK THEN BEGIN;
C O U N T (C N T (J J ) , 1 )  =
1 THEN OK = 
CDIFF < TOL
' l ' B ;
* D IF F
0 & CDIFF < 5 0 0  Sc D IF F  < 5 0 0
C O U N T (C N T (JJ) , 7 )  + 1 ;
/ *  WE HAVE A MATCH!! !  * /
/ *  RECORD PRE Sc POST VALUES FOR 
COMPARISON GROUP. * /
i C Q 2
MATCH = ' l ' B ?
M R K (P A R T (JJ) .C N T ) = 1 ;  / *  ID E N T IF IE S  MATCHED PARTICIPANT
/
TOT ( PART ( J J )  .CNT) = TOT ( PART ( J J )  .CNT) + 1?
DIND = DNULL; F I  = 'O 'B ;
DO I  = K K -36  TO KK + 6 0 ;
I F  PGM (I) > 0 THEN BEGIN;
D I N D (K K + 6 1 -I )  = 1 ;
IA I N D (C N T (J J )  ,K K + 6 1 - I )  = I A I N D (C N T (J J )  ,K K + 6 1 - I )  + 1?
END?
END;
I F  U I . S I N  = I A . S I N  THEN 
DO I  = S T T - 6 0  TO STT + 3 6 ;
I F  U I . B E N ( I )  > 0 THEN BEGIN?
D I N D ( I - S T T + 6 1 )  = 1 ;
U I I N D ( C N T ( J J ) , I - S T T + 6 1 )  = U I I N D ( C N T ( J J ) , I - S T T + 6 1 )  + 1?
END;
END;
DO I  = 1 TO 9 7 ;
NOIND(CNT( J J ) , I )  = N O I N D (C N T (J J ) , 1 )  + D I N D ( I ) ;
END;
I F  R O E .S IN  = I A . S I N  THEN 
DO I  = S T T - 6 0  TO STT + 3 6 ;
I F  INEARNl ( I ) -,= ' * * * * * '  & INWKl ( I ) -.= ' * * '  & I N W K l(I )  -.= ' 0 0  
THEN E A R I N D (C N T (J J ) , I - S T T + 6 1 )  = E A R I N D (C N T (J J ) , I - S T T + 6 1 )
+ INEARNl ( I ) / I N W K l  ( I )  ? ELSE
I F  INEARN2 ( I ) -,= ' * * * * * '  & IN W K 2(I)  -«= ' * * '  & IN W K 2(I)  -i= ' 0 0  
THEN EARIND (C N T (JJ )  # I - S T T + 6 1 )  = EARIND (CNT ( J J )  , I - S T T + 6 1 )
+ IN E A R N 2( I ) / INWK2( I )?
END
END / * MATCHED ON D IF F  * /
END / * MATCHED ON EARN2 * /
END / * MATCHED ON EARNl * /
END / * MATCHED ON WKS * /
END / * MATCHED ON U I3  * /
END / * MATCHED ON U I 2  * /
END / * MATCHED ON U I 1  * /
END / * MATCHED ON IA  H IST (P) * /
END / * MATCHED ON AGE * /
END / * MATCHED ON CLASS & CAT * /
END / * LOOP TO CHECK ALL PARTICIPANTS WITH SAME START
END, / * LOOK FOR MATCH BEFORE AND AFTER START DATE * /
END / * LOOP TO CHECK EACH UNIQUE START DATE * /
M ARK.SIN = I A . S I N ;
I F  MATCH THEN
WRITE F IL E  (OUTSIN) FROM (MARK) ? 
MATCH = ' O ' ;
MRK = NMRK;
READ F IL E  ( I A I N )  IN T O (IA )  ;
END? / *  I A  S I N  NOT LOWEST * /
END? /*N O T  E O F */
DO I  = 1 TO 5 2 1 ;
PUT SK IP  E D I T ( T O T ( I ) ) ( F ( l l ) ) ;
l C 0 2 if 3
I  = M )  (A ( 1 4 )  , F ( 4 )  )
WRITE FILE (O U T FILE ) FROM ( T O T ( I ) )
I F  TOT ( I )  = 0 THEN BEGIN;
PUT SK IP E D I T ( ' TOT = 0 ,
T O T (I )  = . 1 ;
END;
DO J  = 1 TO 9 7 ;
I A I N D ( I ,  J )  = I A I N D ( I , J )  / T O T ( I )
U I I N D ( I , J )  = U IIN D  ( I ,  J )  /TOT ( I )
N O I N D (I / J ) = N O I N D d ,  J )  / T O T ( I )
E A R I N D (I , J ) = E A R I N D d , J ) / T O T ( I )  ; 
WRITE FILE (O U T FILE ) FROM ( I A I N D ( I , J ) )
WRITE FILE (O U T FILE ) FROM
WRITE FILE (O U T FILE ) FROM
WRITE FILE(O UTFILE) FROM
TOTNO(J) = TOTNO(J) +
T O T U I(J )  = T O T U I(J)  +
T O T IA (J )  = T O T IA (J) +
( U I I N D ( I , J ) ) ;  
( N O I N D d ,  J )  ) ; 
(E A R IN D (I ,  J )  )
= TOTEAR(J)
N O I N D ( I , J ) ; 
U I I N D ( I , J ) ; 
IAIN D ( I ,  J )  ;
+ E A R I N D ( I ,J )TOTEAR(J)
END;
END;
DO I  = 1 TO 9 7 ;
PUT S K IP  E D I T ( T O T N O ( I ) / 5 2 1 , T O T U I ( I ) / 5 2 1 , T O T I A ( I ) / 5 2 1 ,  
TOTEAR( I ) / 5 2 1 ) ( ( 4 ) F ( 1 1 , 4 ) ) ;
END;
DO I  = 0 TO 9 ;
PUT SK IP  E D I T (C O U N T 2 (I ) ) ( F ( 1 1 ) ) ;
END;
DO I  = 1 TO 5 2 1 ;
I F  T O T (C N T (I ) )  < 1 THEN BEGIN;
PUT SK IP  EDIT (PART. CNT ( I )  , PART. C A T (I )  , PART. CLASS ( I )  , 
P A R T . A ( I ) , P A R T . P ( I ) , U I 1 ( I ) , U I 2 ( I ) ,
START( I ) , U I 3 ( I ) , W K S (I ) , E A R N l( I ) , EARN2( I ) )
( ( 1 0 ) A ( 4 ) , ( 2 ) F ( 1 1 , 2 ) ) ;
END;
END;
DO I  = 1 TO 5 2 1 ;
I F  T O T ( C N T ( I ) ) < 1 THEN BEGIN;
PUT SK IP  EDIT (CNT ( I )  , COUNT (CNT ( I )  , 1 )  , COUNT (CNT ( I )  , 8 )  
COUNT(CNT(I) , 2 )  , COUNT(CNT( I ) , 3 )  ,
COUNT (CNT ( I ) , 4 )  , COUNT (CNT ( I ) , 5 )  ,
COUNT(CNT( I ) , 6 ) ,C O U N T (C N T (I ) , 7 ) ) ( ( 9 ) F ( 7 ) ) ;
END 
END 
END MAIN 
/ *
/  /G O . ROEIN DD DSN=HRRSD. E l . ROELONG. AUG2 6 9 4 ,  UN IT=TA PE, DISP=SH R  
/ / U I I N  DD DSN=HRRSD. E l  .UILONG. A U G 2694 , U N IT =T A PE ,D ISP=SH R
/ / I A I N
/ /P A R T I N
/ /O U T F I L E
. / /
//*
/ / *
/ / *
DD DSN=HRRSD. E l . IALONG. AUG2 6 9 4 , D ISP=SH R  
DD DSN=HRRSD. E l . PPDPART. SHORT6. O CT079 4 ,  DISP=SH R  
DD DSN=HRRSD. E l . P PD . PERCENT. OCT09 9 4 ,  U N IT =D ISK ,  
DISP=OLD  
D ISP =(N E W ,C A T L G ,K E E P),
DCB=(RECFM=FB,LRECL=4) ,
S P A C E = (T R K ,( 4 0 , 1 0 ) ,RLSE)
i C 0 2 U
/ /O U T S I N  DD DSN=HRRSD.“E l . PPD. S I N S . OCTO9 9 4 , U N IT =D ISK ,
/ /  DISP=OLD
/ / *  DISP=(NEW ,CATLG, K E E P ),
/  /  *  D C B=( RECFM=FB, LRECL=529)  ,
I I *  S P A C E = (T R K ,( 5 0 , 4 0 ) ,R L SE)
/ / * G O . I N F I L E  DD DUMMY 
/ / • O U T F I L E  DD DUMMY
l  C 0 2  ^5
PLl Program 
PPD6
MAIN:
DCL
L C 0 2 6
PROC OPTIONS (MAIN) 
EOF 
F I  
F3
FOUND
SYSPRINT
M IN SIN  P I C ' ( 9 ) 9
S U M D I F (4 ,9 7 )  
SU M D IF2( 4 , 9 7 )
B IT  I N I T ( ' O ' B ) ,  
B IT  I N I T ( ' O ' B ) ,  
B IT  I N I T ( ' O ' B ) ,  
B IT  I N I T ( ' O ' B ) , 
F IL E  OUTPUT,
FLOAT( 6 )  I N I T ( ( 4 * 9 7 ) 0 ) ,  
FLOAT( 6 )  I N I T ( ( 4 * 9 7 ) 0 )
SUMDF( 4 )
SUMDF2( 4 )  
SUMDL(4 )
SUMDL2( 4 )
TOT( 5 2 1 )
VAR( 4 )  
C O M P I A (5 2 1 ,9 7 )  
COMPUI( 5 2 1 , 9 7 )  
COMPNO( 5 2 1 , 9 7 )  
C O M P E R (521 ,9 7 )  
PGM( 1 6 9 )  
T O T I A (9 7 )
T O T U I( 9 7 )  
T O T IN D (97)  
TOTEARN( 9 7 )  
C T O T IA (97 )  
CTOTUI( 9 7 )  
CTOTIND( 9 7 )  
CTOTEARN(97) 
D IN D ( 9 7 )
DNULL( 9 7 )
FLOAT( 6 )  I N I T ( ( 4 ) 0 ) ,  
FLOAT( 6 )  I N I T ( ( 4 ) 0 ) ,  
FLOAT( 6 )  I N I T ( ( 4 ) 0 ) ,  
FLOAT( 6 )  I N I T ( ( 4 ) 0 ) ,  
FLOAT( 6 ) ,
FLOAT( 6 )  I N I T ( ( 4 ) 0 ) ,
FLOAT( 6 ) ,
FLOAT( 6 ) ,
FLOAT( 6 ) ,
FLOAT( 6 ) ,
FLOAT( 6 )  I N I T ( ( 1 6 9 ) 0 ) ,  
FLOAT( 6 )  I N I T ( ( 9 7 ) 0 ) ,  
FLOAT( 6 )  I N I T ( ( 9 7 ) 0 ) ,  
FLOAT( 6 )  I N I T ( ( 9 7 ) 0 ) ,  
FLOAT( 1 4 )  I N I T ( ( 9 7 ) 0 ) ,  
FLOAT( 6 )  I N I T ( ( 9 7 ) 0 ) ,  
FLOAT( 6 )  I N I T ( ( 9 7 ) 0 ) ,  
FLOAT(6 )  I N I T ( ( 9 7 ) 0 ) ,  
FLOAT(9 )  I N I T ( ( 9 7 ) 0 ) ,  
FIXED DEC( 9 )  I N I T ( ( 9 7 ) 0 ) ,  
FIXED DEC( 9 )  I N I T ( ( 9 7 ) 0 )
D IF F FLOAT( 6 ) I N I T ( 0 )  ,
FD IF F FLOAT( 6 ) I N I T ( 0 ) ,
LD IFF FLOAT( 6 ) I N I T ( 0 ) ,
TEMPEARN FLOAT( 6 ) I N I T ( 0 )  ,
TOTAL FLOAT( 9 ) I N I T ( 0 )  ,
NUM FIXED DEC( 9 ) I N I T ( 0 ) ,
START FIXED DEC( 9 ) I N I T ( 0 ) ,
I FIXED DEC( 9 ) I N I T ( 0 ) ,
J FIXED DEC( 9 ) I N I T ( 0 ) ,
N FIXED DEC( 9 ) I N I T ( 0 ) ,
K FIXED DEC( 9 ) I N I T ( 0 )  ,
S FIXED DEC( 9 ) I N I T ( 0 ) ,
MIN B U IL T IN ,
SUBSTR B U IL T IN ,
TRUNC B U IL T IN ,
COMPIN
ROEIN
U I I N
PARTIN
FIL E  RECORD INPU T,  
F IL E  RECORD INPUT, 
F IL E  RECORD INPUT, 
F IL E  RECORD INPUT,
I A I N
OUTFILE
OUTCNT
F IL E  RECORD INPUT, 
F IL E  RECORD OUTPUT, 
F IL E  RECORD OUTPUT,
1 PART,
2 S I N CHAR( 8 ) ,
2 CAT P I C ' 9 ' ,
2 CLASS P I C ' 9 ' ,
2 A P I C ' 9 ' ,
2 P P I C ' 9 ' ,
2 U I 1 P I C ' 9 9 ' ,
2 U I 2 P I C ' 9 9 ' ,
2 STT P I C ' 9 9 9 ' ,
2 CNT P I C ' 9 9 9 '  IN I T (O )
2 U I 3 P I C ' 9 ' ,
2 WKS P I C ' 9 ' ,
2 EARNl FLOAT( 6 ) ,
2 EARN2 FLOAT( 6 ) ,
1 ROE, 
2 
2 
2
S I N
S IN 2
CHAR( 8 ) ,  
P I C ' ( 1 ) 9 ' ,
MONTH( 1 6 8 )  ,
3 ROESTAT C H A R ( l ) ,
3 INWKl CHAR( 2 ) ,
3 INEARNl CHAR( 5 ) ,
3 PCODE11 CHAR( 1 ) ,
3 PCODE12 C H A R (5 ) ,
3 EMPL1 CH AR(9) ,
3 S I C 1 CHAR( 4 ) ,
3 REASON1 C H A R ( l ) ,
3 INWK2 CHAR( 2 ) ,
3 INEARN2 CHAR( 5 ) ,
3 PCODE21 CHAR( 1 ) ,
3 PCODE22 CHAR( 5 ) ,
3 EMPL2 CHAR( 9 ) ,
3 S IC 2 CHAR( 4 ) ,
3 REASON2 CHAR( 1 ) ,
1 U I ,
S I N CHAR( 8 ) ,
S IN 2 P I C ' ( 1 ) 9 '
AGE CHAR( 2 ) ,
SEX C H A R ( l ) ,
MONTH( 1 6 8 ) ,
3 BEN P I C ' 9 ' ,
3 D IS T CHAR( 4 ) ,
3 PROV CHAR( 2 ) ,
3 REG CHAR( 2 ) ,
3 DPND C H A R ( l ) ,
3 BRATE CHAR( 4 ) ,
3 STUD CHAR( 1 ) ,
3 INWK CHAR( 2 ) ,
t  C D 2 4 7
l C 0 2 4 8
3 OCC CHAR ( 7 )  ,
3 S IC  CHAR( 4 ) ,
3 WKPD CHAR( 3 ) ,
CHAR( 2 ) ,
P I C ' 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 ' ,
CHAR( 8 ) ,
P I C ' ( 1 ) 9 ' ,
P I C ' 9 9 ' ,
P I C ' 9 9 ' ,
C H A R ( l ) ,
P I C ' 9 ' ,
P I C ' 9 ' ,
P I C ' 9 ' ,
P I C ' 9 ' ;
/ *  READ I N  AVERAGE VALUES OF 
U I DEPENDENCE, I A  DEPENDENCE 
DEPENDENCE ON EITHER, AND 
EARNINGS FOR COMPARISON 
GROUP * /
DO I  = 1 TO 5 2 1 ;
READ FILE(COM PIN) INTO ( T O T ( I ) ) ;
DO J  = 1 TO 9 7 ;
READ FILE(COM PIN) INTO ( C O M P I A ( I ,J ) ) ;
READ FILE(COM PIN) INTO ( C O M P U I ( I ,J ) ) ;
READ FILE(COM PIN) INTO (COMPNOd, J )  ) ;
READ F IL E  (COMPIN) INTO (CO M PERd, J )  ) ;
END;
END;
ON E N D F IL E ( IA IN )  I A . S I N  = ' 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 ' ;
ON ENDFILE (PARTIN) EOF = ' l ' B ;
ON ENDFILE(RO EIN) BEGIN; ROE. S IN  = ' 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 ' ;
PUT SK IP  E D I T ( ' END OF ROE F I L E ' ) ( A ) ; E N D ;
ON E N D F IL E (U IIN )  B E G I N ;U I .S I N  = ' 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 ' ;
PUT S K IP  ED IT ( '  END OF U I  F I L E ' )  (A) ;END;
READ F IL E (R O E IN ) IN T O (R O E );
READ F I L E ( I A I N )  I N T O ( I A ) ;
READ F I L E ( U I I N )  I N T O ( U I ) ;
READ F IL E (P A R T IN ) IN T O ( P A R T );
NUM = 1 ;
DO WHILE ( - iEOF) ;
I F  R O E .S IN  < P A R T .S IN  THEN 
READ F IL E (R O E IN ) INTO (RO E);
ELSE I F  I A . S I N  < P A R T .S IN  THEN 
READ F I L E ( I A I N )  I N T O ( I A ) ;
ELSE I F  U I . S I N  < P A R T .S IN  THEN 
READ F I L E ( U I I N )  I N T O ( U I ) ;
1 I A ,
2 F I D l  
2 F ID 2  
2 S I N  
2 S IN 2  
2 BYR 
2 BMO 
2 SEX 
2 T M P (1 6 9 )
2 C A T ( 1 6 9 )
2 C L A S S ( 1 6 9 )  
2 D P N O (1 6 9 )
ELSE BEGIN;
0 C O 2 4 9
/ *  PUT IA  INTO SAME ORDER AS 
U I AND EARNINGS. * /
I F  I A . S I N  = P A R T .S IN  THEN 
DO I  = 1 TO 1 6 9 ;
P G M (1 7 0 - I )  = I A .T M P (I )  ;
END;
ELSE PUT SK IP E D I T ( ) (A) ;
START = ( 1 7 0 -P A R T .ST T ) ;
/ *  FINAL CHECK TO MAKE SURE PARTICIPANTS  
ARE ON BASIC I A ,  STARTED THE 
TRAINING IN  THE EXPECTED YEARS,
AND HAVE AT LEAST ONE MEMBER IN  
THEIR COMPARISON GROUP. * /
I F  TOT(NUM) = 0 THEN
PUT SK IP  E D IT ('T O T = O .N  = ' , N U M ) ( A ( 1 6 ) , F ( 4 ) ) ;
ELSE I F  PGM (START) = 3 THEN BEGIN;
I F  START < 6 0  | START > 1 3 3  THEN BEGIN;
PUT SK IP  E D I T ( S T A R T ) ( F ( l l ) ) ;
PUT SK IP E D I T ( P A R T .S T T ) (A );
START = 8 6 ;
END;
TOTAL = TOTAL + 1 ;
/ *  ADD THE AVERAGE VALUES FOR EACH 
COMPARISON GROUP TO GET VALUES 
FOR OVERALL COMPARISON GROUP. * /
DO I  = 1 TO 9 7 ;
CTOTIA( I ) = CTOTIA( I ) + COM PIA(NUM ,I) ;
CTO TUI( I ) = CTOTUI( I ) + COMPUI (NUM, I )  ;
CTOTIND( I ) = CTOTIND( I ) + COMPNO(NUM,I);
CTOTEARN( I ) = CTOTEARN( I ) + COMPER(NUM,I) ;
END;
DIND = DNULL; F I  = ' 0 ' B ;F D IF F ,L D IF F =  0 ;
I F  I A . S I N  = P A R T .S IN  THEN 
DO I  = ST A R T -60 TO START + 3 6 ;
J  = I -S T A R T + 6 1 ;
/ *  CALCULATE SUMS OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PARTICIPANTS  
AND COMPARISON GROUP, AND SUMS OF SQUARES OF 
DIFFERENCES FOR THE PURPOSES OF CALCULATING 
VARIANCES. * /
I F  PGM ( I ) > 0 THEN D IF F  = 1 -  COMPIA (NUM, J )  ;
ELSE D IF F  = 0 -  CO M PIA (N U M ,J);
SU M D IF2( 1 , J )  = S U M D I F 2 (1 ,J )  + D I F F * * 2 ;
SUMDIF( 1 , J )  = SUMDIF( 1 , J )  + D IF F ;
I F  I  > START + 2 4  THEN LDIFF = LDIFF + D IF F ;
I F  I  < START -  4 8  THEN FD IF F = FD IFF + D IF F ;
I F  PGM (I) > 0 THEN D IN D (I -S T A R T + 6 1 )  = 1 ;
I F  PGM (I) > 0 THEN T O T IA (I -S T A R T + 6 1 )  = T O T IA (I -S T A R T + 6 1 )  + 1 ;
t C 0 2 5 0
END;
SUMDF2( 1 )  = SUMDF2( 1 )  + F D IF F * * 2 ;
SUMDL2( 1 )  = SUMDL2(1) + L D IF F * * 2 ;
S U M D F (l)  = SU M D F(l)  + F D IF F ;
SU M D L (l)  = SUM DL(l) + L D IFF;
L D IF F , F D IF F  * 0 ;
I F  U I . S I N  = P A R T .S IN  THEN 
DO I  = ST A R T -60  TO START + 3 6 ;
J  = I -S T A R T + 6 1 ;
I F  U I . B E N ( I )  > 0 THEN D I N D (I -S T A R T + 6 1 )  = 1 ;
I F  U I . B E N ( I )  > 0 THEN TOTUI ( I -S T A R T + 6 1 )  = TOTUI ( I -S T A R T + 6 1 )  + 1 ;
I F  U I . B E N ( I )  > 0 THEN D IFF = 1 -  COMPUI (NUM, J )  ;
ELSE D IF F  = 0 -  CO M PUI(NU M ,J);
SU M D IF2( 2 , J )  = SUM DIF2( 2 , J )  + D I F F * * 2 ;
SUM DIF( 2 , J )  = SUMDIF( 2 , J )  + D IF F ;
I F  I  > START + 2 4  THEN LD IFF = LD IFF + D IF F ;
I F  I  <  START -  4 8  THEN FD IFF = FD IFF + D IF F ;
END; ELSE
DO I  = 1 TO 9 7 ;
D IF F  = 0 -  COMPUI (NUM, I )  ;
SU M D IF2( 2 , 1 )  = SUM DIF2( 2 , 1 )  + D I F F * * 2 ;
SUM DIF( 2 , 1 )  = SUMDIF( 2 , 1 )  + D IF F ;
I F  I  >  8 5  THEN LDIFF = LDIFF + D IF F ;
I F  I  <  1 3  THEN FD IFF = FD IF F + D IF F ;
END;
SUMDF2 ( 2 )  = SUM DF2(2) + F D IF F * * 2 ;
SUMDL2( 2 )  = SUMDL2( 2 )  + L D IF F * * 2 ;
SUMDF ( 2 )  = SUMDF ( 2 )  + F D IF F ;
SUMDL( 2 )  = SUMDL( 2 )  + L D IFF;
L D IF F , F D IF F  = 0 ;
DO I  = 1 TO 9 7 ;
TO TIN D ( I ) = TOTIND( I ) + D I N D ( I ) ;
D IF F  = DIND ( I )  -  COMPNO (NUM, I ) ;
SU M D IF2( 3 , 1 )  = SUM DIF2( 3 , 1 )  + D I F F * * 2 ;
SUM DIF( 3 , 1 )  = SUMDIF( 3 , I )  + D IF F ;
I F  I  > 8 5  THEN LDIFF = LDIFF + D IF F ;
I F  I  < 1 3  THEN FD IFF = FD IFF + D IF F ;
END;
SUMDF2( 3 )  = SUMDF2( 3 )  + F D IF F * * 2 ;
SUMDL2( 3 )  = SUMDL2 ( 3 )  + L D IF F * * 2 ;
SUMDF ( 3 )  = SUMDF ( 3 )  + F D IF F ;
SUMDL ( 3 )  = SUMDL ( 3 )  + LD IFF;
L D IF F , F D IF F  = 0 ;
I F  R O E .S IN  = P A R T .S IN  THEN 
DO I  = ST A R T -60  TO START + 3 6 ;
J  = I -S T A R T + 6 1 ;
TEMPEARN = 0 ;
I F  INEARN1 ( I ) ->=/ * * * * * '  & IN W K l(I )  -i= ' * * '  & I N W K l(I )  -.= ' 0 0 '  
THEN TEMPEARN = INEARNl ( I )  / INWKl ( I )  ;
ELSE I F  INEARN2 ( I ) -,= ' * * * * * '  & IN W K 2(I)  -i= ' * * '  & IN W K 2(I)  -.= ' 0 0 '  
THEN TEMPEARN = INEARN2 ( I )  /INWK2 ( I )  ;
i C G 2 5 1
TOTEARN(J) = TOTEARN(J  ) + TEMPEARN;
D IF F  = TEMPEARN -  COMPER (NUM, J )  ;
SU M D IF2( 4 , J )  = SUM DIF2( 4 , J )  + D I F F * * 2 ;
SUM DIF( 4 , J )  = SUMDIF( 4 , J )  + D IF F ;
I F  I  > START + 2 4  THEN LD IFF = LD IFF + D IF F ;
I F  I  < START -  4 8  THEN FD IF F = FD IFF + D IF F ;
END; ELSE
DO I  = ST A R T -60  TO START + 3 6 ;
J  = I -S T A R T + 6 1 ;
D IF F  = 0 -  COMPER(NUM,J);
SU M D IF2( 4 , J )  = SUM DIF2( 4 , J )  + D I F F * * 2 ;
SUM DIF( 4 , J )  = SUMDIF( 4 , J )  + D IF F ;
I F  I  > START + 2 4  THEN LDIFF = LDIFF + D IF F ;
I F  I  < START -  4 8  THEN FD IF F = FD IF F + D IF F ;
END;
SUMDF2( 4 )  = SUMDF2( 4 )  + F D IF F * * 2 ;
SUMDL2( 4 )  = SUMDL2( 4 )  + L D IF F * * 2 ;
SUMDF ( 4 )  = SUMDF ( 4 )  + F D IF F ;
SUMDL( 4 )  = SUMDL(4 )  + L D IFF;
END;
READ F I L E ( PARTIN) IN T O ( PART) ;
NUM = NUM + 1 ;
END;
END; /*N O T  E O F */
/ *  WRITE OUT PERCENTAGE OF PARTICIPANTS
ON I A ,  U I  NEITHER, AND AVERAGE EARNINGS. * /
PUT SK IP  E D I T ( '  ' )  (A) ;
PUT S K IP  E D I T ( 'PAR TICIPA NTS. ' )  (A) ;
DO I  = 1 TO 9 7 ;
PUT S K IP  E D I T (T O T I N D (I ) /T O T A L ,T O T U I( I ) /TOTAL,
TOTIA ( I ) /TOTAL, TOTEARN( I ) /TOTAL)
( ( 4 ) F ( 1 6 , 4 ) ) ;
END;
PUT S K IP  E D I T ( ' ' ) ( A ) ;
/ *  WRITE OUT PERCENTAGE OF COMPARISON GROUP 
ON I A ,  U I  NEITHER, AND AVERAGE EARNINGS. * /
PUT SK IP  E D I T ( '  ' ) ( A ) ;
PUT S K IP  E D I T ( 'COMPARISON GROUP. ' )  (A) ;
DO I  = 1 TO 9 7 ;
PUT SK IP  E D I T (CTOTIND( I ) / TOTAL, CTOTUI( I ) / TOTAL,
CTOTIA ( I ) /TOTAL, CTOTEARN ( I ) /TOTAL)
( ( 4 )  F ( 1 6 ,  4 )  ) ;
END;
/ *  CALCULATE AND WRITE OUT VARIANCES 
OF DIFFERENCES. * /
PUT S K IP  E D I T ( '  ' ) ( A ) ;
PUT S K IP  ED IT ('VARIANCES OF DIFFERENCES. ' )  (A) ;
DO I  = 1 TO 9 7 ;
I C 0 2 5 2
PUT S K IP  E D I T ( ' ' )  (A) ? '
DO J  = 1 TO 4 ;
V A H (J) =
1 / (T O T A L -1 ) ) * (SU M D IF2(J , I ) - S U M D I F (J , I ) * * 2 / T O T A L ) /T O T A L ;
PUT E D I T ( V A R ( J ) ) ( X ( 4 ) , P ' 9 9 9 V . 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 ' ) ;
END?
END?
PUT SK IP  E D I T ( '  ' ) ( A ) ;
PUT SK IP  E D I T ( 'VARIANCES OF DIFFERENCES IN  F IR S T  12  MONTHS. ) ( A ) ;  
PUT S K IP  E D I T ( '  ' ) ( A ) ;
DO J  = 1  TO 4 ;
V A R (J)  = ( 1 / (TOTAL-1) )* (S U M D F 2 (J ) -S U M D F (J )* * 2 /T O T A L )/T O T A L ;
PUT E D I T ( V A R ( J ) ) ( X ( 4 ) , P ' 9 9 9 V . 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 ' ) ?
END;
PUT S K IP  E D I T ( '  ' )  ( A ) ;  % t
PUT S K IP  E D I T ( ' VARIANCES OF DIFFERENCES IN  LAST 1 2  MONTHS. ' )  ( A ) ;
PUT S K IP  E D I T ( '  ' ) ( A ) ;
DO J  = 1  TO 4 ;
VAR(J )  = ( 1 / (TOTAL-1) )* (SU M D L 2(J)-S U M D L  (J )* * 2 /T O T A L )/T O T A L ?
PUT E D I T ( V A R ( J ) ) ( X ( 4 ) , P ' 9 9 9 V . 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 ' ) ?
END;
PUT S K IP  E D I T ( ' ' )  (A) ;
PUT S K IP  E D I T ( T O T A L ) ( F ( l l ) ) ;
END MAIN?
fit
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PLl Program 
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/♦ROUTE PRINT R07
//STEP1 EXEC PLIXCG,CLASS=X
//P L I .S Y S IN  DD *
MAIN: PROC OPTIONS (MAIN);
DCL EOF
FOUND
SYSPRINT
i C 0 2 5 6
BIT IN IT ( 'O 'B ) ,  
BIT I N IT ( 'O 'B ) ,  
FILE OUTPUT,
RAND(48)
TMPWKS 
DIFF 
CWKS 
INDEARN 
INDDIFF 
INDEARNH 
DEARN(0:20) 
DEARNP(0:20) 
DEARNH(0:20) 
DEARNHP(0:20) 
DEARN2(0 :2 0 )  
DEARNP2( 0 :20)  
DEARNH2( 0 :20)  
DEARNHP2(0 :2 0 )  
DISTDIF(0:20)  
DISTDIFP(0 :2 0 )  
DISTUI(0 :1 2 )  
DISTUIP(0:12)  
DISTDUI( 0 :24)  
DISTDUIP(0:24) 
DISTUI2(0 :1 2 )  
DISTUIP2(0 :1 2 )  
DISTINWK(0:50)  
DISTINWKP(0 :5 0 )
P I C '9 9 9 ' ,
PIC '9 9 ' ,
FLOAT( 6 ) ,
PIC '9 ' ,
FLOAT( 6 ) ,
FLOAT( 6 ) ,
FLOAT( 6 ) ,
FLOAT(6) I N I T ( ( 2 1 ) 0 ) ,  
FLOAT(6) I N I T ( ( 2 1 )0 )  
FLOAT(6)
FLOAT(6)
FLOAT(6)
FLOAT(6)
FLOAT(6)
FLOAT(6)
FLOAT(6) I N I T ( ( 2 1 ) 0 ) ,  
FLOAT(6) I N I T ( ( 2 1 ) 0 ) ,  
FLOAT(6) I N I T ( ( 1 3 ) 0 ) ,  
FLOAT(6) I N I T ( ( 1 3 ) 0 ) ,  
FLOAT(6) I N I T ( ( 2 5 ) 0 ) ,  
FLOAT(6) I N I T ( ( 2 5 ) 0 ) ,  
FLOAT(6) I N I T ( ( 1 3 ) 0 ) ,  
FLOAT(6) I N I T ( ( 1 3 ) 0 ) ,  
FLOAT(6) I N I T ( ( 5 1 ) 0 ) ,  
FLOAT(6) I N I T ( ( 5 1 )0 )
I N I T ( ( 2 1 ) 0 ) ,  
I N I T ( ( 2 1 ) 0 ) ,  
I N I T ( ( 2 1 ) 0 ) ,  
I N I T ( ( 2 1 ) 0 ) ,  
I N I T ( ( 2 1 ) 0 ) ,  
I N I T ( ( 2 1 ) 0 ) ,
PGM(169) FLOAT(6) I N I T (( 1 6 9 ) 0 ) ,
STT FIXED DEC(9) IN I T (0 ) ,
I  FIXED DEC(9) INIT(O ),
J  FIXED DEC(9) I N I T (0 ) ,
K FIXED DEC(9) I N I T (0 ) ,
MIN BUILTIN,
SUBSTR BUILTIN,
TRUNC BUILTIN,
ROEIN
UIIN
RANDIN
IAIN
OUTFILE
OUTSIN
OUTCNT
1 OUT,
2 DEP
FILE RECORD INPUT, 
FILE RECORD INPUT, 
FILE RECORD INPUT, 
FILE RECORD INPUT, 
FILE RECORD OUTPUT, 
FILE RECORD OUTPUT, 
FILE RECORD OUTPUT,
CEARN1
CEARN2
DUI1
CUI1
CUI2
WEEKS
PIC '9 ' ,
PIC '9 9 9 9 9 ' ,  
P I C '9 9 9 9 9 ' , 
P I C '9 9 ' , 
P I C '9 9 ' , 
P I C '9 9 ' ,  
P IC '9 9 9 ' ,
1 TEMP,
2 RND P I C '9 9 9 ' ,  
2 FILL CHAR(77),
1 ROE,
2 SIN
2 SIN2
U
CHAR( 8 ) ,  
P I C '{ 1 ) 9 ' ,
MONTH( 1 6 8 ) ,
3 ROESTAT CHAR( 1 ) ,
3 INWK1 CHAR{ 2 ) ,
3 INEARNl CHAR( 5 ) ,
3 PCODE11 CHAR(l),
3 PCODE12 CHAR( 5 ) ,
3 EMPL1 CHAR(9),
3 SIC1 CHAR( 4 ) ,
3 REASONl CHAR( 1 ) ,
3 INWK2 CHAR( 2 ) ,
3 INEARN2 CHAR( 5 ) ,
3 PCODE21 CHAR( 1 ) ,
3 PCODE22 CHAR( 5 ) ,
3 EMPL2 CHAR( 9 ) ,
3 SIC2 CHAR( 4 ) ,
3 REASON2 CHAR( 1 ) ,
1 UI,
SIN CHAR( 8 ) ,
SIN2 P I C ' ( 1 ) 9 '
AGE CHAR( 2 ) ,
SEX CHAR( 1 ) ,
MONTH( 1 6 8 ) ,
3 BEN P I C '9 ' ,
3 DIST CHAR( 4 ) ,
3 PROV CHAR( 2 ) ,
3 REG CHAR(2),
3 DPND CHAR( 1 ) ,
3 BRATE CHAR( 4 ) ,
3 STUD CHAR(l),
3 INWK CHAR( 2 ) ,
3 OCC CHAR( 7 ) ,
3 SIC CHAR( 4 ) ,
3 WKPD CHAR( 3 ) ,
1 IA,
2 FID1 
2 FID2 
2 SIN  
2 SIN2 
2 BYR 
2 BMO 
2 SEX 
2 IMP (169)
2 CAT(169)
2 CLASS(169)  
2 DPNO(169)
CHAR( 2 ) ,  
P IC '9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 ' ,  
CHAR( 8 ) ,
P IC '99 '  
P IC '99 '  
CHAR(l) 
P I C '9 ' ,  
P I C '9 ' ,  
P I C ' 9 ' , 
P I C '9 ' ;
P I C ' ( 1 ) 9 ' ,
ON ENDFILE(IAIN) EOF = ' l ' B ;
ON ENDFILE(ROEIN) BEGIN;ROE.SIN * '9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 ';
PUT SKIP EDIT( ' END OF ROE F IL E ') (A) ; END;
ON ENDFILE(UIIN) BEGIN;UI.SIN = '9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 ';
PUT SKIP EDIT( ' END OF UI F IL E ') (A ) ; END;
READ FILE(ROEIN) INTO(ROE);
READ FILE(IAIN) INTO(IA);
READ FILE(UIIN) INTO(UI);
/ *  READS IN A FILE WITH THE NUMBERS WHICH CORRESPOND TO
C 
J
L
JANUARY 1987 TO DECEMBER- 1990 (85 TO 132) */
DO I = 1 TO 48;
READ FILE(RANDIN) INTO (TEMP);
RAND(I) = RND;
END;
DO WHILE( i E O F ) ;
IF ROE.SIN < IA.SIN THEN 
READ FILE(ROEIN) INTO(ROE);
ELSE IF UI.SIN < IA.SIN THEN 
READ FILE(UIIN) INTO(UI);
ELSE BEGIN;
/* WELFARE (IA) FILE IS IN REVERSE ORDER TO UI AND
ROE FILES. THIS PUTS THE VARIABLE PGM INTO THE RIGHT ORDER.*/
DO I = 1 TO 169;
PGM(170-I) = I A . I M P (I );
END;
/* RANDOMLY SEARCHES PERIOD FROM JANUARY 1987 TO DECEMBER 
FOR A  MONTH IN WHICH THE INDIVIDUAL RECEIVED WELFARE. */
K  = K  + 1;
IF K > 47 THEN K a 0;
J a K;
FOUND = ' 0' B ;
DO I s 1 TO 48 WHILE (-.FOUND);
J a J + 1;
IF J > 48 THEN J = 1;
IF PGM(RAND(J)) a 3 THEN BEGIN;
FOUND a *l'B;
STT * RAND(J);
END;
END;
IF I < 48 THEN BEGIN;
/* COUNT THE NUMBER OF MONTHS SINCE LAST RECEIPT OF UI. */
DUI1 = 0;
FOUND = '0 'B;
IF UI.SIN a IA.SIN THEN
DO I a STT-1 TO STT - 24 BY -1 WHILE(^FOUND);
IF UI.BEN(I) > 0 THEN BEGIN;
DUI1 a STT - I;
FOUND * 'l'B;
END;
END;
/* COUNT THE NUMBER OF MONTHS OF UI BENEFITS IN EACH OF THE 
PREVIOUS TWO YEARS. */
CUI1,CUI2 a 0;
IF UI.SIN a IA.SIN THEN 
DO I a STT-12 TO STT - 1;
IF UI.BEN(I) > 0 THEN CUI1 a CUI1 + 1;
END;
IF UI.SIN a IA.SIN THEN 
D O  I a STT-24 TO STT - 13;
IF UI.BEN(I) > 0 THEN CUI2 a CUI2 + 1;
END;
C 
J
/* COUNT THE NUMBER OF INSURABLE WEEKS ON ROE'S ISSUED 
WITHIN THE PREVIOUS FOUR MONTHS. */
TMPWKS,W E EKS,CWKS = 0;
IF ROE.SIN a IA.SIN THEN 
DO I = STT-4 TO STT - 1;
IF INWK1 (I) “«= '**' THEN TMPWKS = INWKl(I);
IF TMPWKS > WEEKS THEN WEEKS = TMPWKS ;
IF INWK2(I) '**' THEN TMPWKS = INWK2(I);
IF TMPWKS > WEEKS THEN WEEKS = TMPWKS?
END?
/* SUM THE INSURABLE EARNINGS OVER EACH OF THE PREVIOUS 2 YEARS */
CEARN1,CEARN2 = 0?
IF ROE.SIN = IA.SIN THEN 
DO I r STT-12 TO STT - 1;
IF INEARN1 (I) -,= '*****' & INWKl(I) -•= '**' & INWKl(I) -•= '00'
THEN CEARN1 a CEARN1 + 4 .3*INEARNl(I)/INWK1(I)?
ELSE IF INEARN2(I ) -,= '*****' fc INWK2(I) '**' Sc INWK2(I) ia '00
THEN CEARN1 = CEARN1 + 4 .3*INEARN2(I)/INWK2(I)?
END?
IF ROE.SIN * IA.SIN THEN 
DO I = STT-24 TO STT - 13?
IF INEARN1 (I ) -,= '*****' & INWKl(I) -.= '**' & INWKl(I) '00'
THEN CEARN2 = CEARN2 + 4.3*INEARN1(I )/INWK1(I )?
ELSE IF INEARN2 (I ) is'*****' & INWK2(I) '**' & INWK2(I) -»a '00
THEN CEARN2 = CEARN2 + 4.3*INEARN2(I )/INWK2(I )?
END?
/* FIND PERCENTAGE ON WELFARE 6 MONTHS LATER BY EACH VARIABLE. */
IF PGM(STT + 6) > 0 THEN DEP * 1? ELSE DEP a 0?
DIFF a CEARN1 - CEARN2?
INDDIFF a TRUNC(DIFF/1000) ?
INDDIFF = INDDIFF + 1 0 ?
IF INDDIFF < 0 THEN INDDIFF = 0?
IF INDDIFF > 2 0  THEN INDDIFF a 20?
DISTDIF(INDDIFF) a DISTDIF(INDDIFF) + 1?
IF PGM (STT + 6) > 0 THEN DISTDIFP( INDDIFF) = DISTDIFP( INDDIFF) + 1 
DISTUI(CUI1) a DISTUI(CUI1) + 1?
IF PGM (STT + 6) > 0 THEN DISTUIP(CUI1) a DISTUIP(CUIl) + 1?
DISTDUI(DUI1) a DISTDUI(DUI1) + 1 ?
IF PGM(STT + 6) > 0 THEN DISTDUIP(DUI1) a DISTDUIP(DUI1) + 1? 
DISTUI2 (CUI2) = DISTUI2(CUI2) + 1?
IF PGM(STT + 6) > 0 THEN DISTUIP2(CUI2) = DISTUIP2(CUI2) + 1?
IF WEEKS > 50 THEN WEEKS a 50?
DISTINWK(WEEKS) = DISTINWK(WEEKS) + 1?
IF PGM (STT + 6) > 0 THEN DISTINWKP (WEEKS) = DISTINWKP (WEEKS) + 1?
IF CEARN1 a 0 THEN INDEARN = 0?
ELSE INDEARN = TRUNC(CEARN1/100) + 1?
IF INDEARN > 20 THEN INDEARN a 20?
DEARN( INDEARN) a DEARN( INDEARN) + 1?
IF PGM(STT+6) > 0 THEN DEARNP(INDEARN) =DEARNP(INDEARN) + 1?
IF CEARNl a 0 THEN INDEARNH a 0?
ELSE INDEARNH = TRUNC (CEARNl/1000) + 1?
IF INDEARNH > 20 THEN INDEARNH = 20?
DEARNH(INDEARNH) = DEARNH(INDEARNH) + 1;
IF PGM(STT+6)>0 THEN DEARNHP(INDEARNH)=DEARNHP(INDEARNH) + 1
IF CEARN2 = 0 THEN INDEARN = 0;
ELSE INDEARN = TRUNC(CEARN2/100) + I?
IF INDEARN > 20 THEN INDEARN = 20;
DEARN2(INDEARN) = DEARN2(INDEARN) + 1;
IF PGM(STT+6) > 0 THEN DEARNP2(INDEARN)=DEARNP2(INDEARN) + 1
IF CEARN2 = 0 THEN INDEARNH = 0;
ELSE INDEARNH = TRUNC(CEARN2/1000) + 1;
IF INDEARNH > 20 THEN INDEARNH = 20;
DEARNH2(INDEARNH) = DEARNH2(INDEARNH) + 1;
IF PGM(STT+6)>0 THEN DEARNHP2(INDEARNH)=DEARNHP2(INDEARNH) +
WRITE FILE(OUTFILE) FROM (OUT);
END; /* I < 48 */
READ FILE(IAIN) INTO(IA);
END;
END; /*NOT EOF*/
DO I = 0 TO 24;
PUT SKIP EDIT (DISTDUI (I),DISTDUIP(I))
((2)(X(l),P'(9)9'));
END;
PUT SKIP E D I T (' ') (A);
DO I = 0 TO 20;
PUT SKIP EDIT(DISTDIF(I ),DISTDIFP(I ))
((2)(X{1),P ' (9)9'));
END;
PUT SKIP E D I T (' ')(A);
DO I = 0 TO 12;
PUT SKIP EDIT(DISTUI (I) ,DISTUI2(I),DISTUIP(I) fDISTUIP2(I)) 
((4) (X(1)#P'(9)9'));
END;
PUT SKIP E D I T (' *) (A);
DO I = 0 TO 50;
PUT SKIP EDIT(DISTINWK(I), DISTINWKP (I))
((2)(X(1),P'(9)9'));
END;
PUT SKIP E D I T (' ')(A);
DO I = 0 TO 20;
PUT SKIP EDIT(DEARN(I ),DEARNP(I ),DEAR N H (I),DEARNHP(I ))
((2)(X(l),P# (9)9f));
END;
PUT SKIP E D I T (' ')(A);
DO I = 0 TO 20;
PUT SKIP EDIT(DEARN2 (I), DEARNP2 (I), DEARNH2 (I ),
DEARNHP2(I ))((2)(X(1),P'(9)9')) ;
END;
END MAIN;
/*
//GO.ROEIN DD DSN=HRRSD.E l .ROELONG.AUG2694,UNIT=TAPE,DISPsSHR 
//UIIN DD DSNsHRRSD.El.UILONG.AUG2694,UNIT=TAPE#DISP=SHR 
//IAIN DD DSN=HRRSD.E1.IALONG.AUG2694,DISP=SHR
L
//RANDIN DD DSN=HRRSD.E1.F0RC94 (TEMP) ,DISP=SHR 
//OUTFILE DD DSN=HRRSD.E1.CALCGRP.SEP1894,UNIT=DISK,
// DISPsOLD
//* DISP=(NEW,CATLG,KEEP),
//* DCB=(LRECL=20,RECFM=FB),
//* SPACE=(TRK,(50,5),RLSE)
//*GO.INFILE DD DUMMY 
//★OUTFILE DD DUMMY
C 
j
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Appendix 6: Impacts On UI Dependence
i  C 0 2 8 3
Estimating The Impact On Unemployment Insurance Dependence
An information exchange agreement with Employment and Immigration 
Canada made Unemployment Insurance dependence information on a 
one-in-ten sample of our recipients available for the purposes of this study. Our 
challenge was to track the UI dependence of the program participants and to 
estimate the level of dependence which these recipients would have experienced 
had they not participated in the programs. For the latter, we drew a sample of 
roughly 9000 Income Assistance recipients who did not participate in a program 
and tracked their subsequent UI dependence. For each month following the 
month in which they were selected we modelled the probability of receiving UI 
as a function of various personal characteristics. The variables used were:
• CLASS which took the value one if the recipient was classified as 
unemployable;
• CAT1 which took the value one if the recipient was a single female;
• CAT2 which took the value one if the case was a couple;
• CAT3 which took the value one if the case was a two-parent family;
• CAT4 which took the value one if the case was a one-parent family;
• IAHIST the number of months of LA benefits paid to the case in the previous 
25 months;
• UIHIST the number of months of UI benefits paid to the recipient in the 
previous 24 months;
• DUI which took the value one if the recipient had received any UI in the 
previous two years;
• UI2 UIHIST squared;
• ONUISTRT which took the value one if the recipient received any UI in the 
month in which he/she entered the program or was selected for the 
comparison group;
• PGM1 which took the value one if the recipient participated in CTETP;
• PGM2 which took the value one if the recipient participated in EOP;
• PGM3 which took the value one if the recipient participated in EYC;
• PGM6 which took the value one if the recipient participated in FEP.
The results of these 36 regressions were used to simulate the UI dependence of 
the program participants in each month by multiplying the average value for 
each characteristic of the participants in each program by the relevant coefficient. 
This value could then be compared with the actual percentage of the participants 
receiving UI.
The technique used was OLS, which is unbiased but inefficient. Efficiency was 
not considered to be a major consideration, given the sample size of the 
comparison group. Using OLS enabled us to do the simulations without 
converting the hundreds of z values to probabilities, as would have been 
required if we had used the fully efficient maximum-likelihood probit analysis.
The regression results for four of the months follow.
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*-* LIMDEP *-* F i l e  cr e a te d  0 6 /0 8 /9 2  /  15:09:16  
MODEL COMMAND:
REGRESS;LHS=ONUI3M;RHS=REGS$
O r d in a ry lea s t  sq uares r e g r e s s io n .  Dep. V ariab le
O bservations = 10688 Weights
Mean o f  LHS — 0.4425524E-01 Std Dev o f LHS
StdDev o f  r e s id u a l s = 0.1816618E+00 Sum o f squares
R-squared = 0.2208684E+00 Adjusted R- squared
F [ 14, 10673] = 0.2161132E+03
L o g - l ik e l ih o o d — 0.3071433E+04 R estr b=0) Log-
Amemiya Pr. C r i t e r . =--0.5719372E+00 Akaike I n f o . C r i t .
ANOVA Source V a r ia t io n Degrees o f  Freedom
R eg r ess io n 0.9984738E+02 14.
R esidu a l 0.3522199E+03 10673.
T ota l 0.4520673E+03 10687.
Durbin-Watson s t a t . — 1.9813331 A u to c o r r e la t io n
V a r ia b le C o e f f i c i e n t Std .  Error t - r a t i o Prob1t
Constant 0.21784 0.1366E-01 15.952 0.00000
CLASS ■0.88481E-02 0.3973E-02 -2 .2 2 7 0.02594
CAT1 0.30270E-03 0.5140E-02 0.059 0.95303
CAT2 0.14784E-01 0.1036E-01 1 .428 0.15339
CAT3 0.18767E-01 0.6829E-02 2 .748 0.00599
CAT4 0.13897E-02 0.4329E-02 0.321 0.74818
IAHIST ■0.14246E-02 0.2231E-03 -6 .3 8 6 0.00000
UIHIST 0.24182E-01 0.2744E-02 -8 .8 1 4 0.00000
DUI 0.17406 0 . 1310E-01 ■13.291 0.00000
UI2 0.70161E-03 0.1385E-03 5.066 0.00000
ONUISTRT 0.37886 0 . 8985E-02 42.163 0.00000
PGM1 0 . 62091E-03 0.1228E-01 0.051 0.95969
PGM2 0 . 18568E-01 0.7375E-02 2 .518 0.01181
PGM 3 0 . 40089E-01 0.4072E-01 -0 .9 8 4 0.32487
PGM6 0 . 22827E-01 0.1886E-01 1 .210 0.22621
r ONUI3M 
= ONE
= 0.2056713E+00  
= 0.3522199E+03  
= 0 .2198464E+00
= 0.1737702E+04
= 0 .3304734E-01  
Mean Square
0.7131956E+01
0 . 3300102E-01
0.4230067E-01
: 0 .0093334
Mean o f  X S td .D e v .o f  X
0.36171 0.48052
0.17683 0.38155
0 . 31250E-01 0 .17400
0 . 81306E-01 0.27332
0.34113 0.47411
17.463 8.8160
1.9161 4.2763
0.78948 0.40769
21.957 59.814
0.50243E-01 0.21846
0.21239E-01 0.14419
0 . 61845E-01 0.24089
0.18713E-02 0.43220E-01
0.88885E-02 0 . 93863E-01
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MODEL COMMAND:
REGRESS?LHS=ONUI9M;RHS=REGS$
O r d in ary least  squares r e g r e s s io n .  Dep. V a r ia b le  = ONUI9M
O b servations = 10688 Weights = ONE
Mean o f  LHS - 0.7438249E-01 Std.Dev o f  LHS = 0.2624046E+00
stdDev o f  r e s id u a l s = 0.2463255E+00 Sum o f squares = 0 . 6475978E+03
R-squared = 0.1199514E+00 Adjusted R-squared = 0.1187970E+00
F [ 14, 10673] - 0.1039099E+03
L o g - l ik e l ih o o d = --0.1831389E+03 R e s t r . ( b=0) Log-■1 = - 0 . 8659853E+03
Amemiya Pr. C r i t e r . — 0 . 3707688E-01 Akaike I n f o . C r i t . = 0 .6076142E-01
ANOVA Source V a r ia t io n Degrees o f  Freedom Mean Square
R egress ion 0 . 8826815E+02 14. 0 . 6304868E+01
R esidu a l 0 . 6475978E+03 10673. 0 .6067627E-01
T ota l 0.7358659E+03 10687. 0 . 6885617E-01
Durbin-Watson s t a t . = 2.0136416 A u to c o r r e la t io n - -0 .0 0 6 8 2 0 8
V ariab le C o e f f i c i e n t S td . Error t - r a t i o Prob1t 1 >x Mean o f  X iS td .D e v .o f  X
Constant 0.14480 0 . 1852E-01 7 .820 0.00000
CLASS - 0 . 31752E-01 0.5387E-02 -5 .8 9 4 0.00000 0 .36171 0.48052
CATl - 0 . 11958E-01 0 . 6969E-02 -1 .7 1 6 0.08618 0 .17683 0.38155
CAT2 0.28421E-02 0.1404E-01 0.202 0.83960 0.31250E-01 0 .17400
CAT3 -0 .16171E -02 0 . 9259E-02 - 0 .1 7 5 0.86136 0.81306E-01 0 .27332
CAT4 - 0 . 50709E-02 0.5870E-02 -0 .8 6 4 0.38764 0.34113 0.47411
IAHIST -0 .13603E -02 0.3025E-03 -4 .4 9 7 0.00001 17.463 8 .8160
UIHIST -0 .32249E -02 0.3720E-02 -0 .8 6 7 0.38603 1-9161 4.2763
DUI - 0 . 69169E-01 0.1776E-01 -3 .8 9 5 0.00010 0.78948 0.40769
UI2 0 . 16501E-03 0.1878E-03 0.879 0.37960 21 .957 59 .814
ONUISTRT 0 . 89039E-01 0.1218E-01 7 .308 0.00000 0.50243E-01 0.21846
PGM1 0.36331 0.1666E-01 21.811 0.00000 0.21239E-01 0.14419
PGM2 0 . 16633T0. 1000E-01 16.633 0.00000 0.61845E-01 0.24089
PGM3 0.32996 0.5522E-01 5 .976 0.00000 0.18713E-02 0.43220E-01
PGM6 0.31304 0.2558E-01 12.239 0.00000 0.88885E-02 0.93863E-01
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MODEL COMMAND:
REGRES S ; LHS=ONU118M;RHS=REGS $
O r d in a ry lea st  squares r e g r e s s io n .  
O b servations  
Mean o f  LHS 
StdDev o f  r e s id u a l s  
R-squared  
F [ 14, 10378]
L o g - l ik e l ih o o d  
Amemiya Pr. C r i t e r .
ANOVA Source 
R eg r ess io n  
R esidu a l  
T otal  
Durbin-Watson s t a t .
V a r ia b le
Constant
CLASS
CAT1
CAT2
CAT3
CAT4
IAHIST
UIHIST
DU I
Ul2
ONUISTRT 
PGM1 
PGM2 
PGM 3 
PGM 6
10393
= 0.8717406E-01  
= 0.2739533E+00 
= 0.5821763E-01  
= 0. 4582364E+02 
= -0.1282691E+04  
= 0.2497241E+00 
V a r ia t io n  
0 . 4814716E+02 
0.7788731E+03 
0.8270203E+03  
= 1.9836557  
C o e f f i c i e n t  Std . Error t - r a t i o
0.13211 0 . 2082E-01 6 .346
- 0 . 43720E-01 0.6040E-02 -7 .2 3 9
- 0 . 96642E-02 0.7863E-02 -1 .2 2 9
- 0 . 54831E-02 0.1593E-01 -0 .3 4 4
0 . 31830E-02 0.1044E-01 0.305
- 0 . 16366E-01 0 . 6615E-02 -2 .4 7 4
- 0 . 11964E-02 0.3414E-03 -3 .5 0 4
0.22480E-03 0.4199E-02 0.054
-0 .26048E -01  0.1997E-01 -1 .3 0 4
0.18943E-03 0.2127E-03 0.891
0 . 89396E-01 0.1376E-01 6.499
0.17215 0.2118E-01 8.128
0 .16598 0 . 1335E-01 12.429
0.15351 0 . 6141E-01 2 .500
0 .12555 0.3306E-01 3 .798
Dep. V ar iab le
Weights  
Std Dev o f  LHS 
Sum o f  squares  
Adjusted R-squared
R estr . (b = 0 )  
Akaike i n f o . C r i t .  
Degrees o f  Freedom 
14. 
10378.  
10392.
= ONUI18M 
= ONE
= 0.2821035E+00  
= 0.7788731E+03  
= 0.5694716E-01
Log~l= -0.1594383E+04  
= 0 .7515873E-01  
Mean Square 
0 . 3439083E+01 
0 . 7505041E-01  
0.7958240E-01
A u to c o r r e la t io n
P rob ltI> x  
0.00000  
0.00000  
0.21902  
0.73071  
0.76056  
0.01336  
0.00046  
0.95731  
0.19211  
0.37320  
0.00000  
0.00000 
0.00000 
0.01243  
0.00015
Mean o f  X
0.36861  
0.17743  
0.30886E-01  
0 . 81401E-01 
0 .34427  
17.577  
1 .8787  
0.79323  
21 .558  
0 . 50419E-01 
0.16550E-01  
0.42913E-01  
0.19244E-02  
0 . 67353E-02
= 0 . 
Std.
0.
0.
0.
0 .
0.
8 .
4.
0.
59.
0.
0.
0.
0 .
0.
0081721 
D ev .o f  X
48245
38205
17302
27346
47515
7842
2462
40501
416
21882
12758
20267
43828E-01
81796E-01
t C 0 2 8 8
MODEL COMMAND:
REGRESS; LHS=ONUI3 OM;RHS=REGS$
O r d in a ry lea s t  squares r e g r e s s io n .  Dep. V a r ia b le  = ONUI30M
O b servations  = 10071 Weights = ONE
Mean of: LHS — 0 . 1057492E+00 Std.Dev o f LHS = 0.3075316E+00
StdDev o f  r e s id u a l s - 0 . 3030612E+00 Sum o f squares = 0.9236041E+03
R-squared = 0.3021179E-01 Adjusted R-squared = 0 .2886165E-01
F[ 14, 100561 = 0 . 2237674E+02
L o g - l ik e l ih o o d = --0.2259657E+04 R estr . (<b>=0) Log-1 = - 0 . 2414134E+04
Amemiyai Pr. C r i t e r . = 0 . 4517242E+00 Akaike I n f o . C r i t . = 0 . 9198287E-01
ANOVA Source V a r ia t io n Degrees o f  Freedom Mean Square
R eg r ess io n 0.2877302E+02 14. 0.2055215E+01
R esidu a l 0 . 9236041E+03 10056. 0 . 9184607E-01
T ota l 0 . 9523771E+03 10070. 0 . 9457568E-01
Durbin- Watson s t a t . — 2.0321442 A u to c o r r e la t io n  = -0 .0160721
V a r ia b le  C o e f f i c i e n t Std . Error t - r a t i o P r o b I t1< X Mean o f  X S td .D ev .o f  X
CLASS -0 .43274E -01 0 . 6734E-02 -6 .4 2 6 0.00000 0.37722 0.48472
CAT1 -0 .32975E -01 0 . 8812E-02 -3 .7 4 2 0.00018 0.17933 0.38364
CAT2 -0 .22180E -01 0 . 1804E-01 -1 .2 2 9 0 .21900 0.30384E-01 0.17165
CAT3 0.38018E-02 0.1177E-01 0.323 0.74675 0.81025E-01 0.27289
CAT4 -0 .17527E -01 0 . 7430E-02 -2 .3 5 9 0.01833 0.34684 0.47599
IAHIST -0 .11170E -02 0.3840E-03 -2 .9 0 9 0.00363 17 .691 8.7607
UIHIST -0 .72732E -02 0.4753E-02 -1 .5 3 0 0.12597 1.8341 4 .2001
DUI - 0 . 66157E-01 0.2255E-01 -2 .9 3 4 0.00334 0.79714 0.40215
UI2 0.65614E-03 0.2409E-03 2.724 0.00645 21.003 58 .780
ONUISTRT 0.28068E-01 0.1546E-01 1.816 0.06941 0 . 50839E-01 0.21968
PGM1 0 . 90794E-01 0 . 3569E-01 2.544 0.01096 0.72485E-02 0.84833E-01
PGM2 0 . 66461E-01 0.1936E-01 3.433 0.00060 0.25122E-01 0 .15650
PGM3 0.12293 0 . 6794E-01 1.809 0.07038 0 . 19859E-02 0 . 44521E-01
PGM6 - 0 . 31107E-01 0.4819E-01 -0 .6 4 6 0.51857 0.39718E-02 0 . 62900E-01
Appendix C: Details Of Analysis Relating To
Job Club
0 GO2 9 0
Analyzing The Level of Benefits Received by Participants in the 
Region A Job Action Pilot Project___________________________
Unfortunately more people with dependents were randomly selected into the 
participant group of the Job Action Pilot Project, so they were entitled to a higher 
average level of benefits than the control group. The variables which determine 
eligibility, number of dependents, classification and category are known and can 
be used as explanatory variables. Benefits received will vary from maximum 
entitlement as a result of variable shelter costs, which we expect to be 
uncorrelated with program participation, eligibility for other allowances, which 
may be correlated with program participation (eg work clothing) and income, 
which we expect to be correlated with program participation.
Each month in which an individual in the study received benefits generated a 
data point. Results are given below.
*-* LIMDEP *-* F i l e  cr ea ted  0 1 /0 3 /9 2  /  10:14:55  
Reading f i l e  REGABEN.DAT 
MODEL COMMAND:
CRMODEL;LHS=BEN;RHS=ONE,D l.D 2 .D 3 .CAT3. CAT4, CATS. XCLASS,PI, P2, P3, P4, P5$
O r d in a ry lea s t  sq uares  
O b serva tion s  =
Mean o f  LHS 
StdDev o f  r e s id u a l s  
R-squared  
F( 12. 1886]
L o g - l ik e l ih o o d  
Amemiya Pr. C r i t e r .  
ANOVA Source 
R egress ion  
Residual  
Total
r e g r e s s io n .
1899
= 0.4517841E+03  
= 0.1309431E+03
= 0.4752677E*00  
= 0.1423511E+03  
= - 0 . 1194522E+05 
= 0 . 1259422E+02 
v a r i a t i o n  
0. 2928919E+08 
0.3233753E+08 
0.6162671E+08
Dep. V ariab le  
Weights 
StdDev o f  LHS 
Sum o f  squares
= BEN 
= ONE
= o.: = o.:
1801924E+03 
3233753E+08 
Adjusted R-squared = 0.4719290E+00
Degrees o f  Freedom 
12 .
1886.
1898.
Restrfa=0>  
Akaike I n fo .  
Mean Square 
0.2440765E+07  
0 . 1714609E+0S 
0 . 3246929E+05
Log-1 * -0.1255752E+05  
C r i t .  * 0.1726347E+05
Durbin-Watson s t a t .  
V a r ia b le C o e f f i c ie n t
= 1.5359713  
Std . Error t - r a t i o
A u to co r re la t io n  = 0. 
o r o b l t l> x  Mean o f  X
.2320143
S td .D e v .o f  X
Constant 412 .06 3.571 115.402 0.00000
Dl 282 .29 19.00 14.860 0.00000 0.56345E-01 0 .23065
D2 512.41 23 .29 22.004 0.00000 0 . 35282E-01 0.18454
D3 643.05 29 .30 21.945 0.00000 0.17904E-01 0.13264
CAT3 39 .430 36.62 1.077 0.28155 0.78989E-02 0.88547E-01
CAT4 -2 5 3 .8 4 32.12 -7 .9 0 4 0.00000 0 . 16324E-01 0.12675
CAT5 - 1 4 .5 2 0 20 .66 -0 .703 0.48928 0.62138E-01 0.24147
XCLASS 72 .809 19.58 3.718 0.00030 0.24223E-01 0 .15378
Pi -7 .2 3 5 7 12.89 -0 .561 0.58183 0.58452E-01 0 .23466
P2 -14 .0 3 1 14.86 -0 .944 0.34770 0.43181E-01 0 .20332
P3 -2 3 .2 2 6 15.80 -1 .4 7 0 0.13743 0.37915E-01 0.19104
P4 -6 .9 9 5 1 16.97 -0 .4 1 2 0.68263 0 . 32649E-01 0 .17776
P5 -2 3 .3 9 5 18 .15 -1 .2 8 9 0.19426 0.28436E-01 0 .16626
XCLASS 72.517 19.57 3 .705 0.00031 0.24223E-01 0 .15378
End cmnd. en try  from e d i t o r
0 0 0 2 9 1
The variables used were:
• Di took the value 1 if the case had i dependents;
• CATC took the value 1 if the case was a couple;
• CAT4 took the value 1 if the case was a two parent family;
• CATC took the value 1 if the case was a one parent family;
• XCLASS took the value 1 if the case was classified as unemployable;
• Pi took the value 1 if the case was selected for Job Action, and the benefits 
were paid i months after selection.
Confirming Random Selection In The Job Action Control Group
It is always possible for workers to subvert the random assignment process and 
substitute clients of their choosing for those randomly selected. If workers are 
successful in substituting clients, and if the clients which they choose have 
characteristics which are different from the group as a whole, then once again 
we will face the problem of not knowing whether the difference in the outcome 
is due to the different characteristics or to the program itself.
In so far as the characteristics have been measured, the extent of the substitution 
(contamination) can be identified. The table below lists the means of a number 
of different characteristics for the participants and the control group. In no case 
is the difference between the means statistically significant - the difference is not 
twice the standard deviation of the difference. We can conclude that if the 
random assignment process was subverted, it was not subverted to such a 
degree that it was detectable with this sample size.
0 G 0 2 9 2
The variables used were:
• Di took the value 1 if the case had i dependents;
• CAT3 took the value 1 if the case was a couple;
• CAT4 took the value 1 if the case was a two parent family;
• CAT5 took the value 1 if the case was a one parent family;
• XCLASS took the value 1 if the case was classified as unemployable;
• Pi took the value 1 if the case was selected for Job Action, and the benefits 
were paid i months after selection.
Confirming Random Selection In The Job Action Control Group
It is always possible for workers to subvert the random assignment process and 
substitute clients of their choosing for those randomly selected. If workers are 
successful in substituting clients, and if the clients which they choose have 
characteristics which are different from the group as a whole, then once again 
we will face the problem of not knowing whether the difference in the outcome 
is due to the different characteristics or to the program itself.
In so far as the characteristics have been measured, the extent of the substitution 
(contamination) can be identified. The table below lists the means of a number 
of different characteristics for the participants and the control group. In no case 
is the difference between the means statistically significant - the difference is not 
twice the standard deviation of the difference. We can conclude that if the 
random assignment process was subverted, it was not subverted to such a 
degree that it was detectable with this sample size.
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Appendix D: Regression Results: Impact of 
programs on employment
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The Impact o f the Program on Employment
Information on the subsequent employment of the participants was gathered from the 
survey. In addition to the variables retained in the administrative records, survey records 
contained information on schooling and employment history. The variables APS and AUN 
take the value one if the recipients had received any post-secondary education or any 
university education. The variable SCH contained the number of years of elementary and 
high school completed. EMPHIST is the number of months of employment history. PGM4 
takes the value one if the recipient participated in Job Action. This variable is a remnant of 
a failed attempt to include participants in Job Action from other than the Region A Job 
Action Pilot project in the study. The attempt was dropped when it became clear in 
conversations with contractors that they were only reporting their successes. PGM5 takes 
the value one if the recipient participated in the Forestry program.
Full information was available for 1,077 observations. 1,422 respondents answered the 
question “Are you working now?” The information on the missing explanatory variables 
(schooling and employment history variables) was filled using the technique outlined by 
Griliches. The technique used was maximum-likelihood probit.
The results follow for the question “Are you working now?”
Binomial Probit Model 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Log-Likelihood..................................  -960.2569
Restricted (Slopes=0) Log-L  -985.4527
Chi-Squared (16)................................  50.39162
Significance Level...............   0.1985276E-04
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio
Constant -1.0051 0.2793 -3.598
AGE 0.23397E-03 0.3405E-03 0.687
SCH 0.86639E-01 0.2267E-01 3.821
APS -0.38096E-02 0.6987E-01 -0.055
AUN -0.51158E-01 0.9923E-01 -0.516
CLASS -0.18278E-01 0.924 IE-01 -0.198
CATI -0.16685 0.8714E-01 -1.915
CAT2 0.41538E-01 0.1835 0.226
CAT3 0.33024 0.1312 2.518
CAT4 0.31632 0.1021 3.097
EMPHIS
T
0.59811E-03 0.1424E-02 0.420
IAMST -0.14820E-01 0.5279E-02 -2.807
PGMI 0.24283E-02 0.1004 0.024
PGM2 0.27751 0.9312E-01 2.980
PGM3 0.12248 0.1656 0.740
PGM4 0.20878 0.1033 2.021
PGM5 -0.56430 0.3473 -1.625
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Appendix E: Limdep Commands for Monte 
Carlo Study
OPEN ;output=monte.rot$
calc;al =0;a2=0;a3=0;a4=0;c3=0;c4=0$
matrix;olsa=[0];tslsa=[0];hecka=[0];heckb=[0];
cnt3=[0];cnt4=[0]$
do for, iters;i = 1,100$ 
sample; 1-10000$
create; xl=mn(0,50);x2=mn(0,50);x3=mn(0,10); 
el=mn(0,50); bias=mn(0,50); 
e2=mn(0,50);
in=xl + x2 + x3 + el + bias; 
t=in>0;
y=xl + x2 + 40*t +e2 + bias; 
if (y>246) y=246; 
if (y<-226) y= -226$
2sls;lhs=y;rhs=one,t,x 1 ,x2;inst=one,x 1 ,x2,x3$
calc;a3=a3+b(2);a2=a2+varb(2,2)$
enddo;iters$
probit;lhs=t;rhs=one,x 1 ,x2,x3 ;hold results$ 
select;lhs=y;rhs=one,t,x 1 ,x2;all$ 
calc;a3=a3+b(2);a2=a2+varb(2,2)$
enddo;iters$
matiix;olsa=[olsa/al];tslsa=[tslsa/a2];hecka=[hecka/a3];heckb=[heckb/a4];
cnt3=[cnt3/c3];cnt4=[cnt4/c4]$
calc;al=0;a2=0;a3=0;a4=0;c3=0;c4=0$
enddo;samps$
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